Two-month-old seedlings of Sophora davidii were subjected to a randomized complete block design with three water (80, 40, and 20 % of water field capacity, i.e. FC80, FC40, and FC20) and three N supply [N0: 0, Nl: 92 and Nh: 184 mg(N) kg-1(soil)] regimes. Water stress produced decreased leaf area (LA) and photosynthetic pigment contents, inhibited photosynthetic efficiency, and induced photodamage in photosystem 2 (PS2), but increased specific leaf area (SLA). The decreased net photosynthetic rate (PN) under medium water stress (FC40) compared to control (FC80) might result from stomatal limitations, but the decreased PN under severe water deficit (FC20) might be attributed to non-stomatal limitations. On the other hand, N supply could improve photosynthetic capacity by increasing LA and photosynthetic pigment contents, and enhancing photosynthetic efficiency under water deficit. Moreover, N supply did a little in alleviating photodamages to PS2 caused by water stress. Hence water stress was the primary limitation in photosynthetic processes of S. davidii seedlings, while the photosynthetic characters of seedlings exhibited positive responses to N supply. Appropriate N supply is recommended to improve photosynthetic efficiency and alleviate photodamage under water stress. and F. Z. Wu ... [et al.].
Searle’s conception of ontological emergence is a basis for his explanation of mind and consciousness in the physical world. In this article, I try to show that a closer examination uncovers some possible ambiguities in Searle’s conception of emergence. First, I try to show that Searle’s distinction between emergent1 and emergent2 leads to a distinction between a strong and a weak interpretation of a causal consequence of interactions among constitutive entities and that from this point of view the existence of emergent2 is improbable only in the strong sense. Second, I attempt to clarify Searle’s distinction between explanation and deduction of consciousness in his claim for the non-deducibility of consciousness . At the end I try to show in what sense is Searle’s concept of emergence loaded with a form of mechanicism, one which is being abandoned in more recent ontological conceptions., Searleovo pojetí ontologického vzestupu je základem pro jeho vysvětlení mysli a vědomí ve fyzickém světě. V tomto článku se snažím ukázat, že bližší zkoumání odhaluje některé možné nejasnosti v Searlově pojetí vzniku. Nejprve se snažím ukázat, že Searleův rozdíl mezi vznikajícím1 a vznikajícím2 vede k rozlišení mezi silným a slabým výkladem příčinných důsledků interakcí mezi konstitutivními entitami a že z tohoto hlediska je existence vznikajícího2 nepravděpodobná pouze v silných smyslu. Za druhé, snažím se objasnit Searleovo rozlišení mezi vysvětlení a dedukcívědomí v jeho tvrzení o neodvoditelnosti vědomí. V závěru se snažím ukázat, v jakém smyslu je Searleův koncept vzniku naplněn formou mechanismu, který je opuštěn v novějších ontologických koncepcích., and Vladimír Havlík