Autor polemizuje s názorem, který nedávno vyjádřili Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, že materialismus, převažující v současné filosofii mysli, by měl být nahrazen tomistickým hylemorfismem. Polemika se zaměřuje na dva aspekty Machulova a Peroutkova argumentu. Za prvé, na jejich předpoklad, že současná preference materialismu je výsledkem náhody (neznalosti faktu, že kromě materialismu a dualismu se nabízí i hylemorfismus). Tento předpoklad si ovšem neporadí s faktem, že dualismus byl kritizován již v 17. století, ale materialismus se prosadil až v polovině minulého století. Za druhé, autor souhlasí, že tomistický hylemorfismus lze aktualizovat, a to dokonce úspěšněji, než jak se to podařilo Machulovi s Peroutkou. Této aktualizaci je však třeba obětovat některé metafyzicky neúnosné představy – konkrétně představu duše jako nemateriální substance nezávislé na těle., The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body., and Tomáš Hříbek.
This study aims to interpret Mencius' political thinking taking as the starting point his doctrine of human nature. Each individual is capable of the moral self-cultivation of his or her innately good human nature, but in this task the individual requires adequate conditions and education. Political power is able to ensure this (and it is, indeed, one of its main asks to do so), but it can also, on the contrary, contribute, in a fundamental way, to the decadence of the state and society. The result of inadequate and ineffective application of political power is a growing crisis in society, especially in the area of inter-personal relations and moral conduct. Mencius' ideal is a relatively small and effective state that looks after its inhabitants and which does not unduly intervene in the social organism. War is understood, by him, as a great evil which is justifiably used only when putting-down an uprising or in self-defence. Generally, Mencius' political thought is characterized by the thought that the virtuous ruler will have, by dint of his strength of character, not only spiritual but also purely practical political successes., Stanislav Myšička., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl's descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of is own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object - I observe the "consequential parallel" between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as a subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl's example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for and original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy., Jan Halák., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii