The truth of an utterance generally depends on what the words uttered mean and what is the current state of the world; but also on the context of the utterance. Within formal semantics this was first accounted for. by Kaplan, by means of explicating meanings as functions from contexts to intensions. Stainaker then brought the attention to the fact that utteraces not only ‘consume’ contexts but also ‘produce’ new ones; and that context is thus what mediates the interplay between subsequent utterances. In this paper we point out that context can be considered either from the viewpoint of the information it contains (which delimits what can be subsequently consistently claimed), or from the viewpoint of individuals which it contains (which determines what can be subsequently succesfully anaphorically referred to). We discuss the possibilities of explicating contexts within the framework of formal semantics and we also discuss the question to which extent contexts belong to semantics.
In his criticism of my book Člověk a pravidla [Man and rules], Michal Ivan scrutinized my notion of implicit rule, concluding that it is flawed. In this contribution, I defend my approach, explaining the notion in greater detail. I state that my talk about the existence of an implicit rule refers to the social setting in which some kinds of social (especially linguistic) actions are governed by normative attitudes of the members of the society. These normative attitudes institute the propriety which make instances of actions of the kinds either correct or incorrect; hence people can follow or violate the rule, the rule can come into being, develop, and fade away - without it being explicitly articulated., Ve své kritice své knize Člověk Pravidla [ Člověk a pravidla ], Michal Ivan prozkoumány mé pojem implicitního pravidla, k závěru, že je chybné. V tomto příspěvku obhajuji svůj přístup a podrobněji vysvětluji pojem. Prohlašuji, že můj rozhovor o existenci implicitního pravidla odkazuje na sociální prostředí, ve kterém jsou některé druhy společenských (zejména jazykových) akcí řízeny normativními postoji členů společnosti. Tyto normativní postoje zakládají vhodnost, která činí případy těchto činů správné nebo nesprávné; lidé tak mohou pravidlo dodržovat nebo porušovat, pravidlo může vzniknout, rozvinout se a zmizet - aniž by to bylo výslovně vyjádřeno., and Jaroslav Peregrin