The topic of the presented text is an examination of the relationship between the philosophy of individuation, as elaborated by Gilbert Simondon and later Gilles Deleuze, and the traditional philosophical issue of the individual and the world, which is exemplified by Kantian philosophy. Simondon attempts to elaborate a philosophy of the individual and individuation which departs from the idea of a priori forms of knowledge, and makes use of the concept of the “pre-individual” as a “proto-ontic dimension” as the real totalities defining the potentials of the individual. In so doing, Simondon embarks on a path that ushers in the philosophical programme which Deleuze would attempt to fulfil: in contrast to Kant, who attempts to stipulate the conditions of possible experience, Deleuze - following Simondon, but also Bergson - sets as his objective to define the conditions of real experience, above all in the book Difference and Repetition (Différence et répétition). The paper concludes by suggesting what consequences this reformulation of the issue of the individual and experience has for Deleuze’s interpretation of the concept of difference and intensity., Nicolas Dittmar., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Cieľom tejto štúdie je vyvrátiť časté a stále sa objavujúce kritické námietky voči temer štyri dekády starému Singerovmu antidruhistickému argumentu, ktoré sú založené predovšetkým na jeho nepochopení. Nepochopený je nielen samotný argument, ale aj Singerovo metodologické východisko, ktoré sme nazvali „Singerova etická britva“. V práci ukazujeme, prečo nie je možné zamietnuť Singerov utilitaristický argument len preto, že odmietame utilitarizmus en bloc. Rovnako tak ukazujeme, prečo nie je namieste obviňovať Singera z toho, že nerozšíril svoju etiku aj na rastliny a neživú prírodu. Opak je pravdou, pretože Singer jasne demonštruje, ako môže byť environmentálna etika vzťahujúca sa na ochranu divočiny založena na tom istom princípe rovnakého zvažovania záujmov, vďaka ktorému je druhizmus morálne neprijateľný., The aim of this study is to refute the frequent and repeated critical objections to Singer’s almost four-decades-old argument against speciesism. These objections are based, above all, on misunderstanding. There is misunderstanding not only of the argument itself, but also of Singer’s methodological starting point, which we have termed “Singer’s ethical razor”. In the text we show why it is not possible to reject Singer’s utilitarian argument only by rejecting utilitarianism en bloc. In the same way, we show why it is not appropriate to charge Singer with failing to extend his ethics to include plants and lifeless nature. In fact the opposite is true because Singer clearly demonstrates how environmental ethics relating to the protection of the wild can be based on the same principle of the equal consideration of interests which is the basis for the moral unacceptability of speciesism., and Peter Sýkora.
The revival of Pyrrhonian scepticism in European thought of the seventeenth century had a significant influence not only on the further development of epistemology, but also on the sphere of theology. Sceptical denial of the legitimacy of rational judgement affected even the legitimacy of traditional arguments for God’s existence. The attempt to “save God” led to fideism in which faith is transferred to the sphere of inner experience, and is fraught with mystery. One of the main propagators of Pyrrhonism, and representatives of the fideistic turn, was Montaigne. What about Hume? Do we not find a similar strategy here too? After all, Hume accepted the irresolvability of epistemological scepticism by rational means, and he founded the positive structure of knowledge on human nature instead. Analogically, he might be inclined to go for the opposite pole of religious scepticism by endorsing the private faith of the heart, and he might perhaps even recognise this as a natural need in human life. The author, in her investigation of these questions, treats above all of Hume’s Dialogues and she arrives at the conclusion that Hume - in contrast to his predecessor Bayle - is perfectly devoted to an enlightened world where religion, especially in its fideistic form, belongs to the old times of “darkness”. It may be replaced, though, by the almost secular true religion practiced in an enlightened community., Zuzana