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Start Over Creator Marvan, Tomáš Rights http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/

2. Jeden svět stačí. Poznámka ke Goodmanově tezi o mnohosti aktuálních světů

Creator:
Marvan, Tomáš
Type:
article, model:article, and TEXT
Language:
Czech
Description:
The paper falls into two parts. In the first part, the principles of Goodman's worldmaking relevant to his thesis of multiple actual worlds are briefly expounded. In the second part it is argued that alleged examples of multiple actual worlds are spurious and that the thesis inself leads to absurd consequences.
Rights:
http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public

4. Romulus, Scott a Klára Issová. Kdy vlastní jména zkracují deskripce?

Creator:
Marvan, Tomáš
Type:
article, model:article, and TEXT
Language:
Czech
Description:
In his conception of the semantics of proper names, Russell combines, in his typical fashion, philosophy of language and epistemology. The resulting theory is fairly complex and difficult to reconstruct. The paper does not purport to give an exhaustive reconstruction of Russell’s theory, but only to answer the central question: in which cases do ordinary proper names abbreviate definite descriptions? The primary aim of the paper is to show that the “orthodox” interpretation, according to which all ordinary proper names abbreviate descriptions, is correct. The secondary aim is to demonstrate the falsity of an alternative interpretation, according to which there are two kinds of meaning of proper names: private and public.
Rights:
http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public

5. Searle on external realism and ''Priviledged conceptual scheme''

Creator:
Marvan, Tomáš
Format:
bez média and svazek
Type:
model:article and TEXT
Subject:
John Searle, external realism, constructivism, conceptual relativity, Privilege Conceptual Scheme, konceptuální relativita, konstruktivismus, vnější realismus, and koncepční schéma Privilege
Language:
Slovak
Description:
In the paper, I question some of the claims professor Searle makes about external realism, a position I accept. I briefly sum up Searle’s position, and then proceed to the mentioned critique. In particular, the target of my paper is Searle’s claim that external realist is to shun commitment to any particular ontology. I also point out that Searle’s external realism is in some respects difficult to disentangle from ontological constructivism, a position incompatible with external realism. The paper concludes with an apology for the idea of a ''Privileged Conceptual Scheme'' that Searle views as misguided., V příspěvku se ptám na některá tvrzení profesora Searleho o externím realismu, což je postoj, který přijímám. Stručně shrnuji Searlovu pozici a pak přistoupím k uvedené kritice. Hlavním cílem mé práce je Searlovo tvrzení, že externí realista je vyhýbat se závazkům vůči jakékoli ontologii. Poukazuji také na to, že Searleův externí realismus je v některých ohledech obtížně oddělitelný od ontologického konstruktivismu, což je pozice neslučitelná s vnějším realismem. Příspěvek je zakončen omluvou za myšlenku ,,privilegovaného konceptuálního schématu'', který Searle vnímá jako zavádějící., and Tomáš Marvan
Rights:
http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public

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