Laudanovým príspevkom do filozofie vedy bol jeho pokus odmietnuť hodnotiaci relativizmus zavedený do interpretácií vedeckej revolúcie. Usudzoval, že kľúčovým pre pochopenie vedeckého pokroku nie je približovanie sa k pravde, ale schopnosť teórie riešiť problémy. Preto Laudan navrhol svoj „retikulárny model“, v ktorom je napätie vznikajúce medzi teóriami, metodologickými pravidlami a kognitívnymi cieľmi udržované v dynamickej rovnováhe prostredníctvom pozvoľných a postupných krokov. Problémom tohto modeluje je, že vyžaduje kvalitatívno-kvantitatívne parametre hodnotenia, a pritom jasne neurčuje žiadnu hodnotiacu škálu takéhoto druhu. Retikulárny model teda neprináša efektívne prostriedky na rozlíšenie medzi prijateľným a neprijateľným vývojom vedy. Laudanova metodológia tak nie je normatívnou teóriou schopnou predpísať primerané hodnotiace kritériá v špecifickom kontexte a vymedziť presné podmienky zabezpečujúce vedecký pokrok., Laudan’s contribution to the philosophy of science was an attempt to reject the unacceptable evaluative relativism that had been introduced into the interpretation of the scientific revolution. He concludes that the key to understanding scientific progress is not as an approximation to truth but rather with reference to the problem-solving ability of theories. Therefore Laudan proposed his reticulational model in which the tension that arises among theories, methodological rules and cognitive aims is kept in dynamic equilibrium through a process of gradual, piecemeal adjustment. The problem is that the model is highly qualitative, yet it promises quantitative parameters of evaluation, and it is not clear how a comparative evaluative scale of this sort would be determined. Hence, though the reticulation model is valuable as a description of scientific evaluative practice, it does not provide an effective means for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable developments. It is inadequate as a normative theory that prescribes appropriate evaluative decisions in specific contexts., and Miroslav Karaba.
The basic aim of this study is to draw attention to certain inaccuracies in the recent discussion about evolutionary ontology. After a brief presentation of Šmajs’ theory, the author describes his standing in contemporary environmental thought and he classifies evolutionary ontology as “ecological ecocentrism”. In the second part he attempts to show that evolutionary ontology, in its character and claims, belongs to a different level of scientific knowledge than standard scientific theory pertaining to a limited sphere, and that therefore certain critical remarks pointing to its overly-broad range are misplaced. The conclusion of the study reminds the reader of the main controversial points of evolutionary ontology that give rise to discussion. The first of these is the paradox of unappreciated cultural information, the second is the above-mentioned “frozenness” of evolutionary ontological thought and the third is the attempt at a quick expansion of the ready evolutionary-ontological approach., Bohuslav Binka., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii