We consider a convexity notion for complex spaces X with respect to a holomorphic line bundle L over X. This definition has been introduced by Grauert and, when L is analytically trivial, we recover the standard holomorphic convexity. In this circle of ideas, we prove the counterpart of the classical Remmert’s reduction result for holomorphically convex spaces. In the same vein, we show that if H0(X,L) separates each point of X, then X can be realized as a Riemann domain over the complex projective space Pn, where n is the complex dimension of X and L is the pull-back of O(1)., Viorel Vâjâitu., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant’s metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejects the foundations of Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a species of psychology. His argument against Kant’s conception of subject, or of the ''I'', can be found in his conception of person. A closer scrutiny of this conception of Strawson can, however, reveal that it is not comprehensive enough compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understands the part of being ''I'' which can be known via self-knowledge but he fails to appreciate the second part of being ''I'', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson’s conception with Kant’s conception of being ''I'' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson’s purpose, Kant’s version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity., Strawson vyvinul svou deskriptivní metafyziku v úzkém vztahu s Kantovou metafyzikou zkušenosti, kterou lze chápat jako konkrétní verzi popisné metafyziky. Současně Strawson odmítá základy Kantovy verze popisné metafyziky, která je podle něj druhem psychologie. Jeho argument proti Kantově pojetí předmětu nebo ,,já'' lze nalézt v jeho pojetí člověka. Bližší zkoumání této koncepce společnosti Strawson však může odhalit, že není dostatečně komplexní ve srovnání s Kantem. Když mluvíme s Kantem, Strawson chápe, že je to část ,,já'', kterou lze poznat skrze sebepoznání, ale nedokáže ocenit druhou část bytí ,,Já'', totiž sebeuvědomění., and Jan Kuneš