Marián Zouhar in his article “Evidencia v analytickej filozofii” (“Self-Evidence in Analytical Philosophy”), published in the pages of this journal (Filosofický časopis, 62, 2014, No. 3, p. 323-375), points to reasons why we might call into doubt the self-evident status of intuitions in (analytical) philosophy. In this contribution I distinguish between diff erent theses that are the subject of M. Zouhar’s arguments. Since there are mutually non-equivalent claims at stake, it is only natural that arguments concerning them require the application of non-identical assumptions (premises). I attempt to show that (whether explicitly or implicitly) the assumptions of several arguments which M. Zouhar draws upon, are themselves problematic, or in certain cases require more clarification. Finally I point to the fact that the criteria of adequate richness, precision and transparency, which M. Zouhar applies to intuitions, are clearly not met by other kinds of givens which are standardly considered self-evident in philosophy and the methodology of science.