European agriculture has recently undergone important changes connected with the reorientation of EU policy towards regional, recreational, and land-use subsidies, and owing to the internal divergence in agriculture itself, which has led to large 'industrial' farming companies on the one hand and small, ecological farms on the other. During the period of transformation, the Czech agricultural sector has been forced to confront these changes and full stability remains a long way in the future. Transformation has thus brought both advantages and disadvantages to all the players involved. The former include the existence of large-scale farms, relatively highly skilled workers, and a cheap labour force, which make Czech agriculture competitive on a European scale. On the other hand, Czech attitudes towards work and respect for the property of others are inadequate; production efficiency and quality are low, whereas the expectations of farmers are high. Czech entrepreneurs have opted for relatively strict, unsocial, win-win strategies and understand their business simply in terms of material profit. Conversely, Western businessmen active in the Czech Republic more highly value the long-term profit, social ties and the symbolic functions of agriculture, though that does not mean they would not prefer 'industrial' forms of farming. The main problem of Czech agriculture is thus the absence of family-type farms rooted in their local, social environment, and there is only limited potential for this to develop. Unfortunately, this fact creates the threat of a 'two-speed' European agriculture: the Western model, combining both small and 'industrial' farms, and the Eastern model, focusing solely on extensive large-scale farming.
This article explores the trajectory of so-called guaranteed social housing in the Czech Republic as an example of penetrating financial instruments into the public policy realm. The project, promoted by the government’s Agency for Social Inclusion, was intended to encourage private landlords to rent their properties to people in need through commercial insurance against the risk of rent defaults. Using policy documents, media and interviews with governmental officers, the article describes the performative strength of financial instruments in the sphere traditionally occupied by the welfare state. In financialisation literature, the proliferation of financial instruments is often described as a one-way process in which these instruments colonise public domains. However, the empirical case discussed in the article shows that this process is much more complex and contingent, and financial instruments are not used as the best option but rather as a last resort in a situation marked by weak policies.
Článek se zaměřuje na Galileův Dopis Castellimu z 21. prosince 1613. Autor analyzuje Galileovy hermeneutické principy představené v první části dopisu (bible by měla být vyloučena ze zkoumání přírody) a jeho doslovnou interpretaci pasáže z knihy Jozue (10: 12–13), v duchu kopernikanismu, která se objevuje ve druhé části dopisu. Zdá se, že Galileo užívá bibli jako vědeckou autoritu a na podporu svých kopernikánských názorů, a tak se ocitá v rozporu se svými vlastními hermeneutickými principy. Autor tvrdí, že Galileovo stanovisko je konzistentní, zvláště pokud se vezme v úvahu historický kontext jeho vzniku, tj. kontext stálých, teologicky motivovaných útoků na Koperníka, Galilea a jeho věrnost heliocentrickému systému světa (pohyb Země odporuje bibli) a kontext jeho nedávných teleskopických pozorování a objevů., The article focuses on Galileo’s Letter to Castelli, 21 December 1613. The author analyzes Galileo’s hermeneutical principles established in the first part of the letter (the Bible should be excluded from natural investigation) and his literal interpretation of the passage from the Book of Joshua 10, 12–13, in Copernican terms, in the second part of the letter. Galileo appears to use the Bible as a scientific authority, supporting his Copernican views, and thus he seems to contradict his own hermeneutical principles. The author argues that Galileo’s position is consistent, especially if one takes into account the historical context of its genesis, that is, in the context of the constant, theologically-inspired attacks on Copernicus and Galileo and his commitment to the heliocentric world system (the movement of the earth contradicts the Bible) and in the context of his newly-made telescopic observations and discoveries., and Matjaž Vesel.
The question of the reasons for the extreme variation in morbidity among the gene carriers of acute porphyria and the great diversity of the precipitating factors are approached by the aid of a model of interacting genomic circuits. It is based on the current paradigm of the acute porphyric attack as a result of a toxic proximal overload of the enzyme-
deficient heme-biosynthetic patway. Porphyrogenic influx of precursors is seen as a consequence of uncontrolled induction of its gate-keeping enzyme, ubiquitous 5-aminolevulinate synthase (ALAS1), due to attenuated post-translational control of the enzyme combined with activated gene transcription. Focus is directed on the genomic
control of the master-regulator of ALAS1-transcription, the nuclear receptor pair constitutively active receptor (CAR) and pregnane xenobiotic receptor (PXR). On activation by their ligands, i.e. lipophilic drugs, solvents, alcohols, hormonal steroids and biocides, these DNA-binding proteins transform xenobiotic or steroid stimuli to coordinated
activations of gene transcription-programs for ALAS1 and apo-cytochromes P450 (apo-CYPs), thus effecting the formation of xenobiotic-metabolizing cytochrome P450 enzymes. The potency of the CAR/PXR-transduction axis is enhanced by co-activators generated in
at least four other genomic circuits, each triggered by different external and internal stimuli clinically experienced to be porphyroge
nic, and each controlled by co-activating and co-repressing modulators. The expressions of the genes for CAR and PXR are thus augmented by binding glucocorticoid receptor (GR) activated by a steroid hormone, e.g, cortisol generated in fasting, infection or different forms of stress. The promotor regions of ALAS1 and apoCYPs contain binding sites for at least three co-activating transcription factors enhancing CAR/PXR transduction: i.e. the ligand-independent growth hormone (GH)-pulse controlled hepatocyte nuclear factor 4 (HNF4), the insulin-responsive forkhead box class O-(FOXO) protein pathway activated in stress and infection, and the proliferator-activated receptor gamma co-activator 1 al
pha (PGC-1alpha) circuit responding to glucagon liberated in fasting. Many interactions and cross-talk take place within the tangle of genomic circuits that control ALAS1-transcription, which may explain the extreme inter- and intra-individual variability in morbidity in acute porphyria. Reasons for gender-differences are found in sex-dependent control of HPA- and GH-activity as well as in direct, or GR-mediated effects on CAR/PCR activation. Constitutional differences in individual porphyric morbidity may be discussed along lines of mutations or duplications of genes for co-activating or co-repressing nuclear proteins active at different levels within the circuits.
