On the appropriateness of holding morally accountable

Title:

On the appropriateness of holding morally accountable

Creator:

Sun, Haozhan and Dragoun, Ivo

Identifier:

https://cdk.lib.cas.cz/client/handle/uuid:3c54d503-85d4-4061-a9b2-1227c4ab7f30
uuid:3c54d503-85d4-4061-a9b2-1227c4ab7f30
doi:10.31577/orgf.2022.29303

Subject:

blame, holding accountable, moral standing, and the Principle of Plenitude

Type:

model:article and TEXT

Format:

bez média and svazek

Description:

Our everyday social interactions involve holding others morally accountable for their wrongdoings. Sometimes such holdings might be inappropriate. For instance, it feels inappropriate if the person holding another morally accountable is in some relevant sense morally compromised. Thus a thief chastising a thief would strike us as somewhat odd. We might, when witnessing such behaviour, want to remind the chastiser that he is not in a position to reprimand others. But what if none of us are ever in such a position? In this paper we will argue that all men are irremediably morally compromised, and conclude that, ultimately, it is never appropriate for us to hold others morally accountable.

Language:

Slovak

Rights:

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
policy:public

Coverage:

348-375

Source:

Organon F: filozofický časopis | 2022 Volume:29 | Number:3

Harvested from:

CDK

Metadata only:

false