The topic of the presented text is an examination of the relationship between the philosophy of individuation, as elaborated by Gilbert Simondon and later Gilles Deleuze, and the traditional philosophical issue of the individual and the world, which is exemplified by Kantian philosophy. Simondon attempts to elaborate a philosophy of the individual and individuation which departs from the idea of a priori forms of knowledge, and makes use of the concept of the “pre-individual” as a “proto-ontic dimension” as the real totalities defining the potentials of the individual. In so doing, Simondon embarks on a path that ushers in the philosophical programme which Deleuze would attempt to fulfil: in contrast to Kant, who attempts to stipulate the conditions of possible experience, Deleuze - following Simondon, but also Bergson - sets as his objective to define the conditions of real experience, above all in the book Difference and Repetition (Différence et répétition). The paper concludes by suggesting what consequences this reformulation of the issue of the individual and experience has for Deleuze’s interpretation of the concept of difference and intensity., Nicolas Dittmar., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Cieľom tejto štúdie je vyvrátiť časté a stále sa objavujúce kritické námietky voči temer štyri dekády starému Singerovmu antidruhistickému argumentu, ktoré sú založené predovšetkým na jeho nepochopení. Nepochopený je nielen samotný argument, ale aj Singerovo metodologické východisko, ktoré sme nazvali „Singerova etická britva“. V práci ukazujeme, prečo nie je možné zamietnuť Singerov utilitaristický argument len preto, že odmietame utilitarizmus en bloc. Rovnako tak ukazujeme, prečo nie je namieste obviňovať Singera z toho, že nerozšíril svoju etiku aj na rastliny a neživú prírodu. Opak je pravdou, pretože Singer jasne demonštruje, ako môže byť environmentálna etika vzťahujúca sa na ochranu divočiny založena na tom istom princípe rovnakého zvažovania záujmov, vďaka ktorému je druhizmus morálne neprijateľný., The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism., and Peter Sýkora.
The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community., Zuzana Parusniková., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii