Kniha americké historičky Pauliny Brenové je podle recenzenta přesně tím příspěvkem k české historii ze zahraničí, který musíme co nejradostněji uvítat. Obsahuje mimořádně zajímavé postřehy, originální uchopení celého neotřelého tématu, načrtnuté komparace a analogie nejen se sovětskou realitou a děním v dalších zemích východního bloku, ale i s vývojem v západní Evropě a Spojených státech. Na české poměry stále poněkud neobvykle je studie psána spíš esejistickým stylem, bez mohutné deskriptivní zátěže s množstvím dat. Důraz je položen na jednotlivé myšlenky a zcela chybí pozitivisticky těžkopádná snaha o syntézu všech faktů a faktíků k danému značně širokému tématu. To pak umožňuje vytvořit plynulý a poměrně strhující obraz, který ovšem plně zapůsobí až v dialogu s aktivním čtenářem. Jde o knihu, která neuzavírá diskusi, ale naopak ji zahajuje. A právě takové knihy v české historiografii, zejména pro oblast soudobých dějin, neustále chybějí. Nicméně v některých dílčích otázkách obraz načrtnutý autorkou odpovídá realitě pouze částečně a někdy se s ní dokonce míjí. To se týká z neznalosti hlubšího kulturního pozadí určitých převzatých klišé nebo mylných interpretací, ale i řady faktografických chyb, které mohla odstranit překladatelka nebo redakce. and [autor recenze] Martin Franc.
The “corporeal turn” which has taken place in 20th century thought, is closely related with the discovery of corporeality as a key motive of philosophical ethics. The aim of the present paper is to present and compare two phenomenological contributions to „bodily ethics“ – the fi rst one consists in an ethical interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, while the second one is explicitly contained in the thought of E. Levinas. The starting point of our analysis is the conception of intersubjectivity which diff ers radically in the thought of the two philosophers. While Merleau-Ponty stresses especially the primordial inter-corporeal resonance and empathy between myself and the other, Levinas’ view is based on the idea of an irreducible alterity of the other, which makes him to consider the relation between myself and the other as essentially asymmetrical. We attempt to show that the relation between Levinas’ and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of intersubjectivity is far more complex than it seems and that in order to develop the moral phenomenology of corporeality in a productive way, it is necessary to overcome certain one-sidedness both in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty. This overcoming is unthinkable without taking over the most productive motives of both philosophers’ views of intersubjectivity and corporeality and „Die Wende zur Leiblichkeit“, die in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts stattfand, ist untrennbar mit der Entdeckung der Leiblichkeit als Schlüsselmotiv der philosophischen Ethik verbunden. Ziel der Studie ist es, zwei phänomenologische Beiträge zur „leiblichen Ethik“ vorzustellen und zu vergleichen – der erste steht im Zusammenhang mit der ethischen Interpretation der Philosophie M. Merleau-Pontys, während der zweite explizit im Denken von E. Levinas enthalten ist. Ausgangspunkt der Interpretation ist die Analyse der Auff assung der Intersubjektivität, in der sich beide Denker deutlich voneinander unterscheiden. Während Merleau-Ponty insbesondere die primäre inter-leibliche Resonanz und Empathie zwischen mir und dem Anderen betont, baut Levinas auf dem Gedanken der nicht reduzierbaren Andersheit des Anderen, wobei er die Beziehung zwischen mir und dem Anderen als wesenhaft asymmetrisch betrachtet. Die Studie versucht nachzuweisen, dass die Beziehung zwischen der Philosophie der Intersubjektivität von Levinas und Merleau-Ponty weitaus komplexer ist, als es auf den ersten Blick erscheint, und dass für die fruchtbare Entwicklung einer moralischen Philosophie der Leiblichkeit die Überwindung einer gewissen Einseitigkeit sowohl bei Levinas als auch bei Merleau-Ponty erforderlich ist, Hand in Hand mit einer Anknüpfung an Levinas und Merleau-Ponty hinsichtlich der tragenden Motive ihrer Gedanken zur Intersubjektivität und Leiblichkeit.
The problem of intersubjectivity has, in modern philosophy, been traditionally bound up with the so-called problem of other (human) minds. This present study attempts to show that phenomenological approaches to the problem of intersubjectivity overcome the traditional intellectualist and mentalistic conceptions of intersubjectivity, and further that in some of their many varieties, they provide a promising way of overcoming the anthropocentric framework of this problem. Posing the question of the sense and character of animal-bodily co-existence leads to a phenomenology that transcends the concept of intersubjectivity in favour of the concept of interanimality. It also leads to the discovery of the phenomenon of bodily co-existence which shows itself to be fundamental for, among other things, the clarification of intersubjectivity in the narrow sense of experience with an inner aspect of the life of others.
The article attempts to revive the conception of the body in Ludwig Feuerbach and the young Marx. The aim is to show that Feuerbach produced a concept of embodiment which is to be distinguished from its conception in psychoanalysis and in political thought (the body as the object of bio-power) which prevail in contemporary post-Marxist theory. The difference between these two conceptions can be expressed thus: the Feuerbachian and young-Marxian understanding corresponds to the concept sarx (the natural body), while its conception in post-Marxist thought corresponds to the concept sóma (the body symbolised).
Post-Marxist authors generally assume the correctness of Althusser’s rejection of this conception. It is for this reason that I examine Althusser’s critique of Feuerbach’s philosophy in its relation to the question of embodiment and I attempt to show that Althusser’s theory cannot comprehend Feuerbach’s most important discovery.
In the final part I deal with Feuerbach as the first thinker of non-identity (Adorno’s term) and I look at his reflections on death as the hidden background of his living and real body. The conclusion is that Feuerbach introduces a conception of embodiment which cannot be completely incorporated into cultural and bio-political practices.
This text aims to interpret human corporeal being as a part of the system of modern industrial civilization. The corporeality of human existence is explained in the context of its integration into the complex web of biological and cultural processes, by which it is shaped on the one hand and which it shapes on the other hand. Our situation in the world is primarily conditioned by our corporeal presence in it. But even as natural corporeal beings we are today part of an artificial space built by industrial technology. This space is called the technosphere in this text and is conceived as a global sphere, analogically to the atmosphere or biosphere. The technosphere covers all the planet in the same way as the biosphere does. As a product of natural corporeal beings, interwoven via their corporeality into the whole of planetary life, it is itself originally a product of the biosphere. Nevertheless it shows a very strong and clear tendency to rule it in a parasitic way. The notion of the technosphere is therefore formulated in this text as a hyperparasitical net with no stable power center and no plan or will to control life, but with the urge and need for self-sustainability common to all living systems. The text also explores the notion of corporeality as a fully integrated part of the technosphere, which is controlled and shaped by it (and shapes it) as its living source.