The work tackles the question of wheter, and in what sense, Patočka's phenomenology is first philosophy and strict science. It does this by considering the problem ot the relationship of phenomenology, as a doctrine about appearing, to epistomology and to ontology. After an analysis of the conceptation of phenomenology which Patočka works with his dissertation and habilitation on the natural world, the study moves on to Patočka's late thinking, especially to the conception of an "asubjective phenomenology". The interpretation distinguishes various phenomenological approaches which are intertwined in the project of asubjective phenomenology, and its points to their weak points. Finally it identifies an acceptable conception of phenomenology in that which is presented in Patočka's lecture cycle Tělo, společenství, svět (Body, Community, Language, World). and Martin Ritter.
Jan Patočka, a disciple of Husserl and Heidegger, was the most eminent Czech philosopher of the 20th century. The article focuses on his concept of practical philosophy, which is seen as a constitutive force in European modernity. As such it has critical, dynamic, and stabilising effects. In this sense it is always closely related to politics and can both motivate social change and legitimise stable political orders. The consequences of this are demonstrated in liberalism and socialism as the two major projects of modern thought.
The study raises the question of the sustainability of Husserl’s early theory of linguistic meaning. In order to answer it, the text presents Husserl’s theory of linguistic meaning as it is found in his Logical Investigations and discusses a serious problem which follows from Husserl’s own presuppositions. This problem involves the question of the expressibility of the quality of the intentional essence of the act –“quality” being Husserl’s term roughly corresponding to the later and more common concept of propositional attitude. The study argues for the lack of theoretical means sufficient for the expression of the quality as well as for the fact that the expressibility of the quality is presupposed in the meaning of the linguistic expressions used in the solitary life of the speaker.
Tento článek se zabývá problémem žití (Leben) v Husserlových analýzách vnitřního časového vědomí. To, že se v těchto analýzách motiv života objevuje jenom sporadicky, nijak nesnižuje jeho důležitost. Život se stává problémem s ohledem na svébytné intence souvislosti (Zusammenhangsintentionen). V článku se autor snaží vyjasnit způsob, jakým se tyto intence podílejí na vzájemné konstituci jednoty vnitřního vědomí času a časového vědomí. V závěru studie pak interpretace několika textových pasáží poukazuje na souvislost těchto analýz s dalším Husserlovým myšlenkovým vývojem., The present article deals with the issue of life (Leben) in Husserl’s analyses of the consciousness of internal time. The fact that in these analyses the motif of life appears only sporadically does not diminish its importance. Life becomes an issue with regard to the intentions aimed at the context (Zusammenhangsintentionen). We try to clarify how these intentions participate in the mutual constitution of the unity of consciousness of internal time. In conclusion, we interpret some later texts to provide the reader with an understanding of Husserl’s late analyses of living with regard to the previous analysis of the consciousness of internal time., and Der vorliegende Artikel befasst sich mit dem Problem des Lebens in Husserls Analysen des inneren Zeitbewusstseins. Die Tatsache, dass das Motiv des Lebens in diesen Analysen eher sporadisch auftaucht, tut dessen Wichtigkeit keinen Abbruch. Das Leben wird im Hinblick auf die eigenständigen Zusammenhangsintentionen zu einem Problem. Im Artikel versucht der Autor zu erläutern, wie diese Intentionen an der wechselseitigen Konstitution der Einheit des inneren Zeitbewusstseins und des Zeitbewusstseins beteiligt sind. Zum Abschluss der Studie verweist der Autor in einer Interpretation mehrerer Textpassagen auf den Zusammenhang dieser Analysen mit der weiteren Entwicklung Husserls.
