It is often supposed that linguistic, conceptual and, perhaps, other kinds of intuitions are one of the most important tools used to test theories in analytical philosophy. On this view, intuitions thought to be rich enough to be applicable to all the data the philosopher has used in formulating and testing her theory; but specific enough to enable one to choose between competing theories; and transparent enough to be clearly relevant for the theory. In the light of certain examples from epistemology and philosophy of language, it is claimed here that these requirements are not met. Consequently, evaluation of philosophical theories on the basis of intuitions leads to unreliable and problematic results., Marián Zouhar., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
This article examines Taylor’s approach to the conception of civil society and attempts to interpret the relation of this approach to contemporary debates on the forming of European civil society. By way of introduction, Taylor’s interpretation of the medieval socio-political assumptions for the creation of the extra-political public sphere is presented. Next, there is a discussion of Taylor’s interpretational conception of the two most significant traditions of civil society which take their rise from a confrontation with European enlightenment absolutism - the traditions of Locke and Montesquieu. The author attempts to make sense of the way in which Taylor’s approach resonates with the concept of civil society in discussions about the presuppositions and forms of the creation of the European public sphere and trans-national (European) identities as two key forms of European civil society. In conclusion, the concept of the active border is presented as a key matrix of the conceptual constellation of the public sphere, identity and Europeanisation., Karel B. Müller., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Článek reflektuje Hayekovy výklady o povaze pravidel. Ukazuje, že jeho pojetí pravidel je extrémně široké a vazba mezi pravidly a pravidelnostmi je nepřijatelně úzká. Následně je nastíněno alternativní - užší - vymezení pojmu pravidla. Nakonec je podrobeno kritice Hayekovo příliš úzké chápání pojmu normativních pravidel a je navrženo jeho širší vymezení., The article reflects on Hayek's expositions concerning the nature of rules. It shows that his conception of rules is extremely wide, and that the bond between rules and regularities is too tight. Subsequently an alternative - narrower - delineation of the concept of rule is proposed. In the last part of the paper Hayek's too narrow a conception of normative rules is subjected to criticism and a broader conception is proposed., and Vladimír Svoboda.
This review study analyses Martin Nitsche’s monograph devoted to Heidegger’s Contributions to philosophy (Beiträge zur Philosophie), primarily addressing the question of whether Nitsche succeeds in displaying the phenomenological character of the Contributions. It identifies a key step in Nitsche’s interpretation; that is, Heidegger’s shift from emphasising the specific entity of Dasein to emphasising the distinctive “phenomenological” or “relational field”, which is understood as an “ontological locality”. The study focuses on the question of whether it is possible, subsequent to this shift, to preserve the phenomenological character of (Heidegger’s) thought, and it arrives at a negative conclusion in this regard: Heidegger does not offer a phenomenological description - nay, he presents a conceptual, or perhaps even narrative, structure, in which he lays claim to the possibility of speaking from a principled position of (the experienced) “enowning”., Martin Ritter., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Poté co se logika ve dvacátém století podstatným způsobem opřela o matematiku (podobě jako některé další vědy), začala se objevovat i celá řada prací, které pod hlavičkou logika obsahují v podstatě matematiku. Začalo se hovořit o matematické logice (což bylo ovšem interpretováno různým způsobem, někdy právě jako označení jisté čistě matematické disciplíny vzešlé z logiky, jindy jako aplikace na základy matematiky a opět jindy jako logika provozovaná matematickými prostředky). Někteří filosofové, které zajímala logika, ale nijak specificky matematika, proto začalil razit termín filosofická logika, který měl znovu nastolit rovnováhu mezi filosofickým a matrmatickým aspektem logiky. Problém je ovšem v tom, že tento termín velice rychle získal celou plejádu různých významů, které zcela zatemňují to, co by se mělo pod jeho hlavičkou dělat; a v této situaci se navíc zcela na okraj logiky dostává to, co dává logice její raison d´etre a co ji stále ukotvuje v realitě - totiž zkoumání a kritické hodnocení pravidel, kterými se řídí naše argumentace a v jistém smyslu i naše usuzování. Domnívám se, že tuto situaci je třeba řešit tak, že si zopakujeme, co má být cílem logiky a uděláme si pořádek v tom, co z toho, co se dnes pod hlavičkou logika provozuje, je k tomuto cíli schopno nějak skutečně přispět., Since, in the twentieth century, logic has come to essentially rest upon mathematics (just like a lot of other sciences) there began to appear many works which, under the title ´logic´, contained what is basically mathematics. There emerged them term mathematical logic (which was however interpreted in various ways, sometimes precisely to indicate a certain purely mathematical discipline resulting from logic, sometimes as the application of logic to the foundations of mathematics and sometimes also as logic undertaken by mathematical means). Some philosophers interesed in logic, but not specifically in mathematics, therefore began to use the term philosophical logic as a way of reinstating a balance between the philosophical and mathematical aspects of logic. There is a problem however in that this term very quickly acquired a whole range of different meanings which have essentially blurred what should be done under this heading; and, moreover, this situation made the very raison d´etre of logic, which grounds it in reality - viz. examination and critical evaluation of the rules which govern our argumentation nad, in a certain sense, our reasoning -, move to a periphery of logic. This situation should be resolved, I belive, by our revisiting the question of what should be the aim of logic, and by clarifying to what extent that which goes under the title logic can really contribute to this aim., and Jaroslav Peregrin.