Much of the recent debate over the moral permissibility of abortion focuses on the question of whether the foetus is or is not a person, i.e. the only entity endowed with moral rights including the right to life. The article traces this line of thought in several key figures in the debate (Thomson, Tooley, Warren and Brody). However, I consider this way of argumentation as both inappropriate and misleading; in the second half of the article I offer arguments against using the concept of person in this debate., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant’s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant’s conception of subject, or of the ''I'', can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not comprehensive enough compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understands the part of being ''I'' which can be known via self-knowledge but he fails to appreciate the second part of being ''I'', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson’s conception with Kant’s conception of being ''I'' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson’s purpose, Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity., Strawson vyvinul svou deskriptivní metafyziku v úzkém vztahu s Kantovou metafyzikou zkušenosti, kterou lze chápat jako konkrétní verzi popisné metafyziky. Současně Strawson odmítá základy Kantovy verze popisné metafyziky, která je podle něj druhem psychologie. Jeho argument proti Kantově pojetí předmětu nebo ,,já'' lze nalézt v jeho pojetí člověka. Bližší zkoumání této koncepce společnosti Strawson však může odhalit, že není dostatečně komplexní ve srovnání s Kantem. Když mluvíme s Kantem, Strawson chápe, že je to část ,,já'', kterou lze poznat skrze sebepoznání, ale nedokáže ocenit druhou část bytí ,,Já'', totiž sebeuvědomění., and Jan Kuneš
The person as a legal term is traditionally derived from a human being, either from an individual or a group of people. Hans Kelsen maintains that no such substance really exists. “The person exists only insofaras he “has” duties and rights; apart from them the person has no existence whatsoever.” This is why a human being is construed as an abstract holder of subjective rights rather than the person in a legal sense. This conception results in the normative construction of a person. The person is considered to be a mere point, an ideal and never real fact. Kelsen designates this point as “personification of the set of norms” regulating the conduct of a human being. However, such an entity as the personification of legal norms does not exist in the outer, real world. The legal order may attach legal personality to any segment of the outer world, even to an imagination of something non-existent in the outer world. The relationship between this abstract point and the addressee of duties is called “assignability”. This is why the person in a legal sense is, in the normativist perspective, considered to be “a point of assignability”. The aim of this article is to describe the approach of pure legal science to a person as a personified set of legal norms or as a point of assignability.