In his last book about Locke’s philosophy, E. J. Lowe claims that Frege’s arguments against the Lockean conception of number are not compelling, while at the same time he painstakingly defines the Lockean conception Lowe himself espouses. The aim of this paper is to show that the textual evidence considered by Lowe may be interpreted in another direction. This alternative reading of Frege’s arguments throws light on Frege’s and Lowe’s different agendas. Moreover, in this paper, the problem of singular sentences of number is presented, and Frege’s and Lowe’s views are confronted with it., Ve své poslední knize o Lockeově filosofii EJ Lowe tvrdí, že Fregeho argumenty proti Lockeanově pojetí čísla nejsou přesvědčivé, zatímco zároveň pečlivě definuje Lockeanovu koncepci Lowe sám. Cílem tohoto příspěvku je ukázat, že textové důkazy, které Lowe zvažuje, mohou být interpretovány jiným směrem. Toto alternativní čtení Fregeových argumentů vrhá světlo na různé agendy Fregeho a Loweho. V tomto příspěvku je navíc prezentován problém jednotlivých číselných vět a Fregeovy a Loweho názory jsou s ním konfrontovány., and Agustin Arrieta-Urtizberea
Frege argues that considering Socrates as an object in the proposition “Socrates exists” raises two problems. First, this proposition would be uninformative. Second, its negation entails a contradiction. Attempting to solve these problems, Frege claims that Socrates is representing the concept of a man whose name is Socrates. Therefore, existence is a second-order concept. This paper surveys the main modern theories about the types of existence, in order to find another response to Frege’s problems. For, if Socrates’ existence differs from the type that “exists” implies, “Socrates exists” is informative and its negation is not a contradiction. At last, this paper argues for an idea, in which “existence” is not a concept or property. Existence is the principle of the objects. So, “Socrates exists” is in fact “the existence is Socrates,” and “Socrates does not exist” is “there is no existence that be Socrates.” This idea could be an alternative for responding to Frege’s problems.