The aim of this article is to sketch a certain method of indirect reconstruction of the process by which mathematics as a deductive discipline emerged in ancient Greece. We try out this method in a reconstruction of Thales' mathematics, but the main aim for which this method has been developed is the work of Pythagoras. We consider the process of the emergence of mathematics as a process of the constitution of a new language in the framework of which one can carry out deductive proofs. Therefore we base the method of indirect reconstruction of the emergence of mathematics on the theoretical findings in the book L. Kvasz: Vedecká revolúcia ako lingvistická událosť (The Scientific Revolution as a linguistic event, Prague, Filosofia 2013)., Ladislav Kvasz., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The aim of this paper is to show how the theory of an active society by Amitai Etzioni can provide a theoretical framework for the study of innovation processes - in particular social innovation, which is generally defined here as the implementation of a new social practice aimed at solving social problems and/or meeting social needs. An active society is a society in which collectivities (social groups) have the potential to articulate values and needs, to participate in consensus building processes and decision processes, to develop organisational structures and to realise values through collective social action. This paper discusses the general differentiation and interrelation between culture, structure and agency which is the fundament of the theory of an active society and additionally presents a systematisation which combines these domains with the “elements” (consciousness, commitment, knowledge, power) and “processes” (consensus building, mobilisation, decision making, control/guidance) that Etzioni perceives as the main dimensions of the active orientation. This systematisation can be seen as an adaptation of Etzioni’s theory which tries to make the interrelation between different theoretical dimensions more explicit. and Alexander Kesselring.
Tato studie se zaměřuje na způsoby, jakými se standardně vytváří sociální teorie, a to především z hlediska proměn stylu psaní textu. Tvrdí se zde, že celkově vzato způsoby psaní využívané v rámci sociální teorie jsou navzdory proklamacím spíše cvičením v systematickém uchopování zkoumaných jevu než akademicky vyzrálou činností usilující o řešení problému. Na několika vybraných historických příkladech „psaní“ sociální teorie je ukázáno, že neexistuje žádná standardní forma vytváření sociální teorie, jež by překračovala stádium "komentáře“. Na rozdíl od jiných stylů akademického psaní sociální teorie nepoužívá "komentář“ jako součást rozvíjení určité argumentace, nýbrž jako standardní a rutinní způsob vznášení poznávacích nároku. Komentář přitom není výchozí metodou pouze v současných z velké části edukačních a instruktážních podobách sociální teorie, zakládá také způsob práce vůdčích představitelů této oblasti, jejichž příspěvky jsou současnými sociálními teoretiky považovány za originální a hodné důkladné interpretace. Zde rozpracovaná argumentace naznačuje, že neschopnost dospět ke standardní podobě "vytváření“ sociální teorie je důsledkem skutečnosti, že je inspirace pro individuální, autentické, originální či kreativní myšlení čerpána ze zdrojů, jež jsou prostoupeny nepůvodností a často také velmi chaotickou a úpornou snahou prokázat koherenci myšlení, jež se určitým způsobem vztahuje k sociálnímu světu., This article analyzes the practice of making social theory in terms of the changing styles manifested in writing social theory texts. It is claimed that, taken generally, “writing” social theory has not moved beyond its most widespread form of being an exercise in the systematic treatment of the phenomena under study rather than being a genuine problem-solving activity. As demonstrated on selected historical examples of “writing” social theory, it seems evident that there is no standard form or style of “making” social theory apart from commentary. And that social theory, unlike related styles of academic writing, uses “commentary” not as a part of the argument being elaborated, but as a standard and routine way of making knowledge claims. It is argued here that commentary is not the basic method only in the contemporary and largely educational and instructive forms of social theory, but also in the supposedly original achievements of the field’s leading figures. The argument elaborated here suggests that the inability to arrive at a standard form of “making” social theory may be a consequence of individual, authentic, original, creative thinking drawing its inspiration from sources that are heavily derivative and sometimes permeated by very chaotic and strenuous efforts to demonstrate the coherence of the thinking that it some way refers to the social world., and Jan Balon.
This article focuses on the problems and contradictions of sociological theories of action. It investigates critically the development of the theory of action after the Parsonian synthesis, drawing attention to the limitations of articulating the concept of action systematically within a presuppositional framework of analytical theory. Having exposed Parsons general theory of action and some interpretations and criticisms, the paper addresses the so-called “return of grand theory”, spearheaded in the early 1980s by authors such as Alexander, Habermas, Giddens and Luhmann. The article analyses the conceptual innovations introduced by their theories according to Parsons own definition of theoretical work, which - as he said - consists in reconstruction and transformation of categories in the moments of their failure. While it is argued that sociological theory cannot do away with general concepts, it is also argued that these need not have the form of a synthetic theory of action of the kind outlined by Parsons and the Post-Parsonians. and Jan Balon.