Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl's descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of is own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that the perceptivity and perception of the body are, from the ontological point of view, one and the same. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls flesh (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also understand sensations roused by the perception of that object - I observe the "consequential parallel" between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be expressed as a double unity, and the body as a subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl's example of two hands of the same body touching each other and, in agreement with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as of a certain field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for and original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy., Jan Halák., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
The work is a contribution to the understanding of the structure and status of Hegel’s dialectic methods. In accordance with other commentators (Cramer, Düssing, Henrich, Horstmann), the author propounds the interpretation of Hegel’s logic as a theory of subjectivity sui generis. In a critical response to an article by H. F. Fulda, the author attempts to demonstrate that Hegel’s use of the term “pure determination of thought” (and similar terms) and their mentalistic interpretation do not imply a psychologisation of Hegel’s logic., Jindřich Karásek., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This study takes the form of a response to Martin Ritter’s review article on my book From enowning. A phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy” (Beiträge zur Philosophie). In its subject-matter it focuses on the key points of Ritter’s critique: on the theme of the phenomenological field and the related methodological priority of intentionality, on the status of the centre, and briefly also on the reduction of historicity in my interpretation of Heidegger. This study, when taken as a whole, is not meant as a dispute over a particular book, but as a discussion of the nature of phenomenology and of the scope of the phenomenological method to which Heidegger leads us in his Contributions to Philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie). The account concentrates on the theme of the methodological opening-up of the phenomenological field, and on the possibility of its topological interpretation. The opening-up of the phenomenological field is, at the same time, interpreted as the determining feature of phenomenological philosophy and the common element in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s use of the phenomenological method., Martin Nitsche., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Mnohorelační teorii soudu Betrand Russell uvedl v roce 1910 jako výsledek kritiky propozičního realismu, který v revoltě proti idealismu přejal od G. E. Moora. Kritizovaná koncepce se zakládá na binární teorii soudu. Binární teorii Russell napadá nepřímo skrze kritiku identitní teorie pravdy, jež jde s tímto pojetím soudu ruku v ruce. V prvním oddílu tuto kritiku vyložím a v tom, který následuje, představím mnohorelační teorii. Ve zbytku práce se budu zamýšlet nad otázkou, k jaké teorii pravdy přijetí mnohorelační teorie vede. Také zodpovím otázku, zda se tato teorie vyhýbá problémům binární teorie soudu. V odpovědi na první z těchto otázek předložím ve třetím oddílu kontextuální teorii pravdy. Tento návrh budu hájit proti tezi, že šlo o korespondenční teorii kongruenčního typu. Jak budu argumentovat ve čtvrtém oddílu, ty pasáže, kde Russell hovoří o korespondenci, je nutno brát s rezervou, ba dokonce je nezbytné tyto pasáže škrtnout. V závěru se vrátím k mnohorelační teorii jako takové a naznačím potíž, která vyvstává tehdy, když máme v této teorii zajistit syntetickou jednotu soudu., The multiple-relation theory of judgement was introduced by Bertrand Russell in 1910 as the upshot of a critique of propositional realism which, in revolt against idealism, he took over from G. E. Moore. The target of the critique is founded on a binary theory of judgement. Russell attacks the binary theory indirectly by a critique of the identity theory of truth which goes hand in hand with this conception of judgement. In the first part I interpret this critique and then, in the part that follows, I present the multiple-relation theory. In the remainder of the piece I will consider the question of which theory of truth adoption of the multiple-relation theory leads us to. I will also address the question of whether this theory avoids the problems of the binary theory of judgement. In answer to the first of these questions I propose, in the third part, the contextual theory of truth. I will defend this proposal against the thesis that it is actually a congruent version of the correspondence theory. As I will argue in the fourth part, those passages where Russell speaks of correspondence should be treated with caution – in fact, these passages should be positively disregarded. In conclusion I return to the multiple-relation theory as such, and I indicate the difficulty which arises when, in the framework of this theory, we seek to make sense of the synthetic unity of judgement., and Milan Soutor.
