Afroaltica subaptera, a new genus and species of flea beetles (Chrysomelidae: Alticinae) from the eastern regions of southern Africa (Eastern Transvaal and Kwazulu-Natal), is described. Afroaltica gen. n. shows some similarities with the genus Dibolia Latreille, 1829 but it is easily distinguishable mainly by the simple-shaped apical spur of hind tibiae, not bifid. External habitus, scanning electronic micrographs of particular morphological features and line drawings of metafemoral spring and male and female genitalia of the new taxon are provided.
Based on the study of type material, two new genera of cestodes (Cyclophyllidea: Anoplocephalidae) are proposed for Paranoplocephala Lühe, 1910 sensu lato species from African rodents. Afrojoyeuxia gen. n., proposed for A. gundii (Joyeux, 1923) comb. n. from Ctenodactylus gundi (Rothmann) (Hystricomorpha: Ctenodactylidae), is characterized by a high length/width ratio of mature proglottids, longitudinally extensive testicular field positioned anterior to the female glands, an ovoid or subspherical cirrus-sac and a thick, conical cirrus. Hunkeleriella gen. n., proposed for H. dasymidis (Hunkeler, 1972) comb. n. from Dasymys incomtus (Sundevall) (Myomorpha: Muridae), differs from related genera mainly by its short (10-20 mm) and wide strobila and neck, unilateral genital pores (exceptionally with a few changes per strobila), the position of the genital pores (slightly anterior to the middle of proglottid margin) and initially tube-like early uterus (later reticulated). Parandrya Gulyaev et Chechulin, 1996, earlier suggested to be a junior synonym of Paranoplocephala, is considered to be a valid, independent genus. Evidence of non-monophyly and need for a taxonomic revision of Paranoplocephala sensu lato, as well as the phylogenetic position of A. gundii and H. dasymidis are discussed.
This paper reports the collecting of adult beetles and third-instar larvae of Coelocorynus desfontainei Antoine, 1999 in Cameroon and provides new data on the biology of this high-altitude Afromontane genus. It also presents the first diagnosis of this genus based on larval characters and examination of its systematic position in a phylogenetic context using 78 parsimony informative larval and adult characters. Based on the results of our analysis we (1) support the hypothesis that the tribe Trichiini is paraphyletic with respect to both Valgini and the rest of the Cetoniinae, and (2) propose that the Trichiini subtribe Cryptodontina, represented by Coelocorynus, is a sister group of the Valgini: Valgina, represented by Valgus. The larvae-only analyses were about twofold better than the adults-only analyses in providing a phylogenetic resolution consistent with the larvae + adults analyses. Only one of the ten clades was consistently supported by the analyses of both the larval and adult datasets, while the remaining nine were invariably strongly supported by one but not the other analysis, thus highlighting the importance of employing different data sources.
A new genus, Afromuelleria gen. n., assigned to the tribe Trachyphloeini Lacordaire, 1863, is described for four South African species of weevils: A. awelani sp. n., A. baobab sp. n., A. limpopo sp. n. and A. venda sp. n. All species are illustrated and keyed. Taxonomic status of the new genus is discussed and compared with similar genera of Trachyphloeini and Embrithini Marshall, 1942.
In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ''I'', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ (p. 98). I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ''Cartesian materialist'' sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word ''I'' or the concept i) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I ''as object'' and the use of I ''as subject''. I don’t argue directly for the ''two uses'' view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad (Wittgensteinian or ''Wittgensteinian'') argument for the ''only one use of I'' view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on ''corporism''-the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind., Ve své knize Jednotlivci PF Strawson píše, že ,,jak karteziánští, tak teoretici bez vlastnictví jsou naprosto špatní v držení, protože každý musí, že existují dvě použití,, I '', v jednom z nich označuje něco, co neoznačuje v ostatních “(str. 98). Naproti tomu si myslím, že existuje obranný ,,karteziánský materialistický'' smysl, který Strawson nemusí odmítat, ve kterém I (= df. Slovo ,,I'' nebo pojem i) lze a označuje dvě různé věci, a které není nic takového jako chybný Wittgensteinův rozdíl mezi použitím I 'jako objektu' a použitím I 'jako předmětu'. Nehledám však přímo na pohled ,,dvou použití''. Místo toho dělám nějaké přípravné práce. Nejprve kritizuji jeden špatný (Wittgensteinův nebo ,,Wittgensteinův'') argument pro ,,jediné použití I''. Pak nabízím fenomenologický popis našich každodenních zkušeností, které vedou k útoku na ,,korporismus'' - nadměrné zaměření na tělo v současné analytické filozofii mysli., and Galen Strawson