The aim of the article is to interpret Heidegger’s theory of understanding as a specific contribution to the investigation of human action. First, Heidegger’s notion of understanding as practical copying is explained and is distinguished from the analytic theory of action based on the concept of intention. Second, the possibility of grasping intentional action as an answer to the situation of disturbed understanding is analysed against the background of Heidegger’s concept of the worldliness of the world. The article attempts to supplement Heidegger’s conception. The genesis of intentional action may be sought in the notion of the identity of self-understanding that is grounded in Dasein’s elaboration of the overall interpretation of the world and in Dasein’s explicit reflexion of the possibilities of his or her own existence. In this context, the relationship between the analysis of action and the lifeworld concept is outlined and it is stressed that theoretical reflection may play an important role in deliberation over possibilities of action. At the end of the article, Gadamer’s concepts of dialogue and play are employed to highlight some conditions that result from social dimension of action and restrict the formulation of intentions. The article approaches Heidegger’s notion of understanding in an unorthodox way: through a hermeneutical dialogue with different interpretative and philosophical positions., Martin Ďurďovič., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii