In this article, the author presents the starting points for a discussion about cognitive phenomenality and, especially, the introspective arguments in its favor. These are based on the argument of abstracting away, in which we neglect its non-phenomenal parts from the selected cognitive state and the result of the operation is a pure phenomenal sense, associated with the cognitive state. The author describes the process of abstracting away with several examples. Immediately following other examples from the philosophy of emotions, he shows that in spite of its intuitive power, the method of abstracting away does not come with substantiated conclusions. This casts doubt on the strength of the introspective arguments that are raised in favor of cognitive phenomenology, especially in the context of a more general thesis about the unity of mind. Finally, the author comes to the conclusion that cognitive phenomenology needs other than introspective methods to defend itself. and V tejto stati autor predstavuje východiská diskusie o kognitívnej fenomenalite a najmä introspektívne argumenty v jej prospech. Tie sa opierajú o argument odmýšľania, keď od vybraného kognitívneho stavu abstrahujeme jeho nefenomenálne časti a výsledkom operácie je čistý fenomenálny pocit, spojený s kognitívnym stavom. Proces odmýšľania autor popisuje na niekoľkých príkladoch. Vzápätí na iných príkladoch z filozofie emócií ukazuje, že napriek jej intuitívnej sile neprichádza metóda odmýšľania so zdôvodnenými závermi. To spochybňuje silu introspektívnych argumentov vznášaných v prospech kognitívnej fenomenológie, najmä v súvislosti s všeobecnejšou tézou o jednote mysli. Napokon autor v tejto stati dospieva k záveru, že kognitívna fenomenológia potrebuje na svoju obhajobu iné než introspektívne metódy.
The paper reflects a long-term ambiguity in the theoretical concept of affective phenomena. The focal point of this study is the conceptualization of the term “affect” with regard to the other affective phenomena (specifically emotion and mood). Our definition of affect is substantially different than existing Czech terminology and we define affect as the necessary component of all affective processes. Contrary to the Czech traditional concept of affect, we do not attribute characteristics such as “high intensity” or “disorganising influence” on cognitive processes, behaviour, etc. per se. We define affect in accordance with many authors, as a point in the continuum of affective stream and the basic unit of all affective phenomena. Affective phenomena or processes we consider as an umbrella term for a complex phenomenon like affect, emotion, mood, emotional episode, interpersonal attitude, sentiment, passion and so on: their common component is the affect. We consider emotion as a figure that emerges in the affective stream as a complex reaction to the event that has meaning for an individual and is interpreted with respect to the experience, context, individual characteristic, and sociocultural environment of the individual. Contrary to the Czech tradition, emotions are viewed as “just” one type of affective phenomena with a relatively specific definitional framework. The moods are considered parts of the affective stream continuum that have a specific and for consciousness accessible quality. The concepts of affect, emotion and mood discussed in this paper are contrasted; however, we have described where they overlap conceptually. The relationships of all affective phenomena have been considered as interacting with a tendency to synchronize into one (for an individual typical) affective stream., I. Poláčková Šolcová, R. Trnka., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Mezi autory se diskutuje o souvislosti mezi emocionalitou a pocitem ţivotní smysluplnosti. Některé výzkumy tuto souvislost naznačují. Cílem našeho výzkumu bylo zasadit problematiku ţivotní smysluplnosti do kontextu lidské emocionality a zjistit, zda existuje vzájemná souvislost subjektivně pociťovaného emocionálního stavu a ţivotní smysluplnosti. Výzkum byl proveden pomocí dotazníkové metody, konkrétně pouţitím dotazníku smysluplnosti lidské existence Logo-testu a testu PANAS-X1 zaměřeného na zkoumání emocí. Zúčastnili se jej studenti vysokých škol (N=120). K ověření hypotéz bylo provedeno vyhodnocení získaných dat pomocí popisné statistiky. Výsledky výzkumu potvrzují vzájemnou souvislost pozitivních i negativních emocí s vnímanou existenciální frustrací. and The connection between emotionality and meaningfulness of life is often discussed nowadays. Some research results suggest a connection. The goal of our research was to place the problematic of meaningfulness of life into the context of human emocionality and to find out if there is a connection between subjectively experienced meaningfulness and human emocionality. Questionnaires were used as a method of data collection: Logo-test, the questionnaire of life meaningfullness and the PANAS-X test (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule - Expanded Form). The questionnaires were distributed among university students (N=120). To prove the stated hypothesis methods of descriptive statistics were used. The research suggests that both positive and negative emotions are closely associated with perceived existential frustration.