Investigation of the interactions between submerged vegetation patch and flow structure is of crucial importance for river engineering. Most of hydraulic models have been presented for fully developed flows over uniform vegetation in the laboratory conditions; however, the mentioned interactions are complex in river flows where the flow is not developed along small patch. This reveals a gap between developed and non-developed flow along the vegetation patch. This study was conducted in a gravel-bed river in the central Iran. The results reveal that the flow structure in
evolving flow (non-developed flow) along the patch resembles that in shallow mixing layer. Accordingly, a shallow mixing layer model and modified equations are combined to quantify evolving area along the patch. The evolving shallow mixing layer equations for the flow along a non-uniform vegetation patch reach a reasonable agreement with field data. However, the spreading coefficient of this model less than one was reported in literature, 0.06 and 0.12. In addition, the flow immediately downstream the vegetation patch behaves similar to a jet and is parameterized by two conventional
models, conventional logarithmic law and mixing layer theory. These models present a reasonable agreement with the
measured velocity profiles immediately downstream the patch.
Jerry Fodor’s causal theory of content is a well-known naturalistic attempt purporting to show that Brentano was wrong in supposing that physical states cannot possess meaning and reference. Fodor’s theory contains two crucial elements: one is a notion of ''asymmetric dependence between nomic relations'', and the other is an assumption about the nature of the ''causally operative properties'' involved in the causation of mental tokens. Having dealt elsewhere with the problems Fodor’s notion of asymmetric dependence poses, we show in this paper a difficulty with the other element of his theory concerning what kinds of properties are the causally operative ones in the tokenings of a semantic symbol in the brain of a perceiver. After presenting this difficulty, we examine three possible responses a Fodorian might make to our criticism., Kauzální teorie obsahu Jerryho Fodora je známým naturalistickým pokusem, který ukazuje, že Brentano se mýlil v domněnce, že fyzické stavy nemohou mít smysl a odkaz. Fodorova teorie obsahuje dva klíčové elementy: jeden je představa o ''asymetrické závislosti mezi nomic vztahy'', a jiný je předpoklad o povaze ''kauzálně operativních vlastností'' zahrnutý v příčině duševních tokenů. Když jsme se zabývali problémy s Fodorovým pojetím asymetrické závislosti, ukázali jsme v tomto článku problém s dalším prvkem jeho teorie týkajícím se toho, jaké vlastnosti jsou kauzálně operativní v tokenech sémantického symbolu v mozku vnímatele. . Poté, co představíme tento problém, zkoumáme tři možné reakce, které by Fodorian mohl učinit pro naši kritiku., and Tevfik Aytekin ; Erdinç Sayan
We contend that since what is true cannot be false, foreknowledge is transparently incompatible with free will. We argue that what is crucial to the conflict is the role of truth in foreknowledge and that the identity of the one who foreknows is irrelevant., Tvrdíme, že vzhledem k tomu, že to, co je pravdivé, nemůže být falešné, je předzvěst transparentně neslučitelná se svobodnou vůlí. Tvrdíme, že rozhodující pro konflikt je role pravdy v předzvědomí a že identita toho, kdo předvídá, je irelevantní., and Alex Blum
Ice jams in rivers often arise from the movement of frazil ice as cover-load under ice cover, a process which is conceptually similar to the movement of sediment as bed-load along a river bed. The formation and movement of an iceaccumulation wave is one facet of a larger class of cover-load movements. The movement of an ice-accumulation wave obviously plays a crucial role in the overall process of ice accumulation. In the present study, experiments under different flow and ice conditions help reveal the mechanics of formation and evolution of ice-accumulation waves. In particular, suitable criteria for formation of an ice-accumulation wave are investigated along with the resulting speed of wave propagation. The transport capacity of frazil ice under waved accumulation is modeled by comparing those of experiments collected in laboratories, and the resulting equation is shown to be in good agreement with measured experimental results.
In this paper I argue that the idiosyncrasy of linguistic competence fosters semantic conceptions in which meanings are taken for granted, such as the one that Quine calls ''uncritical semantics'' or ''the myth of the museum''. This is due to the degree of automaticity in the use of language which is needed for fluent conversation. Indeed, fluent conversation requires that we speakers instinctively associate each word or sentence with its meaning (or linguistic use), and instinctively resort to the conceptual repertoire of our language, without calling into question that the meaning of a particular word, or the conceptual repertoire of our language, could have been different than they are. This habit of taking meanings for granted, inherent to our linguistic ability, sometimes interferes with our semantic research, hampering it. In order to illustrate this problem, I pinpoint four places in Quine’s work where, despite his acknowledged analytical rigour, and despite his congenital aversion to the habit of taking meanings for granted, he himself appears to slip into this habit, inadvertently., V tomto příspěvku tvrdím, že idiosynkrace jazykové kompetence podporuje sémantické koncepty, ve kterých jsou významy považovány za samozřejmost, jako je ta, kterou Quine nazývá ,,nekritickou sémantikou'' nebo ,,mýtem muzea''. To je způsobeno stupněm automatiky při používání jazyka, který je nezbytný pro plynulou konverzaci. Plynulá konverzace vyžaduje, abychom my, mluvčí, instinktivně sdružovali každé slovo nebo větu s jeho významem (nebo lingvistickým použitím) a instinktivně se uchylovali k konceptuálnímu repertoáru našeho jazyka, aniž bychom zpochybňovali, že význam určitého slova nebo konceptuálního repertoáru našeho jazyka, mohlo být jiné než oni. Tento zvyk brát významy za samozřejmé, vlastní naší jazykové schopnosti, někdy se střetává s naším sémantickým výzkumem a brání tomu., and Gustavo Picazo