This study on Alois Klar (1763-1833) focuses mainly on his achievements as a pedagogue and his work for the visually impaired. Methodologically, it draws on Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Michel Foucault, enabling us to view the evolution of social care as a concomitant of the emerging modern state and integral to its structure. The study presents an analysis of the beginnings of Klar’s Prague institute for the visually impaired against a background of rapid changes in medicine, the scope of the state, and educational thinking. At a time of compulsory school attendance and new approaches to education, when the state demanded the active participation of its subjects/citizens in propagating its aims and the values of society as a whole, the blind and partially sighted were given access to a full and systematic education. We also present data concerning Klar’s educational work and thinking (he taught in Litoměřice and at Prague University), and examine the internal workings of the newly established institute - one of the first of its kind in Europe - and its contacts with the medical discourse of the emerging science of ophthalmology., Marek Fapšo., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
In the independent Czechoslovak Republic, President Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk played a profound role in influencing Musil´s important decisions and subsequent actions, even though their political and social opinions differed. Musil, at that time a student of theology, met Masaryk in 1889 in Turčiansky Sväty Martin in Slovakia. He recalled Masaryk´s emphasis on the necessity of having strong personal convictions when studying. Musil gave an inaugural lecture, How did I get to know the Orient, on 11th February 1920.In the auditorium, journalists and politicians were present, headed by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edvard Beneš. Musil´s plans for Czech Oriental studies were not only scientific and cultural, but also political and economic. Musil believed that for the newborn Czechoslovakian state the Orient could act as a substitues for colonies, since it could supply the country with raw materials in exchange for various products, and it could also offer its countrymen profitable employment opportunities. According to him, the government needed to systematically arouse interest in the Orient in Czechoslovakia and vice-versa, and also to use cultural links as the starting point for the establishment of active economic relations. Therefore, he believed it should be a national aim to establish an Oriental library, a school of living languages and a large Oriental institute. In 1920, based on Masaryk´s wishes, Musil began preparations for a great journey leading from Northern Africa to Southwest Asia, where he hoped to promote the political and economic interests of Czechoslovakia. The journey was postponed on several occasions and, in the end, never took place., Pavel Žďárský., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
The article presents visualization options for archaeological sites employing a manual GPS receiver and a methodology for creating maps on the basis of surface finds using the MapSource program. Sophisticated analytical databases make it possible to examine the distribution and spatial relationships of different types of archaeological finds. Spatial data from the analytical database of MapSource were treated using open source statistical package R., Martin Kuča, Petr Matějec, Lubomír Prokeš., and Obsahuje seznam literatury
When spectators see a baroque play staged with use of period means of expression, they often appreciate fine form, but lack emotions. Dealing with Jesuit school plays from the first half of the 18th century, whose theme is true friendship, this article illustrates that baroque drama actually combines stylized form and strong emotions. It was also the main aim of baroque theatre: to transfer the emotions through this form., Magdaléna Jacková., and Obsahuje bibliografické odkazy
V této obsáhlé studii, rozdělené do dvou částí, autor sleduje, jak se do zahraniční politiky Spojených států amerických promítalo poučení z následků Mnichovské dohody ze září 1938, na jejímž základě bylo Československo nuceno odstoupit nacistickému Německu pohraniční území s většinou německého obyvatelstva. V první části studie, založené na publikovaných i nepublikovaných dokumentech z amerických archivů, je téma zpracováno pro období od konce třicátých let do vypuknutí korejského konfliktu (ten je obsahem druhé části, která bude otištěna v příštím čísle časopisu). Autor zachycuje bezprostřední americké reakce na vpád severokorejských vojsk do Jižní Koreje v červnu 1950 a poté se vrací do podzimu 1938, aby verifikoval hypotézu, že za nezvyklou jednotou těchto reakcí byl zažitý odmítavý postoj Spojených států k politice appeasementu. Na americké politice i veřejném diskurzu ukazuje, že od konce třicátých let v nich zůstávaly pojmy Mnichov a appeasement natrvalo spjaty, a přibližuje proměny tohoto vnímání za druhé světové války, po jejím skončení a v počátcích války studené. „Poučení z Mnichova“ se podle autora napájelo z idealistického i pragmatického zdroje americké politiky, neboť vycházelo z přesvědčení, že appeasement je jednak nemravný, jednak se nevyplácí. Zatímco v Rooseveltově politice bylo toto obecné poučení namířeno proti Hitlerově expanzi, jeho nástupce v prezidentském úřadě Harry S. Truman je navzdory vlastní zdrženlivosti musel v konfrontaci se Stalinovými poválečnými kroky začít uplatňovat vůči dosavadnímu válečnému spojenci, Sovětskému svazu. Důležitými událostmi na této cestě byl komunistický převrat v Československu v únoru 1948 a blokáda západních sektorů Berlína od léta téhož roku., In this extensive article, divided into two parts, the author traces how the lessons of the Munich Agreement of September 1938 (on the basis of which Czechoslovakia was forced to cede the predominantly ethnic-German Sudetenland to Nazi Germany) were