This polemical reflection critically investigates the likewise polemical article by Ladislav Hohoš, published in the Filosofický časopis, No.5/2013: “Is social critique exclusively a question of neo-Marxism?”. This piece was itself responding to my polemical study “Social criticism as a problem of neo-Marxism” (Filosofický časopis, No.2/2013). I take Hohoš’s main objections against my polemic in turn, and I reply to them. To this end, I focus on Hohoš’ reproduction, and partial reinterpretation, of Marx’s ideological doctrine of historical materialism, on the basis of which he presents his standpoint. In my polemic I point to the overall unsustainability of his objections, demonstrating the unsustainability of the foundations of Marxist doctrine itself., Miloslav Bednář., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
V příspěvku jde nejprve o otázku, zda Kant ještě ve svém spisku „O rozdílu směrů v prostoru“ z r. 1768 zastává Newtonovo pojetí prostoru, jak se to zdá naznačovat okolnost, že zde Kant mluví o „absolutním prostoru“. Autor se snaží ukázat, že tomu tak není, neboť termín „absolutní prostor“ je třeba interpretovat jinak než jako odkaz k Newtonovu pojetí prostoru. Ve druhé části se příspěvek věnuje hlavnímu tématu zmíněného spisku, jež je tvořeno Kantovou kritikou Leibnizova pojetí prostoru. Leibnizova koncepce se podle Kanta ukazuje jako neudržitelná, neboť se dostává do rozporu s fenomény, když nedokáže vysvětlit existenci inkongruentních protějšků, jakými jsou pravá a levá ruka., This article is firstly concerned with the question of whether Kant still holds Newton’s conception of space in his work Concerning the Distinction of the Directions in Space, as his reference to “absolute space” seems to suggest. The author attempts to show that this is not in fact the case since the term “absolute space” should not be interpreted as referring to Newton’s conception of space. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on the critique of Leibniz’s conception of space that is the main theme of Kant’s aforesaid work. Leibniz’s conception, in Kant’s view, is shown to be inadequate because it comes into conflict with phenomena by not being able to explain the existence of incongruent counterparts, such as right and left hands., and Jindřich Karásek.
This article deals with the fundamental features of Taylor´s concept of recognition and considers some problem areas to which cultural recognition is relevant. Our identity is partly characterized by the recognition or the misrecognition - too often by the misrecognition - of others. The collapse of original social settings has brought a transition from honour to dignity, implying a redefinition of identity and authenticity. The period in which people from western society lived in their pre-determined settings, and with corresponding characters they were called to represent, has lost its relevance today. Taylor distinguishes between the politics of universalism and the politics of difference, both of which are based on the politics of this transition from honour to dignity. Taylor refers to context and particular sociability values, although the community’s perception does not reflect any overly-particularist tendencies. His thesis has universalist elements from which he derives normativity. Universal moral ontology is, according to Taylor’s thesis, a condition for particular values and standards in practice., Martin Solík., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Obsahom článku je kritika chápania autority u Hannah Arendtovej, podľa ktorej patrí k charakteristickým rysom moderného sveta kríza a následná strata autority. Simultánne s autoritou v jej chápaní ustupuje aj sloboda, ktorá je od začiatku 20. storočia vážne ohrozovaná totalitarizmom. Dôvod tvrdenia, že autoritu postihla kríza, ktorá spôsobila jej zánik, je skôr filozofický ako politický, je to relativizmus, skepticizmus a pesimizmus, aký sa objavil v západoeurópskom myslení od konca prvej svetovej vojny. Autoritu je však potrebné odvodzovať nie z ideovo-politickej tradície, ale z reálnych spoločenských podmienok. Musíme ju vnímať na pozadí diferencujúcej reality sveta vyznačujúcej sa spoločenskými protikladmi a bojmi, v ktorej snaha zakonzervovať svet tradičnou autoritou a náboženstvom musí nakoniec skončiť neúspechom. Autorita je tak vec relatívna a oblasti jej aplikácie sa menia v rôznych fázach spoločenského vývinu., The aim of the article is to criticise the concept of authority as presented by Hannah Arendt, who claims that crisis in, and subsequent loss of, authority are typical features of the modern world. The weakening of authority goes hand in hand with the retreat of freedom, which has been seriously jeopardised by totalitarianism since the early-20th century. The reason for the claim that authority is afflicted by crisis, causing its demise, is more philosophical than political; this mixture of relativism, scepticism and pessimism began to take shape in Western European thought after World War II. However, authority should be derived not from an ideological or political tradition, but from real social conditions. It must be seen against the background of the diverging reality of the world characterized by social contradictions and struggles, in which an effort to bind the world by traditional authority and religion must ultimately fail. Yet, authority is a relative concept and so its scope of application varies in different stages of social development., and Peter Dinuš.