Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange problem

Title:

Pareto optimality in the kidney exchange problem

Creator:

Borbeľová, Viera and Cechlárová, Katarína

Identifier:

https://cdk.lib.cas.cz/client/handle/uuid:ec47c2ac-742a-4224-895f-e29fe9d74216
uuid:ec47c2ac-742a-4224-895f-e29fe9d74216

Subject:

barter exchange, kidney transplantation, Pareto optimality, and NP-completeness

Type:

model:article and TEXT

Format:

bez média and svazek

Description:

To overcome the shortage of cadaveric kidneys available for transplantation, several countries organize systematic kidney exchange programs. The kidney exchange problem can be modelled as a cooperative game between incompatible patient-donor pairs whose solutions are permutations of players representing cyclic donations. We show that the problems to decide whether a given permutation is not (weakly) Pareto optimal are NP-complete.

Language:

English

Rights:

http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/
policy:public

Coverage:

[373]-384

Source:

Kybernetika | 2008 Volume:44 | Number:3

Harvested from:

CDK

Metadata only:

false