projected into US foreign policy. In Part One of the essay, based on published sources and unpublished documents from American archives, the topic is covered from the late 1930s to the outbreak of the Korean War (which is discussed in Part Two, to be published in the next issue of Soudobé dějiny). The author looks at immediate American reaction to the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950, and then returns to autumn 1938 to test his hypothesis that behind the unusual unity of this reaction was the ingrained negative attitude of the United States to the policy of appeasement. He demonstrates that since the late 1930s the terms ‘Munich’ and ‘appeasement’ have remained forever linked in US policy and US public discourse, and he discusses the transformations of the perception of the two concepts during the Second World War, after the war, and at the beginning of the Cold War. The lessons of Munich, he argues, have drawn on the idealistic as well as the pragmatic sources of US policy, because they stem from the conviction that appeasement is immoral and does not pay. Whereas in Roosevelt’s policy the general lesson was not to allow Hitler’s expansion, Harry S. Truman, Roosevelt’s successor in the White House, had to use the lessons, despite his own self-restraint, to try to counter the steps of a wartime ally, Stalin’s Soviet Union. The Communist take-over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the blockade of the western sectors of Berlin beginning in the summer of that year were important events on this path., and Petr Mareš.
a1_V první části této rozsáhlé studie, která vyšla v minulém dvojčísle Soudobých dějin (roč. 22, č. 1-2/2015, s. 9-29), autor sledoval, jak se poučení z chyb appeasementu, spojovaného s uzavřením Mnichovské dohody na podzim 1938, promítalo v americké zahraniční politice během druhé světové války a na počátku války studené. Ve druhé části na základě poznatků z publikovaných i nepublikovaných amerických pramenů zkoumá vliv daného faktoru na postup Spojených států v korejské válce na počátku padesátých let. Ukazuje, že rozhodnutí Trumanovy administrativy podstatně zasáhnout do tohoto konfliktu bylo přímým důsledkem odmítavého postoje k politice usmiřování agresora, který v té době sdílela v USA politická veřejnost bez ohledu na stranickou příslušnost a politické sympatie. Argumenty založené na odmítání appeasementu však záhy začali využívat republikáni jako munici v předvolebním boji proti vládnoucím demokratům a staly se také předmětem sporu v souvislosti s volbou strategie na korejském bojišti po vstupu čínských jednotek do války. Zatímco Bílý dům se chtěl vyhnout neomezenému konfliktu s Čínou, vrchní velitel vojsk OSN v Koreji generál Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964) zastával nekompromisní postup a fakticky přestal respektovat prezidentovu autoritu. Po svém odvolání z funkce se stal hlavním kritikem Trumanovy politiky a hrdinou republikánské opozice, která na jaře 1951 prosadila slyšení k okolnostem jeho suspendování před zvláštním výborem Senátu., a2_Autor podrobně přibližuje tento mimořádný vnitropolitický střet v poválečných amerických dějinách, který se měl stát triumfem MacArthurovy obžaloby, ale postupně se změnil v její debakl, mimo jiné v důsledku přesvědčivých vystoupení ministrů zahraničí a obrany Deana Achesona (1893-1971) a George C. Marshalla (1880-1959). V závěru autor ukazuje, jak se k „poučení z Mnichova“ vraceli další američtí prezidenti, a konstatuje, že se stalo trvajícím politickým odkazem Harryho S. Trumana (1884-1972) a jako takové pevně zakořenilo v americkém politickém diskurzu., b1_In Part 1 of this article, published in the last issue of Soudobé dějiny (vol. 22, 2015, nos. 1-2, pp. 9-29), the author discusses how the lessons from the mistakes of appeasement, including the signing of the Munich Agreement in autumn 1938, were projected in US foreign policy during the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War. In Part 2, based on published and unpublished American sources, he considers the influence of this factor on the US approach taken in the Korean War in the early 1950s. He seeks to demonstrate that the decision of the Truman Administration to substantially intervene in this conflict was a direct consequence of the negative attitude to the policy of appeasing an aggressor. This attitude was also shared by the American public, regardless of party affiliation and political sympathies. Arguments based on the rejection of appeasement, however, soon began to be used by the Republicans as ammunition in the election campaign against the incumbent Democrats and the choice of strategy also became a matter of dispute in the choice of strategy on the Korean battlefield after China entered the war. Whereas the White House wished to avoid an unlimited conflict with China, the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nation Command in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964), was in favour of an uncompromising approach and in fact ceased to obey President Harry S. Truman (1884-1972). After being relieved of his command by Truman, MacArthur became the chief critic of his policies and a hero of Truman’s Republican opponents. In spring 1951, the Republicans organized a special Senate committee hearing on the circumstances of MacArthur’s suspension., b2_The author looks in detail at this exceptional clash in post-war US domestic politics, which was meant to be triumphantly used against MacArthur, but gradually changed into a debacle in consequence of, among other things, the compelling testimonies of Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893-1971) and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall (1880-1959). In his conclusion, the author seeks to demonstrate how other US presidents returned to the ‘lessons of Munich’, and he argues that these lessons became Truman’s lasting political legacy and as such became firmly rooted in American political discourse., and Petr Mareš.
