The central question of philosophical anthropology is: What is the difference between man and other living beings? While traditionally philosophers attempted to answer this question by pointing to a certain property or ability belonging exclusively to man, Karl Marx performed a theoretical revolution in philosophical anthropology by introducing a new way of how to deal with the problem of anthropological difference. The aim of the paper is, firstly, to analyse the very form, which is common for the answers to the central question of philosophical anthropology, and to describe the dynamic which is characteristic for discussions concerning the anthropological difference. Secondly it depicts Ludwig Feuerbach’s solution to the problem, in which he introduced the concept of a species being. The third step focuses on Marx’s understanding of human nature, in which a central place is given to the concept of species powers. The fourth step sketches Marx’s own solution to the problem of the anthropological difference. In the final step a consideration is given to the underlying motivation of this solution.
According to the traditional interpretation, Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology deposes the concept of man and the notion of human nature from its central place in human and social sciences. While it’s necessary to acknowledge Lévi-Strauss’ distance vis-à-vis all philosophy based on intentionality, experience and consciousness of subject, we argue that the most interesting purpose of the structural anthropology lies elsewhere. Not only Lévi-Strauss never declared himself being part of anti-humanism movement, but most of all, his famous polemics with Sartre at the end of La Pensée sauvage should be interpreted as part of his fight against ethnocentrism. The project of “dissolving the man” can be thus read as deconstructing the idea that western man makes of himself in the light of ethnological findings about universal structures orchestrating all human societies. We further show that the notion of subject survived its very death announced by the most radical structuralist thinkers and that structural method could be effectively employed in order to study different techniques and modes of subjectivation, revealing that “becoming subject” is a process structured by our language, symbolic universe and ethical teleology. and Ondřej Švec.
This article begins with the observation that most contemporary theories of justice pay no attention to the concept of need. And, as my main thesis, I shall argue that this is not correct. First of all (I) I shall explain the reasons for this theoretical deficit and I shall strictly distinguish (II) the concept of “need” from other concepts, such as “wish” and “drive”, which are routinely interpreted as its synonyms. Then (III) I shall offer a definition of need which is based on a complex conception of human personality. I shall introduce an enumeration of the various levels of the person by which various categories of need correspond with various objects. In the next step (IV) I shall tackle the question of whether in some regard it is necessary to treat needs as reasons for conduct. In this context I shall briefly present a historico-naturalistic account which aims to provide a grounding for judgements about questions of human needs. (V). Finally I shall deal with the social dimension of human needs and I will put forward reasons for the view that a theory of social justice should deal with the concept of need as its main theme (VI).