The aim of the article is to interpret Heidegger’s theory of understanding as a specific contribution to the investigation of human action. First, Heidegger’s notion of understanding as practical copying is explained and is distinguished from the analytic theory of action based on the concept of intention. Second, the possibility of grasping intentional action as an answer to the situation of disturbed understanding is analysed against the background of Heidegger’s concept of the worldliness of the world. The article attempts to supplement Heidegger’s conception. The genesis of intentional action may be sought in the notion of the identity of self-understanding that is grounded in Dasein’s elaboration of the overall interpretation of the world and in Dasein’s explicit reflexion of the possibilities of his or her own existence. In this context, the relationship between the analysis of action and the lifeworld concept is outlined and it is stressed that theoretical reflection may play an important role in deliberation over possibilities of action. At the end of the article, Gadamer’s concepts of dialogue and play are employed to highlight some conditions that result from social dimension of action and restrict the formulation of intentions. The article approaches Heidegger’s notion of understanding in an unorthodox way: through a hermeneutical dialogue with different interpretative and philosophical positions., Martin Ďurďovič., and Obsahuje poznámky a bibliografii
Fenomén sdílené pozornosti je podle interpretace Tomasellovy evolučně-antropologické školy jedním z hlavních klíčů k pochopení rozdílu mezi člověkem a ostatními živočichy. Tato koncepce nachází silnou odezvu v některých současných filosofických pokusech o reflexi diference mezi člověkem a zvířetem. Článek upozorňuje na radikálně odlišnou empirickou teorii, vycházející z nejnovějších poznatků na poli komparativní psychologie a etologie primátů, podle které lze všechny aspekty fenoménu sdílené pozornosti najít i u našich nejbližších zvířecích příbuzných. Z provedené úvahy vyplývá, že chce-li filosofie smysluplně přispět k aktuální interdisciplinární debatě o povaze vztahu mezi člověkem a zvířetem, měla by tak činit informovaně a s (minimálně) základním přehledem o nejnovějším stavu empirického výzkumu., The phenomenon of joint attention is, on the interpretation of Tomasello’s evolutionary-anthropological school, one of the main keys to the understanding of the distinction between man and other animals. This conception has had a strong influence on some contemporary philosophical attempts to capture the difference between man and animal. The article draws attention to radically different empirical theory that is arising from the latest discoveries in the field of comparative psychology and the ethology of primates which show that all the aspects of joint attention can be found in our closest animal relations. From the considerations presented it follows that if philosophy wishes to meaningfully contribute to actual interdisciplinary debate about the nature of the relation between man and animal, it should conduct itself in an informed way and with, at least, a basic grounding in the latest state of empirical research., Petr Urban., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
Fenomenologie není pouze specifi cká metoda filosofi ckého zkoumání, ale též svébytná fi losofi cká pozice. Husserl je znám a diskutován spíše jako autor právě zmíněné metody, ovšem ta přeci měla sloužit jakožto organon pro vytvoření samostatné fi losofi cké nauky. Proto se bude v příspěvku věnovat pozornost Husserlovu chápání toho, co je to filosofi e, a to v kontrastu proti dobově populárním fi losofi ckým pozicím, jimiž byly naturalismus a fi losofi e světového názoru s jeho nejodpudivější podobou nazývanou Husserlem pejorativně „Tiefsinn“: důvtipná duchaplnost. Husserl zamýšlí odstranit oba zmíněné typy fi losofi e skutečně přísně vědeckou fi losofi í, jež bude fi losofi í fenomenologickou. and Since phenomenology isn’t just a method of philosophical research but also a genuine philosophical stance, Husserl discusses in his famous article Philosophy as a Strict Science from 1910/11 at least three notions of philosophy to demonstrate, what should be considered solely as a scientifi c philosophy. Th is may only be his phenomenological philosophy, which Husserl contrasts against both in his time most popular philosophical positions, i.e. the naturalism, and the philosophy of world view. But there is also another “brand” of philosophy that’s being mentioned in his article: the so called ‘Tiefsinn’. Is it a fourth notion of philosophy, or just the extreme derivation from the “world view”? Not only shall our article answer that question, but also demonstrate Husserl’s conception of a phenomenological philosophy being a strict scientifi c philosophy in contrast to naturalism as well as the world view.