This paper presents the results of an experimental study to quantify the effects of bed slope and relative submergence on incipient motion of sediment under decelerating flows. Experiments were conducted in an experimental tilting-flume of 8 m long 0.4 m wide and 0.6 m deep with glass-walls. Three uniform sediments with median grain sizes of 0.95, 1.8 and 3.8 mm and three bed slopes of 0.0075, 0.0125 and 0.015 were used under decelerating flow. The main conclusion is that the Shields diagram, which is commonly used to evaluate the critical shear stress, is not suitable to predict the critical shear stress under decelerating flows.
This paper shows that there is a quantum-physical and evolution-biological perspective for (libertarian) free will, and that the so-called scientific arguments against it are in reality metaphysical arguments and insufficient. The paper also develops the idea of a nonphysical organ of higher organisms: the Domindar (Detector of macroscopic indetermination, and restrictor)., Tento článek ukazuje, že existuje kvantově-fyzikální a evolučně-biologická perspektiva pro (libertariánskou) svobodnou vůli a že tzv. Vědecké argumenty proti ní jsou ve skutečnosti metafyzické argumenty a nedostatečné. Příspěvek také rozvíjí myšlenku nefyzického orgánu vyšších organismů: Domindara (detektor makroskopické neurčitosti a omezovače)., and Uwe Meixner
The paper deals with semantic content of elliptic sentences and its relation to semantic content of the corresponding non-elliptic sentences. On the basis of certain kinds of examples it is shown that syntactic theories of ellipsis have serious limits. It is also demonstrated that the so-called Property Theory, which is an example of a semantic theory of ellipsis, bears serious limitations. Another semantic theory, namely that of Minimal Indexicalism, is analyzed thereafter. Theoretical tools of the theory - in particular, its criteria of linguistic expressions identity and three layers of content - that are vital to its handling of ellipsis are discussed in some detail. Finally, a new theory of ellipsis based on Transparent Intensional Logic is proposed and argued for., Příspěvek se zabývá sémantickým obsahem eliptických vět a jeho vztahem k sémantickému obsahu odpovídajících eliptických vět. Na základě určitých druhů příkladů se ukazuje, že syntaktické teorie elips mají vážné limity. Je také prokázáno, že takzvaná teorie vlastností, která je příkladem sémantické teorie elips, nese vážné omezení. Následně je analyzována další sémantická teorie, a to teorie minimálního indexismu. Teoretické nástroje teorie - zejména její kritéria identity jazykových výrazů a tří vrstev obsahu - které jsou nezbytné pro její zvládnutí elipsy, jsou podrobně diskutovány. Nakonec je navržena a argumentována nová teorie elipsy založená na transparentní intenzivní logice., and Miloš Kosterec
Recently, emotion has attracted much attention in many areas of philosophy. In the philosophy of mind, some argue that emotions are individuated and identified with reference to feelings, beliefs, desires, or perceptions. Furthermore, they are often claimed to be changeable, unstable, and ambivalent. However, despite their instability, emotions are sometimes long-standing. They have, in addition, perspective. These characteristics of the emotions, I argue, help us in solving one of philosophy’s most enduring problems, that is, the problem of personal identity. In order to il ustrate this claim I elaborate on the conception of ‘experiential memory’ suggested by Wollheim. To understand memory as experiential, I argue, we need to understand the affective element attached to some memories. I argue that memory affects not only my past thought but also my past emotions, and those emotions deriving from the past stay on to affect my whole being and my future. Hence, I argue that experiential memory is not just confined to the recal ing of events or experiences that the subject has experienced, but concerns the narrative structure of a person’s life as a whole., V poslední době emoce přitahovala mnoho pozornosti v mnoha oblastech filozofie. Ve filozofii mysli, někteří argumentují, že emoce jsou individualizované a identifikované s odkazem na pocity, víry, touhy nebo vnímání. Navíc se často tvrdí, že jsou proměnlivé, nestabilní a ambivalentní. I přes jejich nestabilitu jsou však emoce někdy dlouhodobé. Mají navíc perspektivu. Tyto vlastnosti emocí nám pomáhají při řešení jednoho z nejtrvalejších problémů filozofie, tj. Problému osobní identity. Abych toto tvrzení využil, rozebírám koncepci „zážitkové paměti“, kterou navrhl Wollheim. Abych pochopil paměť jako zkušenost, musíme pochopit, že afektivní prvek spojený s některými vzpomínkami. Domnívám se, že paměť nemá vliv pouze na mé minulé myšlenky, ale také na mé minulé emoce, a ty emoce, které pocházejí z minulosti, ovlivňují celou mou bytost a mou budoucnost. Proto argumentuji, že zkušenostní paměť není omezena pouze na připomenutí událostí nebo zážitků, které subjekt zažil, ale týká se narativní struktury života člověka jako celku., and Sunny Yang
