Using the example of Catherine of Siena († 1380), one of the possible motivations of writing down the legend is followed in the study, and the exploitability of Catherine for the promotion and official confirmation of the Dominican Third Order (1405). In the documents promoting the Third Order, her as-yet uncanonised holy example has an important place as a model for a Tertiary. This fact, however, is in contradiction with the evident "inappropriateness" of Catherine´s life as a real model for Tertiaries, for her extreme practices, exceeding the limits of the Rule. The real function and importance of St. Catherine´s model in the life of the Tertiaries should therefore be complementary viewed in the context of the legend of her repetant successor Mary of Venice, whose author is a great suppporter of Catherine´s holiness and Third Order, Tommaso da Siena. Whereas Catherine served as an ideal, Marie should be an example for practical imitation for Tertiaries., Kateřina Ptáčková., and Obsahuje poznámky pod čarou
The study answers the question who delivered the first sermon at the funeral of Emperor Charles IV, held on 15 December 1378. The second funeral oration was delivered by Adalbert Ranconis de Ericini. Until the 1960s, Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim was considered the author of the first eulogy, or rather sermon, without any reservations. It was Jaroslav Kadlec who suggested the possibility that the oration at the Emperor’s casket was delivered by the successor of Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim, John of Jenstein. The author also expresses the opinion that the Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim remained in active service until the beginning of March 1379; thus, it can be proven that he held funeral services for the deceased Emperor. It is likely that both orators were appointed by the current Archbishop John Očko of Vlašim, who was carrying out other duties at the funeral in his capacity as Archbishop. and František Šmahel.
The subject of the study is the analysis of two arguments that have appeared in the Czech-Slovak philosophical setting in the context of discussions about the moral evaluation of research into stem cells of human embryos. We have presented various reasons (varied understandings of potentiality and the vagueness of the expression “living human body”), on the basis of which we must reject the argument of P. Volek concerning the unconditional protection of each human zygote. With respect to the argument of A. Doležal, D. Černý a T. Doležal, we have shown that their critique of the conception of non-individuality of the early human embryo relies on the identification of the concept of the “individual” with the concept “particular” which, for ontological reasons, cannot be accepted. In both of the analysed bioethical arguments the key role of metaphysical concepts and conceptions is easily demonstrated., Peter Sýkora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Původní koncept epistémické závislosti podněcoval u ne-expertů nekritickou podřízenost expertním názorům. Ve světle nedávného vývoje ve zkoumání vědy se však skutečná situace epistémické závislosti jeví tak, že zahrnuje nezbytnou a všudypřítomnou potřebu pro laické hodnocení vědeckých expertů. Jelikož expertní vědění znamená omezení poznávacího přístupu k některým epistémickým doménám, laická hodnocení expertního vědění jsou racionální a informovaná pouze tehdy, když se kritéria užívaná ne-experty při posuzování expertů liší od kritérií užívaných experty pro jejich tvrzení. Rozlišení mezi "substanciálním věděním“ a "kontextuálním věděním“ umožňuje laikům poznávat spolu s experty bez toho, že by museli vědět přesně totéž, co oni. Taková meta-expertní hodnocení nejsou specifická pro veřejnou sféru mimo vědu ani nejsou na vědu vnitřně omezená, ale vyskytují se v široké míře kontextů ve vědě a kolem ní. Tento článek legitimizuje koncept kontextuálního vědění jeho vztažením k relevantní literatuře a objasňuje tuto myšlenku pomocí identifikace některých prvků takového vědění., The original concept of epistemic dependence suggests uncritical deference to expert opinions for non-experts. In the light of recent work in science studies, however, the actual situation of epistemic dependence is seen to involve the necessary and ubiquitous need for lay evaluations of scientific experts. As expert knowledge means restricted cognitive access to some epistemic domain, lay evaluations of expert knowledge are rational and informed only when the criteria used by non-experts when judging experts are
different from the criteria used by experts when making their claims. The distinction between “substantial knowledge” and “contextual knowledge” allows for the laypeople to know with experts without having to know precisely what experts know. Such meta-expert evaluations are not specific to the public sphere outside science, nor are they limited internally to science, but they are present in a wide range of contexts in and around science. The paper legitimizes the concept of contextual knowledge by relating it to the relevant literature, and expounds the idea by identifying some elements of such a knowledge., and Gábor Kutrovátz.
The article reacts to a critical evaluation of the cognitive revolution which Jaroslav Peregrin has presented (The Cognitive Counterrevolution?, Filosofie dnes, 4, 2012, No. 1, pp. 19-35). According to Peregrin the cognitive revolution has thrown open a Pandora’s box of naive mentalistic theories and variations on Cartesian dualism (“magical theories of the mind”), which “do not belong to science, nor even to sensible philosophy”. Although I agree with the rejection of magical theories of the mind, I attempt to show that the cognitive turn in the 50’s and 60’s of the last century is susceptible of a quite different interpretation, according to which cognitive science, as a result of its basic assumptions and methodology, does not imply or propagate any kind of Cartesian dualism, rather it explicitly denies the possibility of such an account of the relation between mind and body., Juraj Franek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii