This article argues that building an eco-socialist concept of sustainable development must be based on realistic understandings of natural processes and meaningful axiology. First, it focuses on the conflict between Malthus and Marx, which foreshadows modern debates between ecology and socialism. Malthus’s ideas are preferred because in the last instance his principles are logically and ontologically persuasive and empirically relevant. The second part attempts to develop a Marxist perspective on ecological thinking, connecting Marxist economics and thermodynamics using the work of Sergei Podolinsky. This unusual perspective leads to the general conclusion that the ultimate goal of human production is the most effective resistance to the second law of thermodynamics. From these considerations the article derives a norm (value) which states that such resistance should be the supreme goal of advanced civilization. Because life in general is the best counter-entropic barrier, it follows that humanity should strive to expand and develop life. The Marxist critiques of capitalism and of the history of class societies in general are based on the broad notion of “alienation”, which is understood by Marx himself as the opposite of “real life.” Therefore, alienation can be understood as a form of entropy. The biological term “compartmentation” is then used to compare the architecture of biological entities and social systems. Effective compartmentation prevents entropy. Therefore, the study of compartmentation in social entities (capitalism) may indicate where alienation might be structurally incorporated. The article argues that the problem in the last instance is the spatio-temporal scaling of social entities and that all eco-social problems ultimately lie in imperfect interconnection, spatio-temporal and energy scaling or continuity between social entities and between natural and social entities. The conclusion is that we need a completely different metabolic system that mediates the interaction of society and nature.
The central question of philosophical anthropology is: What is the difference between man and other living beings? While traditionally philosophers attempted to answer this question by pointing to a certain property or ability belonging exclusively to man, Karl Marx performed a theoretical revolution in philosophical anthropology by introducing a new way of how to deal with the problem of anthropological difference. The aim of the paper is, firstly, to analyse the very form, which is common for the answers to the central question of philosophical anthropology, and to describe the dynamic which is characteristic for discussions concerning the anthropological difference. Secondly it depicts Ludwig Feuerbach’s solution to the problem, in which he introduced the concept of a species being. The third step focuses on Marx’s understanding of human nature, in which a central place is given to the concept of species powers. The fourth step sketches Marx’s own solution to the problem of the anthropological difference. In the final step a consideration is given to the underlying motivation of this solution.
Jedním z konceptů, který udělal v rámci sociálních věd v devadesátých letech minulého století velkou kariéru, je (vedle například sociálního kapitálu) kvalita života . Nejde vlastně o jeden přesně vymezený koncept ale spíše o (velkou) rodinu navzájem propojených teorií, výzkumů a vlastně i aktuálních a navrhovaných politik. Pod titulem kvality života se provádí široké spektrum výzkumů, od studií zabývajících se životem lidí se specifickými zdravotními problémy po dotazníková šetření reprezentativní pro celé dospělé populace států [Rapley 2003]. Zdá se, že zvýšený zájem o kvalitu života je příznačný pro dobu, která vyzvedává práva jedince a zároveň buduje složité (administrativní i tržní) mechanismy pro uspokojování jeho potřeb. Kvalita života (její zkoumání, stejně jako usilování o ni) byla vlastně důležitým konceptem už od dob osvícenství, ale, jak o tom píše například Foucault [2009], až do druhé poloviny 20. století byla důležitá především kvalita života celých populací, spíše než individuí. V průběhu druhé poloviny 20. století také došlo k určitému posunu od objektivního chápání kvality života, které bylo založeno především na měření materiálních a „biologických“ ukazatelů k pojetí více subjektivnímu. Tuto subjektivní dimenzi sleduji i ve svém textu – primární pro mne jsou respondentova subjektivní hodnocení jeho situace. Studie kvality života se samozřejmě nezabývají pouze jednorozměrnou analýzou kvality, ale téměř vždy jí analyzují ve vztahu k faktorům, které mají vliv na její úroveň. Zaměřuji se zde na vztahy mezi religiozitou/spiritualitou respondenta (o tom jak ji měřit viz níže) a psychosociálními faktory, které úzce souvisí s kvalitou života chápanou objektivisticky a samy jsou tak vlastně součástí šířeji chápané kvality života., The article deals with relationship of religiosity and psycho-social phenomena (powerlessness, normlessness, social isolation, self-estrangement and cultural estrangement) which are inhibiting factor in relation to quality of life of individuals. Theoretically this article (besides general theory of subjective quality of life) is supported by Melvinem Seeman ́s concept of alienation. Personal religiosity is not measured here by individual indicator only but by plurality of indicators. In regressions socio-demographic variables are more important in explaining variability indicators of psycho-social phe - nomena but religiosity is interesting contribution in overall explanation. Among religiosity indicators frequency of church attendance has the strongest predictive ability., and Martin Vávra.
