Assessment of ultimate aeroelastic response of slender facades equipped with thin plexiglass sheets. The wave approach is used for modeling of aeroelastic wind forcing. The analysis of structural response is based on the transient dynamics. Some theoretical approaches are specified with experimental verification in the wind canal. The comparison of numerical and experimental approaches is made in order to demonstrate the efficiency of the procedures suggested. and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The paper studies applications of C*-algebras in geometric topology. Namely, a covariant functor from the category of mapping tori to a category of AF-algebras is constructed; the functor takes continuous maps between such manifolds to stable homomorphisms between the corresponding AF-algebras. We use this functor to develop an obstruction theory for the torus bundles of dimension 2, 3 and 4. In conclusion, we consider two numerical examples illustrating our main results., Igor Nikolaev., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
In this paper it is proved that an abelian lattice ordered group which can be expressed as a nontrivial lexicographic product is never affine complete.
Let $\Delta $ and $H$ be a nonzero abelian linearly ordered group or a nonzero abelian lattice ordered group, respectively. In this paper we prove that the wreath product of $\Delta $ and $H$ fails to be affine complete.
Identities for the curvature tensor of the Levi-Cività connection on an almost para-cosymplectic manifold are proved. Elements of harmonic theory for almost product structures are given and a Bochner-type formula for the leaves of the canonical foliation is established.
Based on the study of type material, two new genera of cestodes (Cyclophyllidea: Anoplocephalidae) are proposed for Paranoplocephala Lühe, 1910 sensu lato species from African rodents. Afrojoyeuxia gen. n., proposed for A. gundii (Joyeux, 1923) comb. n. from Ctenodactylus gundi (Rothmann) (Hystricomorpha: Ctenodactylidae), is characterized by a high length/width ratio of mature proglottids, longitudinally extensive testicular field positioned anterior to the female glands, an ovoid or subspherical cirrus-sac and a thick, conical cirrus. Hunkeleriella gen. n., proposed for H. dasymidis (Hunkeler, 1972) comb. n. from Dasymys incomtus (Sundevall) (Myomorpha: Muridae), differs from related genera mainly by its short (10-20 mm) and wide strobila and neck, unilateral genital pores (exceptionally with a few changes per strobila), the position of the genital pores (slightly anterior to the middle of proglottid margin) and initially tube-like early uterus (later reticulated). Parandrya Gulyaev et Chechulin, 1996, earlier suggested to be a junior synonym of Paranoplocephala, is considered to be a valid, independent genus. Evidence of non-monophyly and need for a taxonomic revision of Paranoplocephala sensu lato, as well as the phylogenetic position of A. gundii and H. dasymidis are discussed.
In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that ‘both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of ''I'', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other’ (p. 98). I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible ''Cartesian materialist'' sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word ''I'' or the concept i) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I ''as object'' and the use of I ''as subject''. I don’t argue directly for the ''two uses'' view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad (Wittgensteinian or ''Wittgensteinian'') argument for the ''only one use of I'' view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on ''corporism''-the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind., Ve své knize Jednotlivci PF Strawson píše, že ,,jak karteziánští, tak teoretici bez vlastnictví jsou naprosto špatní v držení, protože každý musí, že existují dvě použití,, I '', v jednom z nich označuje něco, co neoznačuje v ostatních “(str. 98). Naproti tomu si myslím, že existuje obranný ,,karteziánský materialistický'' smysl, který Strawson nemusí odmítat, ve kterém I (= df. Slovo ,,I'' nebo pojem i) lze a označuje dvě různé věci, a které není nic takového jako chybný Wittgensteinův rozdíl mezi použitím I 'jako objektu' a použitím I 'jako předmětu'. Nehledám však přímo na pohled ,,dvou použití''. Místo toho dělám nějaké přípravné práce. Nejprve kritizuji jeden špatný (Wittgensteinův nebo ,,Wittgensteinův'') argument pro ,,jediné použití I''. Pak nabízím fenomenologický popis našich každodenních zkušeností, které vedou k útoku na ,,korporismus'' - nadměrné zaměření na tělo v současné analytické filozofii mysli., and Galen Strawson
In this paper, I combine an exposition of the historical development of sociology and the philosophy of science from the era of grand theories onwards, with an explication as to why the grand theories have failed. First, I trace some parallels in the history of each of the disciplines. After presenting their chronological development, I scrutinize the metatheoretical findings about the disciplines and examine the main ontological and epistemic reasons why attempts at these general theories or frameworks have not succeeded. Among them are the lack of a universal methodology and of a theoretical core, together with the impossibility of achieving a common objective view. On this basis I conclude that general theories or frameworks are not achievable in principle. As it turns out, however, some contemporary social theorists and philosophers still harbor hopes that they can be successfully formulated, or at the least do not rule out such a possibility. Thus, in closing, I argue that the critical points can also be applied to these latest attempts, as the call for grand theories or frameworks has never ceased and returns regularly with each new generation of social theorists and philosophers of science. and Tento článek kombinuje přehled historického vývoje sociologie a filosofie vědy od období „velkých“ teorií s výkladem toho, proč tyto teorie selhaly. V první části sleduji historické paralely v obou těchto disciplínách. Po představení jejich chronologického vývoje analyzuji metateoretické závěry, které z toho vyplývají, a zkoumám hlavní epistemické a ontologické důvody, proč neuspěly – mezi nimi chybějící univerzální metodologii a teoretické jádro i nemožnost dosažení objektivního náhledu. Z toho vyvozuji závěr, že velké teorie nejsou principiálně zkonstruovatelné. Ukazuje se nicméně, že některé současní sociální teoretici i filosofové vědy stále doufají, že takové teorie nebo rámce mohou být úspěšně formulovány, nebo přinejmenším takovou možnost nevylučují. V závěru argumentuji, že kritika vznesená vůči těmto dřívějším teoriím může být uplatněna i na tyto aktuální pokusy. Ukazuje se totiž, že volání po těchto teoriích a rámcích nikdy úplně nepřestalo a opakuje se s každou novou generací sociálních vědců a filosofů vědy.