Appeals of philosophers to look for new concepts in sciences are being met with a weak response. Limited attention is paid to the relation between synthetic and analytic approach in solving problems of biology. An attempt is presented to open a discussion on a possible role of holism. The term “life manifestations” is used in accordance with phenomenology. Multicellular creatures maintain milieu intérieur to keep an aqueous milieu intracellulair in order to transform the energy of nutrients into the form utilizable for driving cellular life manifestations. Milieu intérieur enables to integrate this kind of manifestations into life manifestations of the whole multicellular creatures. The integration depends on a uniqueness and uniformity of the genome of cells, on their mutual recognition and adherence. The processes of ontogenetic development represent the natural mode of integration of cellular life manifestations. Functional systems of multicellular creatures are being established by organization of integrable cells using a wide range of developmental processes. Starting from the zygote division the new being displays all properties of a whole creature, although its life manifestations vary. Therefore, the whole organism is not only more than its parts, as supposed by holism, but also more than developmental stages of its life manifestations. Implicitly, the units of whole multicellular creature are rather molecular and developmental events than the cells per se. Holism, taking in mind the existence of molecular and space-time biology, could become a guide in looking for a new mode of the combination of analytical and synthetic reasoning in biology., J. Křeček., and Obsahuje bibliografii a bibliografické odkazy
We deployed branch traps in an ash (Fraxinus) plantation to investigate how Agrilus planipennis behavior is associated with Fraxinus pennsylvanica condition and dispersal patterns. Data were collected from traps with or without the presence of beetle visual decoys, and from a yearly survey of exit holes. The traps were placed on trees that were either clearly declining, with most foliage arising from epicormic sprouting, or on apparently healthy trees, with little evidence of damage or decline. We calculated correlations of exit holes among neighboring tree rings and also between exit holes and male trap captures. The damaged trees the traps were hung upon had more cumulative exit holes observed than the corresponding healthy trees. However, there was otherwise no evidence that the experiment was biased by differences in exit hole patterns of the surrounding trees. Male captures were greater on decoy-baited traps than controls and this decoy effect was most clearly apparent late in the season when traps were placed on healthy trees. There were also patterns of correlations between male captures and exit hole numbers that may be indicative of short-range mate finding-and dispersal behaviors. Female captures were sparser, but were positively affected by decoys on healthy and declining trees early in the season. Thus, the results suggest that the placement of such traps on healthier trees will maximize detection, and the branch traps also show promise for further use in dispersal studies., Michael J. Domingue, Jennifer Berkebile, Kim Steiner, Loyal P. Hall, Kevin R. Cloonan, David Lance, Thomas C. Baker., and Obsahuje bibliografii
Práce se zabývá filosofi ckou analýzou vědeckého výzkumu, kterou v polovině minulého století provedla botanička Agnes Arberová. Její koncepce je cenným příspěvkem k otázce kontextu vzniku vědeckého objevu a procesu jeho zdůvodnění v biologických disciplínách. Ve stati se pokusím doložit, že její úvahy mají ráz v zásadě fenomenologický, a proto bude její koncepce interpretována na pozadí úvah Maurice Merleau-Pontyho o tělesné povaze smyslů. Taková interpretace napovídá, že Arberová ve shodě s Merleau-Pontym (při užití odlišné terminologie) uvažuje o fenoménech nikoli jako o objektech, které lze zkoumat odděleně, nýbrž nám představuje fenomenální pole, v němž se fenomény vyjevují v souvislosti s předcházející zkušeností. Orientace v předmětu výzkumu lze vnímat jako otázku rovnováhy, jíž badatel výzkumem aktivně vyhledává. and Th e study refl ects the philosophical analysis of scientifi c research carried out by the botanist Agnes Arber in the 1950s. Her concept entails a valuable contribution to the question of the context of scientifi c discovery and the process of its rationalization in biological disciplines. I will try to show that her considerations are fundamentally phenomenological, and thus the comparison with the thoughts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the topic of corporeal nature of senses is useful. Such an interpretation suggests that Arber, similarly to Merleau-Ponty (though using diff erent terminology), considers phenomena not as objects that can be examined separately, but as representing a phenomenal fi eld in which phenomena arise in the context of past experience. According to her, the orientation in the subject of a study is a question of equilibrium, which a researcher actively seeks.
The work tackles the question of wheter, and in what sense, Patočka's phenomenology is first philosophy and strict science. It does this by considering the problem ot the relationship of phenomenology, as a doctrine about appearing, to epistomology and to ontology. After an analysis of the conceptation of phenomenology which Patočka works with his dissertation and habilitation on the natural world, the study moves on to Patočka's late thinking, especially to the conception of an "asubjective phenomenology". The interpretation distinguishes various phenomenological approaches which are intertwined in the project of asubjective phenomenology, and its points to their weak points. Finally it identifies an acceptable conception of phenomenology in that which is presented in Patočka's lecture cycle Tělo, společenství, svět (Body, Community, Language, World). and Martin Ritter.
