Nash equilibria in a class of Markov stopping games

Title:

Nash equilibria in a class of Markov stopping games

Creator:

Cavazos-Cadena, Rolando and Hernández-Hernández, Daniel

Identifier:

https://cdk.lib.cas.cz/client/handle/uuid:8f89ae33-8af4-4f1a-a283-c1b2ada4007e
uuid:8f89ae33-8af4-4f1a-a283-c1b2ada4007e

Subject:

zero-sum stopping game, equality of the upper and lower value functions, contractive operator, hitting time, and stationary strategy

Type:

model:article and TEXT

Format:

bez média and svazek

Description:

This work concerns a class of discrete-time, zero-sum games with two players and Markov transitions on a denumerable space. At each decision time player II can stop the system paying a terminal reward to player I and, if the system is no halted, player I selects an action to drive the system and receives a running reward from player II. Measuring the performance of a pair of decision strategies by the total expected discounted reward, under standard continuity-compactness conditions it is shown that this stopping game has a value function which is characterized by an equilibrium equation, and such a result is used to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Also, the method of successive approximations is used to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the game.

Language:

English

Rights:

http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/
policy:public

Coverage:

[1027]-1044

Source:

Kybernetika | 2012 Volume:48 | Number:5

Harvested from:

CDK

Metadata only:

false