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3. A non-ethical argument against parental licensing

Creator:
Pušić, Bruno
Format:
text/pdf
Type:
Article
Subject:
parental licensing, licensing program, child abuse, child neglect, child protection, and Philosophy
Language:
English
Description:
LaFollette proposed that the best way to protect children from abuse and neglect caused by their parents would be to implement parental licenses to prospective parents. In this paper, I re-evaluate his proposal by looking at various facts and data related to child abuse and neglect. It will be suggested that (a) parenting as a profession does not satisfy the third of LaFollette's criteria for the introduction of licenses, which is "The benefits of the licensing program outweigh any theoretical reasons against it" (LaFollette 2010, 328), (b) it would subject too many people to unnecessary tests and (c) parenting cannot be compared to other professions licenses are usually issued for.
Rights:
unknown

4. A philosophy of first contact : Stanisław Lem and the myth of cognitive universality

Creator:
Simons, Massimiliano
Format:
text/pdf
Type:
Article
Subject:
Stanisław Lem, first contact, scientific discovery, and Philosophy
Language:
English
Description:
Within science fiction the topic of 'first contact' is a popular theme. How will an encounter with aliens unfold? Will we succeed in communicating with them? Although such questions are present in the background of many science fiction novels, they are not always explicitly dealt with and even if so, often in a poor way. In this article, I will introduce a typology of five dominant types of solutions to the problem of first contact in science fiction works. The first four solutions are the more dominant, but also the least interesting ones. There is a fifth category that addresses the question of first contact in a more interesting way, exemplified by the work of Stanisław Lem. This fifth option defines itself as a critique of the four previous categories, or of their shared assumption of what Lem (1967) has called 'the myth of cognitive universality'. Lem is sceptical of the common optimism that first contact will always be successful. In books such as Solaris (1961), His Master's Voice (1967) and Fiasco (1986), humanity makes first contact with an alien phenomenon, but fails to comprehend the phenomenon. Fundamentally, it will be argued that Lem's work shows that in such an encounter we will typically not only lack the right answers to our questions, but that we also often lack the correct questions: we simply do not have the right categories or instruments to even recognize, let alone meaningfully interrogate, the alien phenomenon. The article ends with an exploration of the implications of Lem's pessimism and whether it is the most plausible option for first contact. Moreover, the article will draw some lessons for philosophy of science, by exploring the parallel with the confrontation of novel or deviant phenomena in science. Lem's work is helpful here because it succeeds in articulating what has not always been appreciated in the philosophy of science, namely that the right questions by which to interrogate scientific phenomena are not given, but that their articulation always requires work.
Rights:
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International and unknown

7. An activity whereby the mind regards itself': Spinoza on consciousness

Creator:
Petrufová Joppová, Michaela
Format:
text/pdf
Type:
Article
Subject:
Baruch Spinoza, body-mind problem, consciousness, philosophy of mind, psychic reality, filozofie mysli, problém vztahu tělo-mysl, psychická realita, vědomí, and Philosophy
Language:
English
Description:
Baruch Spinoza's philosophy of mind stirs up the disputes about the nature of body-mind relations with its rigorous and naturalistic monism. The unity of body and mind is consequential of his metaphysics of the substance, but the concept of the unity of the mind and its idea rightfully confuses Spinoza's commentators. Many have been tempted to interpret this as a possible account of consciousness, but it still has not yet been fully understood. This paper attempts to introduce an interpretation of the concept of ideas of ideas with regards to consciousness based on strict ontological monism, conceptual dualism, and self-similarity architecture, which concludes in distinguishing mental and psychic reality. While we might attribute mental reality, or mentality, to every extended thing, psychic reality is constituted by conscious ideas. And it seems to follow from Spinoza's theory that the more 'psychic' the mind is, the more it knows God. and Filozofie mysli Barucha Spinozy svým rigorózním naturalistickým monismem podněcuje mnohé diskuze o povaze vztahu mysli a těla. Jednota mysli a těla je konsekventní jeho substanční metafyzice, avšak koncepce jednoty mysli a její ideje oprávněně mate Spinozovy komentátory. Mnozí z nich jsou nakloněni interpretovat tento koncept jako Spinozovu variaci na koncept (sebe)vědomí, přesto se však zdá, že jako takový ještě nebyl zcela adekvátně a celostně uchopen. Příspěvek představuje interpretaci konceptu idejí idejí v kontextu vědomí, přičemž metodologicky vychází z ontologického monismu, konceptuálního dualismu a sebe-opakující se architektury mysli a zahrnuje logické vyvození možné diferenciace mentální a psychické reality. Zatímco mentální realitu neboli mentalitu je možné na základě Spinozova učení připisovat každé rozprostraněné věci, psychická realita neboli psychika je konstituována vědomými idejemi. Ze Spinozova učení přitom také vyplývá, že čím více psychiky jednotlivá věc "má", tím více poznává Boha.
Rights:
unknown