Tento článek se zabývá problémem žití (Leben) v Husserlových analýzách vnitřního časového vědomí. To, že se v těchto analýzách motiv života objevuje jenom sporadicky, nijak nesnižuje jeho důležitost. Život se stává problémem s ohledem na svébytné intence souvislosti (Zusammenhangsintentionen). V článku se autor snaží vyjasnit způsob, jakým se tyto intence podílejí na vzájemné konstituci jednoty vnitřního vědomí času a časového vědomí. V závěru studie pak interpretace několika textových pasáží poukazuje na souvislost těchto analýz s dalším Husserlovým myšlenkovým vývojem., The present article deals with the issue of life (Leben) in Husserl’s analyses of the consciousness of internal time. The fact that in these analyses the motif of life appears only sporadically does not diminish its importance. Life becomes an issue with regard to the intentions aimed at the context (Zusammenhangsintentionen). We try to clarify how these intentions participate in the mutual constitution of the unity of consciousness of internal time. In conclusion, we interpret some later texts to provide the reader with an understanding of Husserl’s late analyses of living with regard to the previous analysis of the consciousness of internal time., and Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit dem Problem des Lebens in Husserls Analysen des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Die Tatsache, dass das Motiv des Lebens in diesen Analysen eher sporadisch auftaucht, tut dessen Wichtigkeit keinen Abbruch. Das Leben wird im Hinblick auf die eigenständigen Zusammenhangsintentionen zu einem Problem. Im Artikel versucht der Autor zu erläutern, wie diese Intentionen an der wechselseitigen Konstitution der Einheit des inneren Zeitbewusstseins und des Zeitbewusstseins beteiligt sind. Zum Abschluss der Studie verweist der Autor in einer Interpretation mehrerer Textpassagen auf den Zusammenhang dieser Analysen mit der weiteren Entwicklung Husserls.
Fenomén sdílené pozornosti je podle interpretace Tomasellovy evolučně-antropologické školy jedním z hlavních klíčů k pochopení rozdílu mezi člověkem a ostatními živočichy. Tato koncepce nachází silnou odezvu v některých současných filosofických pokusech o reflexi diference mezi člověkem a zvířetem. Článek upozorňuje na radikálně odlišnou empirickou teorii, vycházející z nejnovějších poznatků na poli komparativní psychologie a etologie primátů, podle které lze všechny aspekty fenoménu sdílené pozornosti najít i u našich nejbližších zvířecích příbuzných. Z provedené úvahy vyplývá, že chce-li filosofie smysluplně přispět k aktuální interdisciplinární debatě o povaze vztahu mezi člověkem a zvířetem, měla by tak činit informovaně a s (minimálně) základním přehledem o nejnovějším stavu empirického výzkumu., The phenomenon of joint attention is, on the interpretation of Tomasello’s evolutionary-anthropological school, one of the main keys to the understanding of the distinction between man and other animals. This conception has had a strong influence on some contemporary philosophical attempts to capture the difference between man and animal. The article draws attention to radically different empirical theory that is arising from the latest discoveries in the field of comparative psychology and the ethology of primates which show that all the aspects of joint attention can be found in our closest animal relations. From the considerations presented it follows that if philosophy wishes to meaningfully contribute to actual interdisciplinary debate about the nature of the relation between man and animal, it should conduct itself in an informed way and with, at least, a basic grounding in the latest state of empirical research., Petr Urban., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Fenomenologie není pouze specifi cká metoda filosofi ckého zkoumání, ale též svébytná fi losofi cká pozice. Husserl je znám a diskutován spíše jako autor právě zmíněné metody, ovšem ta přeci měla sloužit jakožto organon pro vytvoření samostatné fi losofi cké nauky. Proto se bude v příspěvku věnovat pozornost Husserlovu chápání toho, co je to filosofi e, a to v kontrastu proti dobově populárním fi losofi ckým pozicím, jimiž byly naturalismus a fi losofi e světového názoru s jeho nejodpudivější podobou nazývanou Husserlem pejorativně „Tiefsinn“: důvtipná duchaplnost. Husserl zamýšlí odstranit oba zmíněné typy fi losofi e skutečně přísně vědeckou fi losofi í, jež bude fi losofi í fenomenologickou. and Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientifi c philosophy. Th is may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another “brand” of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called ‘Tiefsinn’. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientifi c philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.