Parusniková., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Téma smrti, neustále se vracející v mnoha Marcelových esejích, je tu těsněji spjato – jak to již ohlašuje sám název – s nadějí. Podle toho, zda akcentuje Marcel vztah k vlastní smrti či ke smrti blízké osoby, lze rozlišit i jistou modifikaci: naléhavěji pociťuje neklid právě v souvislosti s odchodem blízké bytosti než v souvislosti se svou vlastní smrtí. Takto se pro Marcela odvíjejí jeho meditace o smrti kolem osy Já-ty a intersubjektivita, jež je vlastně láskou, zakládá možnost hovořit tu o jakékoli naději. Právě kontinuita bytí je založena na intersubjektivitě: jejím základem nejsou lidské bytosti jako souhrny biologických procesů, ale jich vzájemný vztah, jenž nedovolí, aby smrt měla definitivní a poslední slovo. Marcel tu navazuje na svá dřívější zkoumání, v nichž se vyslovil pro „vtělené bytí“. Jeho základem je vztah k lidskému tělu nikoli jako k objektu, ale jako k subjektu, který jako tělo blízké osoby nemůže být nějaké „ono“, ale pouze „Ty“. Na tom Marcel zakládá vztah k blízké osobě, jež je láskou oblativní, nikoli majetnickou, tíhnoucí k pocitu vlastnění., The theme of death, which continually reappears in many of Marcel’s essays, is here connected – as the title already declares – with hope. Depending on whether Marcel focuses on the relation to his own death or to the death of a person near to him, we can distinguish a certain modification: he feels the most acute uneasiness to the departing of a near one rather than to his own death. Thus his meditations on death unfold around the axis of I-thou, and intersubjectivity (which is really love) grounds, for Marcel, the very possibility of speaking here of a kind of hope. The very continuity of being is grounded on intersubjectivity insofar as its basis is not human beings as summaries of biological processes, but for whom a mutual relation does not allow death to have the definitive and final word. Reference is made here to our previous enquiry into the body which called for “embodied being” and for the relation to body not as an object, but as a subject which, as the body of a person near to us, cannot be an “it”, but only a “Thou”. This is the basis for a relation to a person near to us which is dedicated lovingly, and not in the proprietorial spirit of ownership., Gabriel Marcel., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Cílem textu je na základě poznatků a zjištění sociologů kultury (převážně Pierra Bourdieuho) rekonstruovat a kriticky promyslet základní výhrady vůči filosofické estetice: estetický historismus a estetický skepticismus. Estetický historismus konfrontuje filosofickou estetiku na metodologické rovině, protože zpochybňuje možnost vymezit pojem estetična nezávisle na historicky podmíněné estetické teorii, resp. normativních rozhodnutích, co budeme pokládat za relevantní součást estetické zkušenosti. Estetický skepticismus uvádí v pochybnost tradiční představu o autonomii estetické hodnoty a objektivitě estetického hodnocení. Tato pozice je v textu rozpracována na příkladu sociologické kritiky názorů analytického estetika Franka Sibleyho na logicko-sémantický status estetických pojmů. V závěrečné části textu jsou pojednány důsledky, jež ze sociologické kritiky vyplývají pro estetickou axiologii a uměleckou kritiku., The aim of the text is to reconstruct and critically consider, on the basis of the findings of sociologists of culture (above all Pierre Bourdieu), the fundamental objections to philosophical aesthetics – aesthetic historicism and aesthetic scepticism. Aesthetic historicism confronts philosophical aesthetics at the methodological level by questioning the possibility of defining the concept of the aesthetic independently of a historically-conditioned aesthetic theory, or rather of normative decisions to be treated as a relevant part of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic scepticism calls into doubt the traditional conception of the autonomy of aesthetic values and of the objectivity of aesthetic evaluation. This position is elaborated in the text by reference to the example of the sociological critique of the opinions of the analytical aesthetician Frank Sibley on the logico-semantic status of aesthetic concepts. The concluding part of the text discusses the consequences that follow from the sociological critique for aesthetic axiology and for art criticism., and Pavel Zahrádka.