On a common formulation, rationalist infallibilism is committed to two main theses: (i) ''analytic a priori infallibilism'' and (ii) ''synthetic a priori infallibilism''. According to thesis (i), a relatively wide range of analytic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. According to thesis (ii), a relatively wide range of synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. In this paper, I focus on rationalist infallibilism’s second main thesis, what is being called ''synthetic a priori infallibilism''. I argue that synthetic a priori infallibilism, and by extension rationalist infallibilism, is untenable. In particular, exploring what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, I reject the infallible justification of propositions about the self., Na společné formulaci se racionalistický infallibilismus věnuje dvěma hlavním tezím: (i) ,,analytický a priori infallibilismus'' a (ii) ,,syntetický a priori infallibilismus''. Podle teze (i) lze poměrně široký rozsah analytických a priori návrhů neomylně odůvodnit. Podle teze (ii) lze poměrně široce rozšířit řadu syntetických a priori návrhů. V této práci se zaměřuji na druhou hlavní tezi racionalistického infallibilismu, která se nazývá ,,syntetický a priori infallibilismus''. Argumentuji, že syntetický a priori infallibilismus a rozšířený racionalistický infallibilismus je neudržitelný. Zejména zkoumáním toho, co se zdá být jediným potenciálně pravděpodobným druhem syntetické a priori neomylnosti, odmítám neomylné ospravedlnění výroků o sobě., and Glen Hoffmann
In this text we aim to analyze the Cartesian motifs in the “early” period of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Our goal is to explore whether Levinas’s Cartesianism is merely a singular phenomenon, or if it can be set into the wider current of “phenomenologi-cal Cartesianism”. In order to confirm the second possibility, it seems that we must reconstruct the motifs, continuing in Descartes’s specific line of argumentation, which we can directly designate as the “Cartesian way”. These Cartesian motifs can be found in Levinas’s wider context of the issue of subjectivity, and it is these deliberations that form the structure in which the famous formulation of the definition of infinity is made. The first text in which we attempt to identify this general structure that Des-cartes provides for Levinas’s thought and the function that it fulfills in it is Description of Existence. The second motif is Cartesian subjectivity in the book Existence and Existents.