Cieľom tejto štúdie je uvedenie Antisthenových rečí Aias a Odysseus do širšieho kontextu sókratovskej literatúry. Výklad vychádza z otázky, či je možné čítať tieto reči z hľadiska sókratovskej dialektiky. Prvá časť pripomína diferenciu medzi rétorikou a dialektikou, ktorú naznačuje Platón v Prótagorovi, keď stavia do protikladu dlhú monologickú reč (makros logos) a krátku dialogickú reč (brachylogia). Druhá časť sa venuje výkladu niektorých Antisthenových zlomkov, ktoré naznačujú, že Antisthenés spájal brachylogiu so skúmaním zdatnosti (areté), ale zároveň kritizoval Platónove pokusy o jej esencialistické uchopenie. Proti Platónovi namieril zrejme aj svoj koncept oikeios logos a tézu o nemožnosti sporu, ktorú by sme mohli uchopiť pomocou sókratovského učenia o škodlivosti nevedenia. Posledná časť sa zaoberá viacerými aspektmi Antisthenových rečí, dáva ich do vzťahu s predošlým výkladom a poukazuje na ich dialektický charakter, ako aj na Antisthenovo osobité poňatie vzťahu medzi rétorikou a dialektikou., The aim of this study is to introduce Antisthenes’ declamations Ajax and Odysseus into the wider context of Socratic literature. The interpretation has as its starting point the question of whether it is possible to read these declamations from the viewpoint of Socratic dialectic. The first part reminds us of the difference between rhetoric and dialectic, which Plato adumbrated in the Protagoras, where the long monological declamation (makros logos) is opposed to the short dialogical declamation (brachulogia). The second part is devoted to the interpretation of some of Antisthenes’ fragments which adumbrate how Antisthenes connects brachulogia with the investigation of virtue (aretē), but at the same time criticised Plato’s attempts to find an essentialist understanding of them. It was against Plato that he evidently aimed his concept oikeios logos and the thesis concerning the impossibility of contradiction, which we might understand with the help of the Socratic doctrine of the harmfulness of unknowing. The last part tackles the various aspects of Antisthenes’ declamations, relates them to the foregoing interpretation and shows their dialectical character, as well as Antisthenes’ peculiar understanding of the relation between rhetoric and dialectic., and Vladislav Suvák.
Th e image of a dismantled statue of Lenin from Ukraine being transported up the Danube in Th eo Angelopoulos’s 1995 fi lm Ulysses’ Gaze is the starting point for a discussion of the fi lm’s urgent resonance with the questioning of “Europe” in the present day. Th is image foreshadows the destruction of Lenin statues in Ukraine during the ongoing civil war and is more than a fortuitous indicator of the historical context of the present Ukrainian crisis in the aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Exploring the territory of seven post-Cold War Eastern European states and ending amid the rubble and destruction of the besieged city of Sarajevo, Ulysses’ Gaze off ers a panoramic, yet highly subjective, depiction of a Europe undergoing a painful and as-yet-undecided transition. Th is article will show the strong connections between the understanding of Europe that emerges from the fi lm and that elucidated in the work of the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. Both the fi lm and Patočka’s thought seek the European on a utopian level that transcends particular temporal and territorial borders, recalls Classical polity and philosophy, and consists primarily in introspective thinking. Th e recurrence, in today’s Europe, of questions from the immediate post-Cold War era indicates that the work of defi nition undertaken after 1989 is not yet completed and suggests that fi lms from that period may contain images that have the capacity to guide the process of understanding Europe in the present day.
In this paper, I suggest a way of resolving the whole-part dilemma suggested in the Parmenides. Specifically, I argue that grabbing the second horn of the dilemma does not pose a significant challenge. To argue for this, I consider two theses about Forms, namely, the oneness and indivisibility theses. More specifically, I argue that the second horn does not violate the oneness thesis if we treat composition as identity and that the indivisibility thesis ought to be reinterpreted given Plato’s later dialogues. By doing so, I suggest a compositional understanding of Plato’s theory of Forms, which can resolve the whole-part dilemma.