This study is concerned with interpretation of the Tractatus and the picture theory of the early-Wittgenstein from the perspective of the anti-metaphysical reading of M. McGinn and from the perspective of W. Sellars. I analyse McGinn's interpretation and the difficulties which are caused for her in her attempt to provide a non-minimalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's picture theory. The interpretation of McGinn is then contrasted with Sellars who, unlike the majority of other interpreters, reads Wittgenstein's picture theory in a radically nominalistic way, and places little emphasis on the overall consistency of the Tractatus. I show that his approach allows one to preserve some interesting insights provided by McGinn, while it also manages to avoid the problems that beset her interpretation. Sellars' reading may therefore better serve McGinn's aims than her own reading, although it demands that we give up some of the key theses of the Tractatus. At the same time it may also lead us to a reevaluation of the relevance of the Tractatus for contemporary philosophical debates., Stefanie Dach., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The article interprets the not of "common sense" as presented in the works of Thomas Reid. The focus is not primarily on Reid's epistomology or metaphysics or even on the history of the notion or its influence. Rather, the article is strictly concerned with Reid's use of the term. The notion is considered vague by some interpreters and it is confused with the "principles of common sense". The "principles of common sense" play the role of axioms in the model of the human mind that Reid is aiming at, and thanks to that they play the role of criteria since they are the rules of our thinking. We must only distinguish them from widely-shared prejudices. The "principles of common sense" are propositions believed by every healthy adult who understands the propositions in question, considering them without any prejudice. They are integrated into the structures of different languages, they hold up against explicit criticism, and the acceptance of these propositions does not have any absurd consequences. By the term "common sense", on the other hand, Reid understands the faculty of judgment in the area of sensory experience., Petr Glombíček., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Text se zabývá konceptem nejvyššího ohrožení, který patří mezi nejzajímavější a nejprovokativnější problémy teorie spravedlivé a nespravedlivé války. V prvé části se nejprve pokouší osvětlit postavení konceptu nejvyššího ohrožení ve standardní teorii spravedlivé války. Poté provádí rekonstrukci klíčových argumentů konceptu nejvyššího ohrožení v pojetí M. Walzera. Tato rekonstrukce má umožnit pochopit, co vlastně stav nejvyššího ohrožení znamená, a současně má osvětlit pozadí normativních dilemat, jimž za této situace čelí političtí vůdci. Ve druhé části se zabývá Walzerovým pojetím konceptu „špinavých rukou“, které nabízí několik možných interpretací těchto normativních dilemat. Ve třetí části autor nejprve rekapituluje výsledky dosavadních diskusí v rámci standardní teorie spravedlivé války a ukazuje, že v současné době existují tři základní způsoby hodnocení legitimity cíleného ohrožování či vraždění nevinných civilistů za stavu nejvyššího ohrožení. V závěrečné části se pokouší prokázat, že toto morálně a legálně neospravedlnitelné vraždění lze za jistých výjimečných okolností pouze omluvit. Tuto omluvu však lze zdůvodnit jen za předpokladu, že se v rámci konceptu nejvyššího ohrožení podaří spojit koncept špinavých rukou s konceptem občanské neposlušnosti na pozadí nějaké koncepce globální spravedlnosti, globálního konstitucionalismu a globálního vládnutí., The text deals with the concept of the supreme emergency which is one of the most interesting and provocative problems of the theory of just and unjust wars. In the first part an attempt is made to shed light on the status of the concept of the supreme emergency in terms of the standard theory of just war. Then a reconstruction of the key arguments of the concept of the supreme emergency is undertaken according to the conception of M. Walzer. This reconstruction should enable us to understand what the state of supreme emergency actually means, and at the same time to shed light on the background of normative dilemmas which political leaders confront in this situation. In the second part Walzer’s conception of the concept of “dirty hands” is discussed, a conception which offers several possible interpretations of these normative dilemmas. In the third part the author first recapitulates the results of the foregoing discussions in the framework of the standard theory of just war, and he then shows that in contemporary times there exist three basic ways of evaluating the legitimacy of treating intentional threatening behaviour or the murder of innocent civilians as supreme emergency. In the final part an attempt is made to show that morally and legally unjustifiable murder can be only excused in certain exceptional cirmcumstances. This excusing can, however, be justified only on the assumption that, in the framework of the concept of the supreme emergency, a connection is possible between the concept of dirty hands and the concept of civil obedience against the background of some conception of global justice, global consitutionalism and global governance., Josef Velek., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The aim of this article is to sketch a certain method of indirect reconstruction of the process by which mathematics as a deductive discipline emerged in ancient Greece. We try out this method in a reconstruction of Thales' mathematics, but the main aim for which this method has been developed is the work of Pythagoras. We consider the process of the emergence of mathematics as a process of the constitution of a new language in the framework of which one can carry out deductive proofs. Therefore we base the method of indirect reconstruction of the emergence of mathematics on the theoretical findings in the book L. Kvasz: Vedecká revolúcia ako lingvistická událosť (The Scientific Revolution as a linguistic event, Prague, Filosofia 2013)., Ladislav Kvasz., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
My aim is to assess an argument against final causation being an irreducible metaphysical category. The argument in question is based upon the supposition that for anything to count as a cause, it must exist at the very moment of executing its causal action, which requirement can supposedly never be met by anything rightly pretending to be called a final cause. I argue that this argument is far from conclusive as there seem to be ways of blocking it - namely through adopting either a version of the eternalist ontology of temporal dimensions, or else a version of the possibilist ontology, each combined with either a version of the "Humean" approach to analysis of causal relations, or else with a version of the realist approach to causation., Jan Palkoska., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii