According to Keith DeRose, the best argument for epistemic contextualism is supplied by communication intuitions ordinary speakers have when evaluating utterances of sentences of the form ''S knows that p'' and ''S does not know that p''. It is claimed that utterances of ''S knows that p'' and ''S does not know that p'' can both be true with respect to the same S and p because the speakers of the utterances employ different epistemic standards. The aim of the paper is to show that one can accept this claim as true while denying epistemic contextualism. A handful of possible contenders to epistemic contextualism are given. Thus, the alleged best argument for contextualism has to be supplemented by other arguments to show that epistemic contextualism should be given preference to the other approaches., Podle Keith DeRose je nejlepším argumentem pro epistemický kontextualizmus komunikační intuice, které mají obyčejní mluvčí při hodnocení projevů vět ve tvaru ,,S ví, že p'' a ,,S neví, že p''. Tvrdí se, že projevy ,,S ví, že p'' a ''S neví, že p'' mohou být pravdivé s ohledem na stejné S a p, protože reproduktory projevů používají různé epistemické standardy. Cílem příspěvku je ukázat, že toto tvrzení lze akceptovat jako pravdivé, zatímco popírá epistemický kontextismus. Je dána hrstka možných uchazečů o epistemický kontextualismus. Tudíž údajný nejlepší argument pro kontextualismus musí být doplněn dalšími argumenty, které prokazují, že epistemický kontextismus by měl být upřednostňován před ostatními přístupy., and Marián Zouhar
Fictional objects are sometimes modelled as abstract entities; according to some theories, fictional objects are abstract artefacts, i.e. entities that are created by their authors, while according to some other theories, fictional objects are eternal Platonic entities. Both kinds of theories usually suggest that there are two types of relation between such an abstract object and its properties: to use a well-established nomenclature, a fictional object can be said to exemplify certain properties and encode some other properties. The aim of the present paper is to show that the exemplification vs. encoding distinction is not general enough. This is because it is possible to find properties that a fictional object obviously has in some sense, but it makes no good sense to say that it either exemplifies or encodes them. and Marián Zouhar
According to H. Cappelen and E. Lepore, all context-sensitive expressions belong to the so-called Basic Set comprising indexicals and contextuals. This claim is supposed to be justified by certain tests. The paper deals with one of them, namely the test based on inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports. It is claimed that, contrary to appearances, it is not capable to qualify all indexical expressions as context-sensitive. A new version of the test proposed in the present paper removes this drawback. It leads to the consequence, however, that there are context-sensitive expressions that do not belong to the original Basic Set., Podle H. Cappelena a E. Lepora všechny kontextové výrazy patří do tzv. Basic Setu obsahujícího indexicals a kontextové. Toto tvrzení má být zdůvodněno určitými testy. Příspěvek se zabývá jedním z nich, a to testem založeným na interkontextových diskvalifikačních nepřímých zprávách. Tvrdí se, že na rozdíl od vzhledu není schopna kvalifikovat všechny indexové výrazy jako kontextové. Nová verze testu navrženého v tomto dokumentu odstraňuje tuto nevýhodu. To však vede k tomu, že existují kontextové výrazy, které nepatří do původní sady Basic., and Marián Zouhar
According to contextualism a basic feature of (all) sentences is that their semantic content is not determined purely on the basis of semantic conventions and compositionality. In determining the meaning (use) of a sentence the context of use should also play a role, and that even when the sentence does not include indexical expressions. In this paper there is a critical analysis of the contextualist argumentation in favour of the claim that the meaning of predicates (or rather their use) is dependent on context. It is argued that (i) in many uses the meaning of the predicate is the only factor which determines the corresponding semantic conventions, and that (ii) the context of use usually plays a different role it does not lend extra ingredients to the expressed meaning, but only serves as the background for determining the truth-values of a given use of the sentence.
The aim of the paper is to show that Russell’s theory of denoting phrases (particularly, that of definite descriptions) is, first and foremost, a theory of logical form of sentences involving denoting phrases. A proper argument against this theory should impugn its capability to fulfil its task. This strategy is followed by Tichý’s argument from sentences concerning notional attitudes; unfortunately, it is unjustly ignored in the literature. On the other hand, the most popular counterarguments, such as Strawson’s well-known attack, are concerned with features that are irrelevant to Russell’s theory.