In contrary to general interpretations of opera buffa, the presence and importance of arias and ensembles based primarily on emotions (and not only action) are crucial for the genre’s dramaturgy as well as for its historical development. The presence of lyrical arias in opera buffa has its origins in the traditional comic dramaturgy (one or more couples of serious lovers), the number, form and functions of such arias, however, changed considerably during the 18th century. Not only the use of Tuscan Italian, but also adopting new music features of opera seria for lyrical arias of noble lovers (in 30ties) led to the rapid dissemination of the genre. Similarly, broadening of the typology of characters and its emotions in the works of Goldoni and his composers, mostly the including of the sentimental plots and its new kind of heroine, supported the popularity of opera buffa and its transformation to the leading operatic genre in the second half of 18th century., Marc Niubo., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long-standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions, I argue, help us in solving one of philosophy’s most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to il ustrate this claim I elaborate on the conception of ‘experiential memory’ suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, I argue, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Hence, I argue that experiential memory is not just confined to the recal ing of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person’s life as a whole., V poslední době emoce přitahovala mnoho pozornosti v mnoha oblastech filozofie. Ve filozofii mysli, někteří argumentují, že emoce jsou individualizované a identifikované s odkazem na pocity, víry, touhy nebo vnímání. Navíc se často tvrdí, že jsou proměnlivé, nestabilní a ambivalentní. I přes jejich nestabilitu jsou však emoce někdy dlouhodobé. Mají navíc perspektivu. Tyto vlastnosti emocí nám pomáhají při řešení jednoho z nejtrvalejších problémů filozofie, tj. Problému osobní identity. Abych toto tvrzení využil, rozebírám koncepci „zážitkové paměti“, kterou navrhl Wollheim. Abych pochopil paměť jako zkušenost, musíme pochopit, že afektivní prvek spojený s některými vzpomínkami. Domnívám se, že paměť nemá vliv pouze na mé minulé myšlenky, ale také na mé minulé emoce, a ty emoce, které pocházejí z minulosti, ovlivňují celou mou bytost a mou budoucnost. Proto argumentuji, že zkušenostní paměť není omezena pouze na připomenutí událostí nebo zážitků, které subjekt zažil, ale týká se narativní struktury života člověka jako celku., and Sunny Yang
In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of ‘perception’ as the ‘cognitive element’ most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Döring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Döring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz’s and Döring’s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions., In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of ‘perception’ as the ‘cognitive element’ most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Döring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Döring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz’s and Döring’s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions., and Sunny Yang
This paper aims to move the debate over the status of the conflict between emotion and judgement forward by refuting three implicit claims: that conflict between emotion and judgement is always to be avoided; that any conflict should always be resolved and, moreover, that it should be resolved immediately; that judgement should usually take priority in any resolution. Refutation of these three claims leads to recognition of the wide variety of different cases of conflict between emotion and judgement; examination of these cases is aided by consideration of the social context in which the conflicts occur., Cílem tohoto příspěvku je přesunout diskusi o stavu konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem dopředu vyvrácením tří implicitních tvrzení: že vždy je třeba se vyhnout konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem; že každý konflikt by měl být vždy vyřešen a navíc by měl být vyřešen okamžitě; tento rozsudek by měl mít obvykle přednost v každém usnesení. Odmítnutí těchto tří tvrzení vede k uznání širokého spektra různých případů konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem; zkoumání těchto případů je podporováno zvážením sociálního kontextu, ve kterém se konflikty vyskytují., and Chloë FitzGerald
Issues of regionalism and imperialism and their various confrontations significantly defined the mindset of Ide Kaoru (1879-1944) and some of his contemporary Japanese colonial architects. With his long-term service in the colonial government and having spent most of his adult life spent in Taiwan, Ide cultivated particular compassion towards this island, its cultural traditions and natural environment. This paper examines the origins and evolution of Ide´s nascent regionalist perspective and regional identity. His extensive writings on architecture and building projects featured a transient trajectory shaped by personal aesthetic inspiration practical needs, and imperial motivations within a larger pressing context.
In practice, it often occurs that some covariates of interest are not measured because of various reasons, but there may exist some auxiliary information available. In this case, an issue of interest is how to make use of the available auxiliary information for statistical analysis. This paper discusses statistical inference problems in the context of current status data arising from an additive hazards model with auxiliary covariates. An empirical log-likelihood ratio statistic for the regression parameter vector is defined and its limiting distribution is shown to be a standard chi-squared distribution. A profile empirical log-likelihood ratio statistic for a sub-vector of the parameters and its asymptotic distribution are also studied. To assess the finite sample performance of the proposed methods, simulation studies are implemented and simulation results show that the methods work well.
"Classical" optimization problems depending on a probability measure belong mostly to nonlinear deterministic optimization problems that are, from the numerical point of view, relatively complicated. On the other hand, these problems fulfil very often assumptions giving a possibility to replace the "underlying" probability measure by an empirical one to obtain "good" empirical estimates of the optimal value and the optimal solution. Convergence rate of these estimates have been studied mostly for "underlying" probability measures with suitable (thin) tails. However, it is known that probability distributions with heavy tails better correspond to many economic problems. The paper focuses on distributions with finite first moments and heavy tails. The introduced assertions are based on the stability results corresponding to the Wasserstein metric with an "underlying" L1 norm and empirical quantiles convergence.
This work concentrates on a novel method for empirical estimation
of generalization ability of neural networks. Given a set of training (and testing) data, one can choose a network architecture (nurnber of layers, number of neurons in each layer etc.), an initialization method, and a learning algorithrn to obtain a network. One measure of the performance of a trained network is how dosely its actual output approximates the desired output for an input that it has never seen before. Current methods provide a “number” that indicates the estimation of the generalization ability of the network. However, this number provides no further inforrnation to understand the contributing factors when the generalization ability is not very good. The method proposed uses a number of parameters to define the generalization ability. A set of the values of these parameters provide an estimate of the generalization ability. In addition, the value of each pararneter indicates the contribution of such factors as network architecture, initialization method, training data set, etc. Furthermore, a method has been developed to verify the validity of the estimated values of the parameters.
The index of regularity of a measure was introduced by Beirlant, Berlinet and Biau \cite{bbb} to solve practical problems in nearest neighbour density estimation such as removing bias or selecting the number of neighbours. These authors proved the weak consistency of an estimator based on the nearest neighbour density estimator. In this paper, we study an empirical version of the regularity index and give sufficient conditions for its weak and strong convergence without assuming absolute continuity or other global properties of the underlying measure.