The traditional picture of the development of analytical philosophy, represented especially by such thinkers as G. Frege, G. E. Moore, B. Russell or R. Carnap, whose attitude was generally anti-metaphysical, can, on closer study, be shown to be incomplete. This article treats of the Cracow circle a group of Polish philosophers among whom are, above all, to be counted J. Salamucha, J. M. Bocheński, J. F. Drewnowski, and B. Sobociński, who were, at the beginning of the twentieth century, fascinated by the development of modern formal logic and its application to philosophical thinking. They also attempted to apply it to Catholic philosophy. The result of their endeavours were many remarkable works introducing not only a defence of the use of modern philosophical approaches in Christian thought, but also the reconstruction, by means of formal logic, of significant proofs given by Scholastic authors.
Many philosophers of science have maintained that science should be value-free; still others believe that such ideal is neither achievable nor desirable for science. Hugh Lacey is presently one of the main supporters of the idea of value-free science and his theory is probably the most debated today and attracts the most attention and criticism. Th erefore, in this text, I will primarily analyze his theory of value-free science. Aft er briefl y defi ning the notion of value I highlight which strategy Lacey chooses to lay a fi rm foundation for the concept of science without value, with his starting point being the diff erentiation between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Th en I describe three basic characteristics of Lacey’s value-free science: impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. However, the overall plan and design of his project, together with some concrete steps he takes, are not without problems in our view. I will try to point out some of these problematic issues and provide brief suggestions for alleviating them. and Mnoho fi losofů vědy hájí názor, že věda by neměla být zatížena hodnotami; jiní jsou nicméně přesvědčeni, že takový ideál je nejen nedosažitelný, ale není ani žádoucí. Hugh Lacey je v současnosti jedním z hlavních zastánců ideje vědy bez hodnot a jeho teorie je dnes pravděpodobně nejdiskutovanější a přitahuje nejvíce zájmu i kritiky. V předkládaném textu se proto primárně věnujeme jeho koncepci vědy nezatížené hodnotami. Poté, co v krátkosti charakterizujeme pojem hodnoty, vykreslujeme strategii, kterou Lacey volí, aby položil pevné základy své koncepce. Výchozím bodem je rozlišení mezi kognitivními a nekognitivními hodnotami, následuje popis tří základních charakteristik vědy bez hodnot: nestrannosti, neutrality a autonomie. Nicméně celkový rozvrh a výstavba tohoto projektu nejsou z našeho pohledu bez nedostatků, proto v závěru textu na některé z těchto problematických aspektů poukazujeme a pokoušíme se podat stručné návrhy na jejich odstranění.
Interpretations of Kant’s Critique of Judgement often focus on the problematic of beauty and taste which a large part of the first part of his book is devoted to, or on questions of teleology connected with living nature analysed in the context of the second part. This article attempts to show that Kant in the third Critique tries to include the question of the relation of the theoretical and practical sphere in his treatment of this problematic. The crystallisation of Kant’s thought in this respect began to take place from the First Critique onwards. In clarifying this question we put to use the central concept of the Third Critique – purposefulness. The development of this concept in Kant’s thinking is traced. In the concluding part of the study we attempt to show that in employing the newly-formulated conception of purposefulness, Kant tackles the question of how the two spheres are connected by means of a thesis concerning the unity of the super-sensory substrate of nature and freedom.