Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticiz-ing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? I present and examine the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claim that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. My argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. I will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about my internal mental states is disputable - as I will show - both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view., Empirické zkoušky o mezikulturní variabilitě intuic, známá publikace Sticha a jeho kolegů, kteří kritizovali myšlenkové experimenty a intuice ve filosofických debatách, jsou stále výzvou, před níž stojí analytičtí filozofové, jako jakékoli systematické zkoumání metodologie filosofie musí odpovědět na tyto základní otázky: Co je to intuice? Jakou roli by měly ve filozofii hrát intuice? Předkládám a zkoumám skeptický argument experimentálních filosofů a tvrdím, že experimentální filozofové nepochopili roli důkazu ve filozofii. Můj argument využije Goldmanovy názory, podle kterých intuice dávají spolehlivé (i když neomylné) důkazy o pojetí člověka, a tyto znalosti jsou cenné i pro další filosofický výzkum. Tvrdím, že skeptické závěry experimentálních filosofů jsou proti tomuto pojetí filosofie neškodné, protože i z naturalistického hlediska může být odůvodněn určitý druh intuitivních úsudků o našich pojmech, což poskytuje specifický epistemický stav intuic. Samozřejmě, že spolehlivost introspekce může být zpochybněna. Nicméně popírání sebepoznání mých vnitřních duševních stavů je sporné - jak ukážu já - jak z filozofického, tak vědeckého hlediska., and Péter Hartl
Barry Allen’s criticism of the traditional definition of knowledge seems to share a radical tone with Stephan Vogel’s con-cerns about the customary representation of the causes that lie be-hind our current environmental problems. Both philosophers voice their complaints about the Cartesian picture of the world and dismiss the core idea behind the notorious duality embedded in that picture. What they propose instead is a monistic perspective positing an ar-tifactual networking. In this paper, I will try to draw attention to certain weak aspects of Allen’s refreshing description of knowledge as “superlative artifactual performance” and offer a way to improve that characterization via Vogel’s notion “wildness”. More specifically, I will propose a solution to the problems pertaining to the distinction between good and bad artifacts with respect to the epistemic criteria proposed by Allen, and claim that the temporal gap standing in be-tween the expectations of a designer and the qualities of her design may contribute to our understanding of the nature of an artifact. I maintain that each creative attempt to know a given artifact is to be appreciated by recognizing its different uses. In doing so, I will also try to show why and how certain bad artifacts get their undesir-able status because of leading up to techno-cultural stagnation.