Autor polemizuje s názorem, který nedávno vyjádřili Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, že materialismus, převažující v současné filosofii mysli, by měl být nahrazen tomistickým hylemorfismem. Polemika se zaměřuje na dva aspekty Machulova a Peroutkova argumentu. Za prvé, na jejich předpoklad, že současná preference materialismu je výsledkem náhody (neznalosti faktu, že kromě materialismu a dualismu se nabízí i hylemorfismus). Tento předpoklad si ovšem neporadí s faktem, že dualismus byl kritizován již v 17. století, ale materialismus se prosadil až v polovině minulého století. Za druhé, autor souhlasí, že tomistický hylemorfismus lze aktualizovat, a to dokonce úspěšněji, než jak se to podařilo Machulovi s Peroutkou. Této aktualizaci je však třeba obětovat některé metafyzicky neúnosné představy – konkrétně představu duše jako nemateriální substance nezávislé na těle., The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body., and Tomáš Hříbek.
This study aims to interpret Mencius' political thinking taking as the starting point his doctrine of human nature. Each individual is capable of the moral self-cultivation of his or her innately good human nature, but in this task the individual requires adequate conditions and education. Political power is able to ensure this (and it is, indeed, one of its main asks to do so), but it can also, on the contrary, contribute, in a fundamental way, to the decadence of the state and society. The result of inadequate and ineffective application of political power is a growing crisis in society, especially in the area of inter-personal relations and moral conduct. Mencius' ideal is a relatively small and effective state that looks after its inhabitants and which does not unduly intervene in the social organism. War is understood, by him, as a great evil which is justifiably used only when putting-down an uprising or in self-defence. Generally, Mencius' political thought is characterized by the thought that the virtuous ruler will have, by dint of his strength of character, not only spiritual but also purely practical political successes., Stanislav Myšička., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The work is a contribution to the understanding of the structure and status of Hegel’s dialectic methods. In accordance with other commentators (Cramer, Düssing, Henrich, Horstmann), the author propounds the interpretation of Hegel’s logic as a theory of subjectivity sui generis. In a critical response to an article by H. F. Fulda, the author attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s use of the term “pure determination of thought” (and similar terms) and their mentalistic interpretation do not imply a psychologisation of Hegel’s logic., Jindřich Karásek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This study takes the form of a response to Martin Ritter’s review article on my book From enowning. A phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy” (Beiträge zur Philosophie). In its subject-matter it focuses on the key points of Ritter’s critique: on the theme of the phenomenological field and the related methodological priority of intentionality, on the status of the centre, and briefly also on the reduction of historicity in my interpretation of Heidegger. This study, when taken as a whole, is not meant as a dispute over a particular book, but as a discussion of the nature of phenomenology and of the scope of the phenomenological method to which Heidegger leads us in his Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie). The account concentrates on the theme of the methodological opening-up of the phenomenological field, and on the possibility of its topological interpretation. The opening-up of the phenomenological field is, at the same time, interpreted as the determining feature of phenomenological philosophy and the common element in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s use of the phenomenological method., Martin Nitsche., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Mnohorelační teorii soudu Betrand Russell uvedl v roce 1910 jako výsledek kritiky propozičního realismu, který v revoltě proti idealismu přejal od G. E. Moora. Kritizovaná koncepce se zakládá na binární teorii soudu. Binární teorii Russell napadá nepřímo skrze kritiku identitní teorie pravdy, jež jde s tímto pojetím soudu ruku v ruce. V prvním oddílu tuto kritiku vyložím a v tom, který následuje, představím mnohorelační teorii. Ve zbytku práce se budu zamýšlet nad otázkou, k jaké teorii pravdy přijetí mnohorelační teorie vede. Také zodpovím otázku, zda se tato teorie vyhýbá problémům binární teorie soudu. V odpovědi na první z těchto otázek předložím ve třetím oddílu kontextuální teorii pravdy. Tento návrh budu hájit proti tezi, že šlo o korespondenční teorii kongruenčního typu. Jak budu argumentovat ve čtvrtém oddílu, ty pasáže, kde Russell hovoří o korespondenci, je nutno brát s rezervou, ba dokonce je nezbytné tyto pasáže škrtnout. V závěru se vrátím k mnohorelační teorii jako takové a naznačím potíž, která vyvstává tehdy, když máme v této teorii zajistit syntetickou jednotu soudu., The multiple-relation theory of judgement was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1910 as the upshot of a critique of propositional realism which, in revolt against idealism, he took over from G. E. Moore. The target of the critique is founded on a binary theory of judgement. Russell attacks the binary theory indirectly by a critique of the identity theory of truth which goes hand in hand with this conception of judgement. In the first part I interpret this critique and then, in the part that follows, I present the multiple-relation theory. In the remainder of the piece I will consider the question of which theory of truth adoption of the multiple-relation theory leads us to. I will also address the question of whether this theory avoids the problems of the binary theory of judgement. In answer to the first of these questions I propose, in the third part, the contextual theory of truth. I will defend this proposal against the thesis that it is actually a congruent version of the correspondence theory. As I will argue in the fourth part, those passages where Russell speaks of correspondence should be treated with caution – in fact, these passages should be positively disregarded. In conclusion I return to the multiple-relation theory as such, and I indicate the difficulty which arises when, in the framework of this theory, we seek to make sense of the synthetic unity of judgement., and Milan Soutor.
Sam Harris ve své knize The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) tvrdí, že otázka morálních hodnot není ničím jiným než otázkou po blahu vědomých bytostí. Ve svém výkladu si Harris klade tři úkoly: etablovat etiku jakožto plně racionální a ideálně vědeckou disciplínu, posílit a obhájit naturalismus a ustanovit smysluplnost lidského života na nenáboženské bázi. Harrisova kniha se setkala s odmítnutím v odborných recenzích, avšak ne všechny kritiky jsou oprávněné a skutečný problém s Harrisovým přístupem podle mne leží jinde, než se kritici domnívají. Existují nejméně tři důvody, proč odmítnout Harrisovu koncepci morálky jakožto vědy. Prvním je konfuzní pojetí vědy, se kterým souvisí absence čehokoli vědeckého v Harrisově popisu etických problémů či jejich řešení. Druhý důvod je nekoherentní postup při výkladu původu hodnot. A konečně posledním důvodem k odmítnutí Harrisovy vize je podoba života, kterou nám nabízí jakožto výsledek přijetí etiky založené na vědě., Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) argues that the question of moral values is none other than the question of the happiness of conscious beings. In his account Harris sets himself three tasks: to establish ethics as a fully rational and purely scientific discipline, to reinforce and defend naturalism, and to rest the meaning of human life on a non-religious grounding. Harris’ book has met with a negative reaction in journal reviews, but not all the criticisms are justified and the real problem with Harris’ approach, in my view, is different to what his critics suppose. There are at least three reasons why we should reject Harris’ conception of morality as a science. The first is his confused conception of science which brings with it the absence of any scientific (on Harris’ understanding) ethical problems and of their solution. The second reason is an incoherent approach in his account of the origin of values. And finally, the last reason for rejecting Harris’ vision is the form of life which he offers us as the result of accepting ethics founded on science., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje seznam literatury