Laudanovým príspevkom do filozofie vedy bol jeho pokus odmietnuť hodnotiaci relativizmus zavedený do interpretácií vedeckej revolúcie. Usudzoval, že kľúčovým pre pochopenie vedeckého pokroku nie je približovanie sa k pravde, ale schopnosť teórie riešiť problémy. Preto Laudan navrhol svoj „retikulárny model“, v ktorom je napätie vznikajúce medzi teóriami, metodologickými pravidlami a kognitívnymi cieľmi udržované v dynamickej rovnováhe prostredníctvom pozvoľných a postupných krokov. Problémom tohto modeluje je, že vyžaduje kvalitatívno-kvantitatívne parametre hodnotenia, a pritom jasne neurčuje žiadnu hodnotiacu škálu takéhoto druhu. Retikulárny model teda neprináša efektívne prostriedky na rozlíšenie medzi prijateľným a neprijateľným vývojom vedy. Laudanova metodológia tak nie je normatívnou teóriou schopnou predpísať primerané hodnotiace kritériá v špecifickom kontexte a vymedziť presné podmienky zabezpečujúce vedecký pokrok., Laudan’s contribution to the philosophy of science was an attempt to reject the unacceptable evaluative relativism that had been introduced into the interpretation of the scientific revolution. He concludes that the key to understanding scientific progress is not as an approximation to truth but rather with reference to the problem-solving ability of theories. Therefore Laudan proposed his reticulational model in which the tension that arises among theories, methodological rules and cognitive aims is kept in dynamic equilibrium through a process of gradual, piecemeal adjustment. The problem is that the model is highly qualitative, yet it promises quantitative parameters of evaluation, and it is not clear how a comparative evaluative scale of this sort would be determined. Hence, though the reticulation model is valuable as a description of scientific evaluative practice, it does not provide an effective means for distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable developments. It is inadequate as a normative theory that prescribes appropriate evaluative decisions in specific contexts., and Miroslav Karaba.
This review article focuses on two aspects of Lévi-Strauss’ ex change theory: temporal dimension and gender. First, we examine its diachronic dimension to argue that Lévi-Strauss’ exchange theory is far from being static. Its primary interest is evolutionary, regardless of how much Lévi-Strauss distances himself from evolutionism of the 19th century as a paradigm. His analyses of kinship that attempt to identify elementary structures are meant to shed light on the origins of human culture. Although Lévi-Strauss uses different methodology than other scholars interested in socio-cultural evolution, his treatment of the term homology, discussions of primatology and origins of culture suggest his deep interest in long-term process. Second, we examine the critiques of Lévi-Strauss’ analytical treatment of women as passive objects of exchange among men. Through the discussion of feminine agency, personhood, sexuality, and other forms of exchange of human beings, we argue that Lévi-Strauss’ exchange of women has to be understood in its historical context. He grants only limited agency to women but his approach is definitely not based on commodification of women. In contrast, the relational nature of persons as signs refutes such logic. We conclude that Lévi-Strauss is still a source of inspiration for anthropology regardless of the decades of post-structuralist criticism. and Daniel Sosna, Jitka Kotalová.