The well-known book by Peter Singer The Liberation of Animals has not only inspired a series of texts defending the rights and interests of animals, but has also provoked a discussion about what humanity is, what meaning can our belonging to the human kind have for us, and whether Singer’ critique of the “human prejudice” is justified. The paper considers two important defenders of “human prejudice”, B. A. O. Williams and C. Diamond, who both claim the concept of human being to be a basic ethical concept. In the first part, we will present Williams’s argument that solidarity and identity with one’s species doesn’t have the structure of a blameworthy privilege similar to sexism and racism. In the second part, we will proceed to Diamond’s conception of human being that is founded in relations and responses towards the other. Just as our treatment of a human being depends on whether we see this person as our fellow, so our treatment of an animal depends on how we see it. In the last part, we will consider Diamond’s illustration of how it is possible to change our perception of an animal and thus to change our treatment of it., Kamila Pacovská., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The paper deals with the ethics of biotechnological enhancement of human qualities such as intelligence, health and lifespan. In contemporary bioethics three views have emerged concerning the moral permissibility of such a biotechnological enhancement of humans. While bioconservatives reject it as morally impermissible and dangerous, bioradicals welcome it as permissible and desirable. Between these two extremes we find bioliberals who admit some types of enhancement, under certain conditions. These debates are still overshadowed by fear of bioethics, but this discredited term needs to be rehabilitated because it turns out that there are both desirable and undesirable forms of eugenics., Tomáš Hříbek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The subject of the study is the analysis of two arguments that have appeared in the Czech-Slovak philosophical setting in the context of discussions about the moral evaluation of research into stem cells of human embryos. We have presented various reasons (varied understandings of potentiality and the vagueness of the expression “living human body”), on the basis of which we must reject the argument of P. Volek concerning the unconditional protection of each human zygote. With respect to the argument of A. Doležal, D. Černý a T. Doležal, we have shown that their critique of the conception of non-individuality of the early human embryo relies on the identification of the concept of the “individual” with the concept “particular” which, for ontological reasons, cannot be accepted. In both of the analysed bioethical arguments the key role of metaphysical concepts and conceptions is easily demonstrated., Peter Sýkora., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The paper begins with the question of the participation of human subjects in biomedical research, pointing a way from the first principle of the Belmont Report towards the concept of autonomy as expressed by informed consent. From the use of informed consent in experimental medicine, the paper then moves to the application of informed consent in clinical practice. Further, the paper outlines the cultural and philosophical context of the transformation of medicine into biomedicine from the perspective of human subject research, discussing the concept which has played the key role in the ethical framework of both experimental and clinical medicine in the Czech Republic. Finally the paper provides some critical notes on the concept of informed consent and its practice in Czech healthcare., Josef Kuře., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
In the conception of modern bioethics, the concept of autonomy plays a dominant role. Contemporary bioethical discourse in many cases glorifies an approach founded on this principle, and it seems that its role in moral conduct in applied bioethics is considered to be the key to salvation. This article attempts, to a certain extent, to relativise the dominant principle of autonomy, especially in medical ethics, even if it does not deny its indispensability. It points, however, to particular practical aspects which respect for the principle of autonomy, especially in the doctor-patient relation, can influence in a negative way, or can quite negate. As the basic antithesis to theories which found their priority on the axiom of respect to autonomy, the author then presents paternalistic and neo-paternalistic concepts in bioethics which find support, above all, in the principle of beneficence. The argument in this article necessarily demands an outline of the basic properties of paternalism and autonomy. For this reason the article especially focuses on models of the relationships between doctor and patient, that is on medical ethics in the narrow sense., Adam Doležal., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii