It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.
John MacFarlane argues against objectivism about ''tasty''/''not tasty'' in the following way. If objectivism were true then, given that speakers use ''tasty''/''not tasty'' in accordance with a rule, TP, speakers would be using an evidently unreliable method to form judgements and make claims about what is tasty. Since this is implausible, objectivism must be false. In this paper, I describe a context in which speakers deviate from TP. I argue that MacFarlane’s argument against objectivism fails when applied to uses of ''not tasty'' within this context. So objectivism about ''not tasty'' is still a viable position within this context., John MacFarlane argumentuje proti objektivismu o ''chutném'' / ''ne chutném'' následujícím způsobem. Pokud by objektivismus byl pravdivý, vzhledem k tomu, že reproduktory používají ''chutné'' / ''ne chutné'' v souladu s pravidly TP, mluvčí by používali zjevně nespolehlivou metodu k tomu, aby vytvořili soudy a prohlásili, co je chutné. Protože to je nepravděpodobné, objektivismus musí být falešný. V tomto článku popisuji kontext, ve kterém se mluvčí odchýlí od TP. Argumentuji, že argument MacFarlane proti objektivismu selhal, když se v tomto kontextu vztahuje k použití ''ne chutných''. Tak objektivismus ''ne chutné'' je stále životaschopný postoj v tomto kontextu., and Alexi Davies