1. Power analysis of voting by count and account
- Creator:
- Hirokawa, Midori and Vlach, Milan
- Format:
- bez média and svazek
- Type:
- model:article and TEXT
- Subject:
- cooperative games, voting, and power indices
- Language:
- English
- Description:
- Using players' Shapley-Shubik power indices, Peleg [4] proved that voting by count and account is more egalitarian than voting by account. In this paper, we show that a stronger shift in power takes place when the voting power of players is measured by their Shapley-Shubik indices. Moreover, we prove that analogous power shifts also occur with respect to the absolute Banzhaf and the absolute Johnston power indices.
- Rights:
- http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/mark/1.0/ and policy:public