The study situates the events that took place on the Czech borderland on March 4th, 1919 into a greater historical context and refers to the usage of the imagery of the fallen Czech German protestors in contemporary literature. and Článek zahrnuje poznámkový aparát pod čarou
Western moral and political theorists have recently devoted considerable attention to the perceived victimisation of women by non-western cultures. In this paper, the author argues that conceiving injustice to poor women in poor countries primarily as a matter of their oppression by illiberal cultures presents an understanding of their situation that is crucially incomplete. This incomplete understanding distorts Western theorists’ comprehension of our moral relationship to women elsewhere in the world and so of our theoretical task. It also impoverishes our assumptions about the intercultural dialogue necessary to promote global justice for women., Alison M. Jaggar, and Anglické resumé
Autor se ve svém článku zabývá vývojem federálního soudnictví v USA v poslední dekádě 18. a první čtvrtině 19. století. Tuto problematiku se pak snaží především postihnout pod zorným úhlemdramatického ústavního vývoje, který v této době probíhal a v němž se nezřídka právě federální soudnictvíocitalo v prvé linii boje mezi oběma tehdejšími znepřátelenými frakcemi americké politiky – federalistya republikány.Nad celou touto problematikou se pak pochopitelně neodbytně vznáší i klíčová otázka po tom, kdo budedohlížet nad tím, zda akty státní moci jsou v souladu s ústavou, či nikoliv. Ačkoli tyto problémy jsou řešenyjiž na sklonku 18. století – autor v této souvislosti vyzvedává zejména Hamiltonův slavný „esej číslo 78“z „Listů federalistů“ o soudnictví, či přímo zákon o soudnictví z roku 1789 – za „zakladatelský věk“, kdyobrysy federálního soudnictví, jakož i otázka soudního přezkoumávání ústavnosti nabudou svých pevnýchtvarů, lze dle něj považovat také (a snad ještě více) první čtvrtinu 19. století.V článku je tak pochopitelněanalyzován i klíčový případ americké ústavní historie „Marbury v.Madison“, jakož i tzv. „economical cases“. and The author deals with the development of the federal judiciary in the United States in the last decade of the 18th and the first quarter of the 19th century, from the perspective of the dramatic constitutional developments that took place at that time and which often positioned federal judiciary in the front line of the battle between the two then warring factions of American politics – the Federalists and Republicans. This, of course, insistently raises the vital question of who supervises whether the acts of state are in accordance with the Constitution or not. Although these problems are dealt with in the late 18th century – the author in this context, especially highlights Hamilton’s famous “Essay No. 78” from the “Federalists Papers”, or even the Judiciary Act of 1789. The author concludes that the “founding Age”, which lays down the principles of federal judiciary, as well as the question of judicial review of constitutionality, and when they take their solid forms, can also be considered (and perhaps even more) to be the first quarter of the 19th century. The article obviously analyzed the key case of the U.S. constitutional
history “Marbury v.Madison” and the “economical cases”.
The author of this article reacts to a discussion study by Radim Šíp “How to Revive ‘Frozen’ Evolutionary Ontology” (Filosofický časopis, 62, 2014, No. 3). He argues that Šíp’s critique is unacceptable, as is his proposal for a radical reform of the doctrine of Josef Šmajs. He draws attention to Šíp’s misinterpretation of the evolutionary-ontological theory of information and to the consequences of this misinterpretation for the other arguments in Šíp’s text. Šmajs‘ diagnosis of the problematic relation of culture and nature consists in a cleavage between natural information (structural and semantic) and socio-cultural information (semantic and structural). Šíp, however, mistakenly supposes that in evolutionary ontology there is an opposition between semantic, experiential information (natural and cultural) on the one hand and structural, genetic information (natural) on the other. It is only because of this misinterpretation that Šíp can treat the conflict between culture and nature as a conflict between man and nature, subject and object. Only thus can he treat evolutionary ontology as early-modern metaphysics and call for the recognition of a greater continuity between nature and culture – for the “appreciation” of allegedly unappreciated socio-cultural information.