In this paper, I propose a programme for future critical responses to naturalism. The paper is divided into two principal parts. In Part I, after providing a topography of contemporary critical approaches to the Placement Problem, which is the operational logic of naturalism, I provide an overview of a burgeoning critical response to naturalism, which, to date, may be predominantly individuated by hostility towards the Placement Problem in two interconnected manners: an epistemic concern and a political concern. Part II of the paper focuses on four areas of future research on critical responses to naturalism arising from themes identified in Part I: the first is a challenge set by Antonio Nunziante concerning the historical and political aspects of American humanism and naturalism; the second involves centring and combining decolonial and queer theoretic discursive formations to enhance critical theoretic responses to naturalism; the third emphasises the need to put Hegel and Otto Neurath in direct conversation about anti-foundationalism, pragmatism, and the (dis)unity of science, in part to dismantle the long-standing hostility between Hegelians and logical empiricists; the fourth is on the subject of developing a critique of sexology’s scientific naturalist framework for making sense of sexual arousal.
In the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, three works stand out for their compass: Being and Nothingness (L’être et le néant, 1941), Critique of Dialectical Reason (Critique de la raison dialectique, 1960) and The Idiot of the Family (L’Idiot de la famille, 1971). While the subtitle of the first work states that it is an “essay on phenomenological ontology,” the second work aims to study the “theory of practical wholes,” and the last work presents the method of existential psychoanalysis in practice. Due to their distinct focuses, these volumes can be presented as three entities independent from one another, differing not only in terms of their topics and terminologies, but also in their methodological procedures. The aim of the article, however, is to show that in spite of the different perspectives from which Sartre views human existence in the individual texts, there still remains a certain continuity between the discussed works. This continuity lies in Sartre’s effort to restore an authentic relationship between consciousness and the world. Sartre in fact never repudiated his initial concept of consciousness as intentionality, however much he later came to regard it as being inadequate. As a result of pressure from historical events and also the influence of Simone de Beauvoir, he shifted from the concept of “consciousness in the situation” to “consciousness in society and in history.” Across the range of his philosophy, he is primarily concerned with restoring the spontaneity of consciousness and prioritizing it over inauthentic attitudes. and Ve filosofii Jeana-Paula Sartra svým rozsahem vynikají tři publikace: Bytí a nicota (L‘Être et le Néant, 1941), Kritika dialektického rozumu (Critique de la raison dialectique, 1960) a Rodinný idiot (L’Idiot de la famille, 1971). Zatímco podtitul prvního díla sděluje, že se jedná o „esej o fenomenologické ontologii“, druhé dílo si klade za cíl studovat „teorie praktických celků“ a poslední práce uvádí v praxi metodu existenciální psychoanalýzy. Tyto svazky se tak vzhledem ke svému odlišnému zaměření mohou prezentovat jako tři na sobě nezávislé celky, lišící se nejenom tématem a terminologií, ale i metodologickým postupem. Cílem článku je však ukázat, že navzdory odlišným perspektivám, ze kterých Sartre v jednotlivých textech pohlíží na lidskou existenci, jistá souvislost mezi uvedenými díly přece jen existuje. Tato souvislost spočívá v Sartrově snaze o obnovení autentického vztahu mezi vědomím a světem. Sartre totiž nikdy nepopřel svůj prvotní koncept vědomí jako intencionality, jakkoli ho postupem času začal považovat za nedostačující. Pod tlakem historických událostí a také pod vlivem Simone de Beauvoir se proto přesunul z konceptu „vědomí v situaci“ k „vědomí ve společnosti a v dějinách“. Napříč jeho filosofií mu jde především o navrácení spontaneity vědomí a její upřednostnění před neautentickými postoji.