In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of ‘perception’ as the ‘cognitive element’ most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Döring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Döring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz’s and Döring’s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions., In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. My aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, I first argue against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. I then argue that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of ‘perception’ as the ‘cognitive element’ most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then I shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Döring and by Jesse Prinz. I shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Döring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz’s and Döring’s views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, I argue that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. I shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions., and Sunny Yang
This paper aims to move the debate over the status of the conflict between emotion and judgement forward by refuting three implicit claims: that conflict between emotion and judgement is always to be avoided; that any conflict should always be resolved and, moreover, that it should be resolved immediately; that judgement should usually take priority in any resolution. Refutation of these three claims leads to recognition of the wide variety of different cases of conflict between emotion and judgement; examination of these cases is aided by consideration of the social context in which the conflicts occur., Cílem tohoto příspěvku je přesunout diskusi o stavu konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem dopředu vyvrácením tří implicitních tvrzení: že vždy je třeba se vyhnout konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem; že každý konflikt by měl být vždy vyřešen a navíc by měl být vyřešen okamžitě; tento rozsudek by měl mít obvykle přednost v každém usnesení. Odmítnutí těchto tří tvrzení vede k uznání širokého spektra různých případů konfliktu mezi emocemi a úsudkem; zkoumání těchto případů je podporováno zvážením sociálního kontextu, ve kterém se konflikty vyskytují., and Chloë FitzGerald
The article reflects on influential views of the mind that come from cognitive science and seem to undermine the traditional philosophical view that the mind is simply unified and transparent to itself. Specifical y, the modularity thesis is presented, along with its important modifications and criticisms, suggesting that the apparent unity can be ascribed only to higher cognition, if at all. Various theories of why the mind seems to be unified while being composed of autonomous modules are discussed. The overview results in the conclusion that our linguistic capacity plays a prominent role in the unity of the mind., Článek reflektuje vlivné pohledy na mysl, které pocházejí z kognitivní vědy a zdánlivě podkopávají tradiční filosofický názor, že mysl je jednoduše sjednocená a transparentní. Specifická y, modulační práce je představena, spolu s jeho důležitými modifikacemi a kritiky, navrhnout, že zdánlivá jednota může být připisována jen k vyššímu poznání, jestliže vůbec. Diskutovány jsou různé teorie, proč se mysl zdá být sjednocená, zatímco jsou složeny z autonomních modulů. Výsledkem je závěr, že naše jazykové schopnosti hrají v jednotě mysli významnou roli., and Martin Vraný
Based on the data series of the annual reference crop evapotranspiration (ET0) and the amount of irrigation water (IR) from 1970 to 2013 in the Luhun irrigation district, the joint probability distribution of ET0 and IR is established using the Gumbel-Hougaard copula function. Subsequently, the joint probability, the conditional joint probability, and the conditional return period of rich−poor encounter situations of ET0 and IR are analysed. The results show that: (1) For the joint probabilities of rich−poor encounter situations of ET0 and IR, the asynchronous encounter probability is slightly larger than the synchronous encounter probability. (2) When IR is in rich state or ET0 is in poor state, the conditional joint probability is larger, and the conditional return period is smaller. (3) For a certain design frequency of ET0, if the design frequency decreases, the conditional joint probability of the amount of irrigation water will decrease, therefore the encounter probability of them will decrease. (4) For a certain design frequency of the amount of irrigation water, if the design frequency decreases, the conditional joint probability of ET0 will increase, thus the encounter probability of them will increase.
Rationality requires you to intend to do what you believe you ought to do. This is a rough formulation of the requirement I call ''Enkrasia''. This article presents a precise formulation. It turns out to be complicated, and the article also explains the need for each complication., Racionalita vyžaduje, abyste měli v úmyslu dělat to, co si myslíte, že byste měli dělat. To je hrubá formulace požadavku, který nazývám ,,Enkrasia''. Tento článek představuje přesnou formulaci. Ukázalo se, že je to složité a článek také vysvětluje potřebu každé komplikace., and John Broome