8. Artificial instinct : Lem's robots as a model case for AI

Creator:
Zebrowski, Robin
Format:
text/pdf
Type:
Article
Subject:
Stanislaw Lem, Asimov's Laws of Robotics, artificial intelligence, Cyberiad, and Philosophy
Language:
English
Description:
In the seventy years since AI became a field of study, the theoretical work of philosophers has played increasingly important roles in understanding many aspects of the AI project, from the metaphysics of mind and what kinds of systems can or cannot implement them, the epistemology of objectivity and algorithmic bias, the ethics of automation, drones, and specific implementations of AI, as well as analyses of AI embedded in social contexts (for example). Serious scholarship in AI ethics sometimes quotes Asimov's speculative laws of robotics as if they were genuine proposals, and yet Lem remains historically undervalued as a theorist who uses fiction as his vehicle. Here, I argue that Lem's fiction (in particular his fiction about robots) is overlooked but highly nuanced philosophy of AI, and that we should recognize the lessons he tried to offer us, which focused on the human and social failures rather than technological breakdowns. Stories like "How the World Was Saved" and "Upside Down Evolution" ask serious philosophical questions about AI metaphysics and ethics, and offer insightful answers that deserve more attention. Highlighting some of this work from The Cyberiad and the stories in Mortal Engines in particular, I argue that the time has never been more appropriate to attend to his philosophy in light of the widespread technological and social failures brought about by the quest for artificial intelligence. In service of this argument, I discuss some of the history and philosophical debates around AI in the last decades, as well as contemporary events that illustrate Lem's strongest claims in critique of the human side of AI.
Rights:
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International and unknown

9. Austin and Quine on the dogmas

Creator:
Tomeček, Marek
Format:
text/pdf
Type:
Article
Subject:
analytic, a priori, Austin, Quine, reductionism, synthetic, analytické, redukcionismus, syntetické, and Philosophy
Language:
English
Description:
Austin and Quine both reacted to the logical positivism of Carnap, but they did it from different positions. While Quine with his pragmatic rejection of the analytic – synthetic divide and confirmation holism represents a modification and continuation of the tradition, Austin challenges its underlying assumptions: the prominent role of mathematics as a model for natural language and the dichotomy physical object – sense datum. His criticism is paralleled here by the later Wittgenstein in On Certainty and Philosophical Investigations, reacting to his earlier logical phase. But there seems to be no room left for the traditional questions of the philosophy of mathematics in Austin's natural language approach. and Austin a Quine reagovali na Carnapův logický pozitivismus, ovšem z rozdílných pozic. Zatímco Quine z pragmatických pozic odmítá rozdělení na analytické a syntetické věty, svým konfirmačním holismem pokračuje v tradici logického pozitivismu, Austin odmítá už samotné jeho předpoklady: paradigmatickou roli matematiky pro přirozený jazyk a dichotomii fyzický předmět – smyslové datum. Svojí kritikou zrcadlí Wittgensteinovu pozdní fázi v O jistotě a Filozofických zkoumáních, kteréžto knihy reagují na ranou logizující fázi Traktátu. Ovšem Austinův radikální postoj, zdá se, neumožňuje tematizování tradičních otázek filozofie matematiky.
Rights:
unknown

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