Sam Harris ve své knize The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) tvrdí, že otázka morálních hodnot není ničím jiným než otázkou po blahu vědomých bytostí. Ve svém výkladu si Harris klade tři úkoly: etablovat etiku jakožto plně racionální a ideálně vědeckou disciplínu, posílit a obhájit naturalismus a ustanovit smysluplnost lidského života na nenáboženské bázi. Harrisova kniha se setkala s odmítnutím v odborných recenzích, avšak ne všechny kritiky jsou oprávněné a skutečný problém s Harrisovým přístupem podle mne leží jinde, než se kritici domnívají. Existují nejméně tři důvody, proč odmítnout Harrisovu koncepci morálky jakožto vědy. Prvním je konfuzní pojetí vědy, se kterým souvisí absence čehokoli vědeckého v Harrisově popisu etických problémů či jejich řešení. Druhý důvod je nekoherentní postup při výkladu původu hodnot. A konečně posledním důvodem k odmítnutí Harrisovy vize je podoba života, kterou nám nabízí jakožto výsledek přijetí etiky založené na vědě., Sam Harris in his book The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (2010) argues that the question of moral values is none other than the question of the happiness of conscious beings. In his account Harris sets himself three tasks: to establish ethics as a fully rational and purely scientific discipline, to reinforce and defend naturalism, and to rest the meaning of human life on a non-religious grounding. Harris’ book has met with a negative reaction in journal reviews, but not all the criticisms are justified and the real problem with Harris’ approach, in my view, is different to what his critics suppose. There are at least three reasons why we should reject Harris’ conception of morality as a science. The first is his confused conception of science which brings with it the absence of any scientific (on Harris’ understanding) ethical problems and of their solution. The second reason is an incoherent approach in his account of the origin of values. And finally, the last reason for rejecting Harris’ vision is the form of life which he offers us as the result of accepting ethics founded on science., Jakub Jirsa., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The theme of this article is the concept of community in the writings of Charles Taylor. It treats as its starting point both the significance attributed by him to this concept as well as his reluctance to being labelled a communitarian. The reconstruction of the concept is based on two of Taylor’s major works, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity and A Secular Age. In the former the focus is on the notion of moral space which is deployed in a critique of individualist ontology, but which does not lead him to claim that the community has some special status. The reconstruction of the latter book focuses on the description of developments leading to modern forms of sociality that have superseded previous forms of social organization that were based, to a large degree, on local communities. In conclusion, I describe Taylor’s normative concept of community which is an integral part of his vision of “fullness”, which transcends both individualism and the traditional, exclusive communities., Ondřej Štěch., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Tento diskusní příspěvek odpovídá na nedávné kritiky analytického pojmu mysli nabídnuté Tomášem Machulou a zpochybňuje jeho doporučení, abychom se vrátili k tomistickému pojetí racionální duše. Autor se snaží ukázat, že Machula ve svých kritikách jak Descartova pojmu mysli, tak současné analytické filosofie mysli přehlíží ústřední roli vědomí. Dále upozorňuje, že Machula při svém mapování současných teorií mysli opomíjí přístup teoretiků duálního atributu a že jeho kritice fyzikalismu, jakkoli může být účinně uplatňována proti teorii identity, se nedaří vyrovnat se s funkcionalismem, který je od 60. let 20. století nejrozšířenější formou fyzikalismu. Autor se také pokouší ukázat, že pojetí tomistické racionální duše – o nic méně než pojem karteziánské myslící substance – s sebou přináší závažné obtíže z hlediska vysvětlení lidské evoluce. V této souvislosti autor zpochybňuje Machulovo tvrzení, že tomistický pojem duše může být pochopen a oceněn nezávisle na teologickém rámci, ve kterém vznikl., This discussion piece responds to the recent criticisms of the analytical concept of mind offered by Tomáš Machula and questions his recommendation that we return to the Thomist concept of the rational soul. In particular, it is argued that Machula overlooks the central role of consciousness both in his criticisms of Descartes’ concept of the mind and of recent analytical philosophy of mind. In addition, it is argued that Machula ignores the work of dual-attribute theorists in his mapping of contemporary theories of mind, and that his critique of physicalism, while it may be effective against identity theory, fails to properly address functionalism, the most popular form of physicalism since the 1960s. It is also argued that the Thomist rational soul – no less than the Cartesian mental substance – creates serious difficulties for an account of human evolution. In this latter context doubt is raised about Machula’s claim that the Thomist concept of soul can be understood and appreciated independently of the theological framework in which it was developed., and James Hill.
In this study I devote my attention to the significance of the work of the Marquis de Sade in the field of political philosophy. The first part focuses on the definition of the basic principles of de Sade’s politically-orientated reflexion, examining above all the theory of the moral and affective solitude of the human being, and, derived from this, the relativism of all moral judgement. In the second part I indicate - primarily on the basis of the text Yet Another Effort, Frenchman, If You Would Become Republicans - the consequences that flow for human society from these basic postulates: the impossibility of making a social contract and the arbitrary division between sovereign individuals and victims. In the concluding part of the text I attempt to show the extent to which de Sade’s thought is relevant from a certain kind of contemporary political philosophy: I concentrate here on Balibar’s conception of “the inconvertibility of violence”; on Ogilvie’s concept of “man as a write-off”, and also on the concept of bio-power as it is formulated by Michel Foucault in The History of Sexuality, and later by Giorgio Agamben in Homo sacer., Josef Fulka., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
řednosti recenzované knihy jsou následující. Autor rozvíjí svou vlastní teorii a zaujímá kritický postoj k takovým autoritám politické filosofie, jakými jsou Rawls, Taylor či Honneth. Dále je to systematičnost výkladu. Tato studie se zaměřuje především na sporné body Hrubcova díla. Kritika je příliš vázána na pospolitost. V knize se objevuje komunitaristická tendence vzdálená tradici kritické teorie. Autor nepromýšlí vztah mezi pospolitostí a společností. Zásadním problémem je, že Marek Hrubec sice rozšiřuje zorné pole současné kritické teorie o témata první generace frankfurtské školy, např. o společenské struktury nebo obsahovou normativitu (spravedlivá a svobodná společnost), ale uchopuje je prostřednictvím Honnethovy a Taylorovy teorie uznání, která pro svůj formální charakter běží mimo ně. Tato témata tak zůstávají v teoretickém vakuu., The book under review has the following merits: the author develops his own theory and adopts a critical approach to such authorities in political philosophy as Rawls, Taylor, and Honneth; in addition the account given is systematic. This study concentrates primarily on the controversial points of Hrubec’s work. The critique is overly concerned with solidarity. In the book there are to be found communitarian tendencies that are foreign to the tradition of critical theory. The author has not thought through the relationship between solidarity and society. The basic problem is that Marek Hrubec, though he widens the view of contemporary critical theory so as to address themes in the first generation of the Frankfurt School, such as social structures and content normativity (a just and free society), understands these themes by means of Honneth’s and Taylor’s theory of recognition which, because of its formal character, is not relevant to them. These themes therefore remain in a theoretical vacuum., and Michael Hauser.