Language: Slovak - LINDAT/CLARIAH-CZ Catalog Search Results

Start Over Language Slovak Date Unknown

1851. Franz Karmasin :

Creator:: Hruboň, Anton,
Type:: text and literatura faktu
Subject:: Dějiny Česka a Slovenska, Karmasin, Franz,, Němci slovenští, Němci karpatští, Slovenský štát, vztahy slovensko-německé, Slovensko 1939-1945, and politické dějiny, politici
Language:: Slovak
Rights:: unknown

1852. Franz Urban :

Creator:: Takácsová, Ivana
Type:: text and studie
Subject:: Malířství, Urban, František,, grafici, malíři, Československo 1918-1992, malířství, malíři, and české země 1848-1918
Language:: Slovak
Description:: Franz Urban (1894-1959). Nicht ausreichend bekannter Künstler aus dem Schönberger Gebiet (1894-1959).
Rights:: unknown

1853. Freedom, power and causation

Creator:: Pink, Thomas
Format:: bez média and svazek
Type:: model:article and TEXT
Subject:: causation, chance, compatibilism, freedom, Hobbes, Hume, incompatibilism, law of nature, power, reason, scepticism, Suarez, příčina, šance, kompatibilismus, svoboda, nekompatibilita, právo přírody, napájení, důvod, skepticismus, and Suarez.
Language:: Slovak
Description:: Freedom or control of how we act is often and very naturally understood as a kind of power-a power to determine for ourselves how we act. Is freedom conceived as such a power possible, and what kind of power must it be? The paper argues that power takes many forms, of which ordinary causation is only one; and that if freedom is indeed a kind of power, it cannot be ordinary causation. Scepticism about the reality of freedom as a power can take two forms. One, found in Hume, now often referred to as the Mind argument, assumes incompatibilism, and concludes from incompatibilism that freedom cannot exist, as indistinguishable from chance. But another scepticism, found in Hobbes, does not assume incompatibilism, but assumes rather that the only possible form of power in nature is ordinary causation, concluding that freedom cannot for this reason exist as a form of power. This scepticism is more profound-it is in fact presupposed by Hume’s scepticism-and far more interesting, just because freedom cannot plausibly be modelled as ordinary causation., Svoboda nebo kontrola toho, jak jednáme, je často a velmi přirozeně chápána jako druh moci - moc určovat si, jak jedeme. Je svoboda koncipována jako taková moc a jaká moc musí být? Příspěvek tvrdí, že moc má mnoho podob, z nichž obyčejná příčina je pouze jedna; a že pokud je svoboda skutečně určitým druhem moci, nemůže to být obyčejná příčina. Skepticismus o realitě svobody jako moci může mít dvě podoby. Jeden, nalezený v Hume, nyní často odkazoval se na jako myslargument, předpokládá neslučitelnost, a uzavře z neslučitelnosti že svoboda nemůže existovat, jak nerozeznatelný od šance. Ale další skepticismus, nalezený v Hobbes, nepředpokládá nekompatibilitu, ale předpokládá spíše to, že jedinou možnou formou moci v přírodě je obyčejná příčinná souvislost, závěr, že svoboda nemůže z tohoto důvodu existovat jako forma moci. Tento skepticismus je hlubší - ve skutečnosti je předpokládán Humeovým skepticismem - a mnohem zajímavějším, protože svoboda nemůže být věrohodně modelována jako obyčejná příčina., and Thomas Pink
Rights:: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public

1854. Frege on identity and co-reference

Creator:: Corazza, Eros
Format:: bez média and svazek
Type:: model:article and TEXT
Subject:: Frege, Perry, and identity co-reference
Language:: Slovak
Description:: In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.
Rights:: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ and policy:public

1855. Frege’s antipsychologism: some clarifications

Creator:: Hanzel, Igor
Format:: bez média and svazek
Type:: model:article and TEXT
Subject:: antipsychologism, Frege, H. von Helmholtz, J. Habermas, J. Müller, Kant, lifeworld, logic, and physiological psychology
Language:: Slovak
Description:: The paper aims at a clarification of Frege’s antipsychologism. It analyses Frege’s putting into opposition of logic/mathematics and psychology. It then investigates the historical roots of Frege’s views in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and in J. Müller’s and H. von Helmholtz’s physiological psychology. It explicates also how the opposition between Frege’s (third) realm of thoughts and that of representations is rooted in the opposition of a transcendentally understood subject (consciousness) and a naturalistic understanding of an empirical subject (consciousness), as well as its implications in the philosophy of logical positivism/empiricism. Finally, by drawing on Habermas’ linguistico-pragmatically grounded understanding of the lifeworld it shows how that opposition can be overcome and how to understand Frege’s realm of thoughts, Příspěvek se zaměřuje na objasnění Fregeho antipsychologismu. Analyzuje Fregeho uvedení do opozice logiky / matematiky a psychologie. To pak zkoumá historické kořeny Fregeových pohledů v Kantově kritice čistého rozumua v fyziologické psychologii J. Müllera a H. von Helmholtze. Vysvětluje také, jak je opozice mezi Fregeho (třetí) říší myšlenek a reprezentací zakořeněna v opozici transcendentálně chápaného subjektu (vědomí) a naturalistického chápání empirického subjektu (vědomí), jakož i jeho důsledků v filosofie logického pozitivismu / empirismu. Konečně tím, že čerpáme z Habermasova lingvisticko-pragmaticky zakotveného chápání života, ukazuje, jak lze tuto opozici překonat a jak pochopit Fregeovu říši myšlenek., and Igor Hanzel
Rights:: http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public

1856. Fregean monism: a solution to the puzzle of material constitution

Creator:: Wong, Soo Lam
Format:: bez média and svazek
Type:: model:article and TEXT
Subject:: constitution, Fregean, identity, monism, pluralism, reference, and sense
Language:: Slovak
Description:: The puzzle of material constitution can be expressed in at least two ways. First, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are materially and spatially coincident, be regarded as different objects? Second, how can the constituting object and the constituted object, which are qualitatively distinct, be regarded as identical objects? Monists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are identical since they are materially and spatially coincident and the property differences between then are simply differences in description, perspective or context. In contrast, pluralists argue that the constituting and constituted objects are not identical even if they are materially and spatially coincident since they are qualitatively distinct. This paper proposes a solution to the puzzle of material constitution called ‘Fregean Monism’ (FM), and shows that it can better account for the property differences between the constituting and constituted objects without the need to regard them as two distinct objects. On the FM view, the puzzle of material constitution is partly a semantic puzzle and partly a metaphysical puzzle, and shows how a solution to the semantic part of the puzzle, based on the Fregean distinction between sense and reference, can yield a satisfactory solution to the metaphysical part of the puzzle. The key idea is that while the reference of a term picks out both the referent object and referent properties, the sense of the term determine which referent properties are picked out.
Rights:: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ and policy:public