In this paper the author provides a brief sketch of an interpretative turn in legal philosophy. In Law’s Empire, Ronald Dworkin advances a new theory of law, complex and intriguing. He calls it law as integrity. Dworkin’s conception of legal philosophy consists not in regarding its task as interpretive, for he advances the problem of what he dubbs the ''semantic sting''. The argument purports to establish the thesis that a theory of law cannot be an explanation of the meaning of the word ''law''. He claims that legal theories like H. L. A. Hart’s theory of law cannot explain the theoretical disagreement in legal practice, because they suffer from this semantic sting. The author agrees with Dworkin that Hart’s explanation of law is stung by semantics. It is his Dworkin’s main argument to deny that there is a possible alternative to his way of conceiving the task of legal philosophy. The author argues that the importance of Dworkin’s interpretative turn is not that it provides a substitute for ''semantic theories of law'', but that it provides a new conception of jurisprudence. and Marek Neština