The Czech dissident movement included thinkers who searched for a morally pure, parallel polis, and who felt comfortable within its isolation. The philosophers of Charter 77 (Jan Patočka and Ladislav Hejdánek especially), by contrast, rejected the idea of being morally superior to their opponents. It is interesting to consider where Václav Havel stands at this crossroads. Havel very much cooperated with the above-mentioned philosophers and was inspired by them in his own writing and agency. On the other hand, Havel undoubtedly performed a certain moral-existential concept of dissent. In this paper I examine Havel’s existential concept. In particular, after distinguishing between two existential approaches in Havel’s writings, I analyse two fundamental philosophical critiques of Havel in the work of Ladislav Hejdánek. According to Hejdánek, Havel 1) identifies intellectuals with non-politicians, i.e. he is governed by the incorrect dualism of the political versus the non-political, and 2) is self-focused and moralising, i.e. he keeps too much within his own self (subjectivity) and “a given” (existent, objective) world. Given this critique, I will systematise Hejdánek’s objections and suggested solutions. In the first case, I see the solution in a more detailed distinction: we should distinguish between politics and non-politics (intellectuals) but also non-political politics. In the second case, we should look for the essence (focal point) of man not in his morality but outside it: man should orient himself “out of his self”.