Americký diplomat Paul Hacker podle recenzenta významně přispěl k dosud nepočetným diplomatickým memoárům o Československu po pádu komunistického režimu (původní vydání: Slovakia on the Road to Independence: An American Diplomat’s Eyewitness Account. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press 2010). Hacker od podzimu 1990 do konce roku 1992 vedl nově zřízený americký generální konzulát v Bratislavě, který se poté se vznikem Slovenské republiky stal velvyslanectvím. Jeho vzpomínky pojednávají zejména o Slovensku v posledních letech československé federace, o jeho cestě k samostatnosti a prvních krocích jako suverénního státu. Události přitom nahlíží ze slovenské perspektivy, zatímco pohled český či československý téměř absentuje. Recenzent komentuje například jeho líčení dělení společného státu, odstíněný portrét slovenského premiéra Vladimíra Mečiara nebo aféru s objevenými odposlechy na bratislavském generálním konzulátu., The book under review is a Slovak translation of Paul Hacker´s Slovakia on the road to independence: An American diplomat´s eyewitness account (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). With this book, Hacker has made an important contribution to the small number of memoirs by diplomats which discuss Czechoslovakia after the collapse of the Communist regime. Hacker, from autumn 1990 to late 1992, was in charge of the newly established US consulate in Bratislava, and, after the creation of the Slovak Republic, became the US ambassador to that country. His memoirs discuss Slovakia particularly in the last years of the Czechoslovak federation, its road to independence, and its first steps as a sovereign state. He looks at events from the Slovak perspective, almost completely ignoring the Czech and Czechoslovak. The reviewer notes, for example, Hacker´s depiction of the division of the federation, his sketch of the Slovak premier, Vladimír Mečiar (b. 1942), and the affair over the discovery of the wiretapping of the US consulate general in Bratislava., [autor recenze] Tomáš Zahradníček., and Obsahuje bibliografii a bibliografické odkazy
1_ Analysis of chipped stone industry from Kopčany and Brehov (Slovakia). The fl ake stone assemblages (and other assemblages) which were discovered during the excavation of two archaeological sites in Eastern Slovakia – Zemplínske Kopčany and Brehov were analysed. Seventeen stone artefacts were found in object No. 24A-D/1974 at Zemplínske Kopčany. Obsidian stone, which is a local raw material, occurs at a higher frequency than imported raw materials – Jurassic fl int “G” and basalt. With the exception of two blanks (cores), the assemblage consists of fi nished tools, most of which were made on blades. Other tools present include two fl ake scrapers and a blunt drill made of Jurassic fl int “G”. One obsidian core is lightly reduced and the second obsidian core has a pyramidal shape. The remainder of the Zemplínske Kopčany assemblage includes ten fi nished products made of local (sedimentary rocks) and imported raw material (amphibolite?). Whetstones are most common and axes are less numerous. The assemblage also includes a wedge, a fragment of an axe-hammer, a globular pestle and conical byproducts from axe-hammer production., 2_ Local raw materials were used at Brehov. The local obsidian dominates and other stone materials are present in small proportions. The typological character of the fl ake industries is also different. Flakes account for 68 % of the artefacts and blades 25 %. Specifi c artefacts are the „łuszcznie“ (“Splitter” in German) though to have been used as chisels or cutting tools. The cores are very small and lightly reduced. One pebble with negative scars and one drill (borer) are also present. Other artefacts include a shaft of a fl at axe made of local hornstone and a fragment of an unfi nished granodiorite axe-hammer with a hole drilled in the middle (possibly originating from the High Tatras?). The analyzed assemblages are compared with assemblages from other Baden Culture sites in Slovakia and in particular to those from the Malopolskie Voivodship. The analyzed artefacts from Zemplínske Kopčany and Brehov correspond to two phases in the development of the Baden Culture. The older phase has stronger affi nities to the Funnel Beaker Culture, and in the case of the Brehov site, to a younger phase, which is parallel with the Pleszow-Zesławice group in the Malopolskie Voivodship., Marián Soják., and Obsahuje seznam literaruty