This study explored the effect of soil water repellency (SWR) on soil hydrophysical properties with depth. Soils were sampled from two distinctly wettable and water repellent soil profiles at depth increments from 0–60 cm. The soils were selected because they appeared to either wet readily (wettable) or remain dry (water repellent) under field conditions. Basic soil properties (MWD, SOM, θ v) were compared to hydrophysical properties (Ks, Sw, Se, Sww, Swh, WDPT, RIc, RIm and WRCT) that characterise or are affected by water repellency. Our results showed both soil and depth affected basic and hydrophysical properties of the soils (p<0.001). Soil organic matter (SOM) was the major property responsible for water repellency at the selected depths (0–60). Water repellency changes affected moisture distribution and resulted in the upper layer (0–40 cm) of the repellent soil to be considerably drier compared to the wettable soil. The water repellent soil also had greater MWDdry and Ks over the entire 0–60 cm depth compared to the wettable soil. Various measures of sorptivity, Sw, Se, Sww, Swh, were greater through the wettable than water repellent soil profile, which was also reflected in field and dry WDPT measurements. However, the wettable soil had subcritical water repellency, so the range of data was used to compare indices of water repellency. WRCT and RIm had less variation compared to WDPT and RIc. Estimating water repellency using WRCT and RIm indicated that these indices can detect the degree of SWR and are able to better classify SWR degree of the subcritical-repellent soil from the wettable soil.
This paper is a critical appraisal of the most recent attempt from cognitive science in general, developmental and evolutionary biology in particular, to understand the nature and mechanisms underlying consciousness as proposed by Anton J.M. Dijker. The proposal, briefly stated, is to view consciousness as a neural capacity for objec- tivity. What makes the problem of consciousness philosophically and scientifically challenging may be stated as follows: If consciousness has a first-person ontology and our best scientific theories have a third-person ontology, how can we come up with a satisfactory theory? Moreover, if the reduction of one to the other is impossible, what are we supposed to do? By neglecting what Chalmers calls the ''hard problem'' of consciousness, Dijker’s proposal seems unable to respond to the foregoing questions, and these questions, I maintain, are the very motivations that most of us have when we inquire about consciousness., Tento článek je kritickým posouzením posledního pokusu o kognitivní vědu obecně, zejména vývojové a evoluční biologie, pochopit podstatu a mechanismy, které jsou základem vědomí, jak navrhl Anton JM Dijker. Návrh, stručně řečeno, je vnímat vědomí jako neurální schopnost objektivity. Co dělá problém vědomí filozoficky a vědecky náročný, lze říci následovně: Pokud má vědomí první ontologii člověka a naše nejlepší vědecké teorie mají ontologii třetí osoby, jak můžeme přijít s uspokojivou teorií? Pokud je navíc redukce jednoho na druhého nemožná, co máme dělat? Zanedbáním toho, co Chalmers nazývá ,,tvrdým problémem'' vědomí, se zdá, že Dijkerův návrh nedokáže odpovědět na výše uvedené otázky, and John Ian K. Boongaling