The article deals with the questions of the (in)visibility of women in Slovak political life. The material presents statistical data on women's participation in Slovak national, regional and local politics with the support of qualitative data from interviews with women politicians and activists. The author looks at the reasons for the low political representation of women and the unsuccessful attempts to increase it by introducing positive mechanisms such as quotas. The primary focus is put on the representation of women in municipal politics. The author analyses the main reasons why women are more successful in local politics than in 'high' politics.
Wittgenstein’s approach to philosophy is closely related not only to the content but also to the form of his investigations. The following paper presents the uniqueness of Wittgenstein’s writing style, namely his use of questions, by comparing part of his work with Austin’s essay. For this purpose a typology of questions with regard to their function in the text is established and applied. The difference between Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s writing style is then documented by the frequency of certain types of questions, and omission of others, and related to some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about his approach to philosophical inquiry. The difference is then summarized tentatively as one between ''pedagogical'' and ''academic'' writing style, which poses questions concerning the translation of Wittgenstein’s investigations into academic prose., Wittgensteinův přístup k filozofii úzce souvisí nejen s obsahem, ale také s formou jeho vyšetřování. Následující článek prezentuje jedinečnost Wittgensteinova stylu psaní, konkrétně jeho použití otázek, porovnáním části jeho práce s Austinovým esejem. Pro tento účel je zavedena a aplikována typologie otázek s ohledem na jejich funkci v textu. Rozdíl mezi Wittgensteinovým a Austinovým stylem psaní je pak dokumentován četností určitých typů otázek a opomenutím druhých a je spojen s některými Wittgensteinovými poznámkami o jeho přístupu k filosofickému zkoumání. Rozdíl je pak předběžně shrnut jako ,,pedagogický'' a ,,akademický'' styl psaní, který představuje otázky týkající se překladu Wittgensteinových výzkumů do akademické prózy., and Blahoslav Fajmon
In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is., According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally., V tomto příspěvku se chci znovu zabývat úctyhodným problémem úmyslné identity , problémem toho, jak mohou být různé myšlenky ohledně stejné věci, i když tato věc neexistuje. Za prvé se pokouším ukázat, že protirealistické přístupy k tomuto problému jsou odsouzeny k selhání. Jelikož nakonec sdílejí problematický předpoklad, totiž že myšlení na něco zahrnuje identifikaci . Za druhé, budem tvrdit, že jakmile jeden odmítne tento předpoklad a místo toho tvrdí, že myšlenky jsou tvořeny buď tím, o čem jsou, jejich záměrnými objekty , nebo tím, co určuje jejich úmyslný obsah, lze řešit problém úmyslné identity jiným způsobem. Jeden může opravdu nabídnout nové řešení, které se v podstatě opírá o dva faktory: a) jaký druh metafyzické přírody úmyslné objekty účinně mají, jakmile jsou koncipovány jako schematické objekty à laJeřáb (2001, 2013); b) zda takové předměty skutečně patří do celkového ontologického inventáře toho, co existuje., Podle tohoto řešení jsou dvě myšlenky o stejném neexistujícím úmyslném předmětu, pokud i) tento objekt splňuje kritérium totožnosti pro objekty tohoto metafyzického druhu a ii) předměty tohoto druhu patří k celkové ontologické inventáři toho, co existuje, nezávisle na tom, zda existují (ve vhodném prvotřídním smyslu existence). Jako takové není toto řešení realistické ani nerealistické: pouze pokud je podmínka ii) uspokojena, různé myšlenky mohou být o stejném neexistujícím úmyslu ; jinak jsou prostě tvořeny stejným záměrným obsahem (za předpokladu, že tento obsah není v souladu s touto záměrností). Zatřetí, vyzbrojené tímto řešením, domnívám se, že lze nalézt vhodnou léčbu konkrétního a souvisejícího problému, zda se mohou lidé rozmýšlet o tom samém, i když v takovém případě skutečně neexistuje. A konečně se pokouším ukázat, že toto zacházení lze aplikovat také na případ, kdy jsou různé myšlenky podle fenomenologie stejné záměrné a přesto je tento záměr takový, že takové věci skutečně neexistují. V takovém případě jsou takové myšlenky o stejné úmyslnosti jen smyšlené., and Alberto Voltolini